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Abstract 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) is a term used in many industries to describe a 
company that produces parts and equipment that may be marketed by another manufacturer. In 
the aviation industry, the aircraft engine OEM refers to the company that manufactures engines 
powering the aircraft. The OEM manufactures the engine, defines the required maintenance to 
operate the engines, and recommends product modifications. Product modifications are 
recommended to improve product safety, durability, reliability, and cost of ownership and are 
formally communicated through issuance of service bulletins. Properly performing the required 
maintenance and adopting service bulletins is an important element of maintaining a high 
standard regarding safety performance. The aircraft engine OEM is the source of knowledge 
regarding how to properly and effectively perform standard maintenance tasks. The OEM also 
has information related to service bulletins that is critical to properly assess and adopt service 
bulletins. This study identifies the critical elements of engagement between aircraft engine 
OEMs and airlines during two processes. The first process studied was the adoption of service 
bulletins and included how the airline becomes aware of a service bulletin, how they assess the 
need to perform the service bulletin, and finally how the airline prepares and executes on the 
adoption of the service bulletin. The OEM engagement was identified and analyzed during each 
phase of this process. The second process studied was how the airline identifies when they need 
support from the OEM to properly complete required maintenance and inspection tasks. OEM 
engagement was identified and analyzed during this process. Critical elements required for 
effective and efficient engagement identified in this study are then compared to existing 
literature on effective interorganizational engagement. Applying the learnings from this study to 
the more generic process maps developed in previous studies allowed for a specific process map 
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for ensuring effective and efficient engagement between aircraft engine OEMs and airlines, in 
this specific context.  This dissertation is available in open access at AURA: Antioch University 
Repository and Archive, http://aura.antioch.edu/, and OhioLINK ETD Center, 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/. 
Keywords: Airline Safety, Interorganizational Engagement, Original Equipment 
Manufacturer, Knowledge Sharing, Interorganizational Trust, Aviation Industry 
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Glossary 
Accident. An accident in an event that happens after a person has boarded an aircraft, with 
intention for flight, and before all passengers and crew exit the aircraft after the flight and 
involves a fatal injury or substantial damage to the aircraft (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011).  
Airline traffic. Quantity of passenger and/or cargo service provided. 
Airline demand. Quantity of passenger and/or cargo service desired or requested by customers. 
Airline revenue. Income generated from airline traffic. 
Available seat kilometer (ASK). The number of available seats on a flight multiplied by the 
distance flown.  By summing the ASK for all flights the airline quantifies their output.  An alternate 
to this unit of measurement is the Available Seat Mile (ASM).   
ASKflight = (number of available seats) * (distance of flight) 
ASKtotal = Σ ASKflight 
Example: If an aircraft with 100 seat operates a flight 500 kilometers from departure to destination, 
they have generated 50,000 ASK. 
ASKflight = (100 available seats) * (500 km) = 50,000 Available Seat Kilometers 
Airworthiness directive. A formal communication from civil aviation regulating authorities, 
often the civil aviation authority of the country of the original equipment manufacturer, notifying 
the operator or owner of a known safety issue.  
Average leg load factor (ALLF). The average load factor on a specific route or flight is the 
average of all load factors for the specific route or flight over a number of flights.  
!"#$%&#	(#&	()%*	+%,-)$	(!((+)012345 = ∑ ()%*	+%,-)$0123458292:; <  
 
 
 
 
xii 
Average load factor (ALF). The average load factor for a network of routes which may utilize 
aircraft with different size capacities and operating longer or shorter routes is a ratio of the RPK 
to the ASK for each flight.  The Average Load Factor is used in most airline financial statements.  
!"#$%&#	()%*	+%,-)$	(!(+) = ∑ =>?0123458292:;∑ !@?0123458292:;  
Damage event. A damage event is an event in which no person was killed or injured but in 
which a part 121 aircraft was substantially damaged (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). 
Fatal injury. A fatal injury would classify any aviation event as an accident. Any death related 
to the aviation event that occurs within 30 days of the aviation event is considered a fatal injury 
(Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011).   
Fully reciprocal communication. A method of communication, defined for this study, that 
allows for unrestricted back-and-forth communication between two individuals or organizations. 
This type of communication allows both organizations to drive the conversation based on what 
they determine to be important. Both organizations are able to introduce new topics to the 
conversation. As example of fully reciprocal communication includes face-to-face 
communication, communication over the phone, or internet communications service. Back and 
forth email communication is also categorized as fully reciprocal communication.  
Incident. An incident is any event that is not classified as an accident but affects or could affect 
the safety of operations.  An incident is loosely defined as a near accident such as a near mid-air 
collision, runway incursion, in-flight fire, and failure of flight critical equipment. There is a 
defined list of incidents that require reporting (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 2019).  
Most incidents are not required to be reported and coupled with the fact that the definition of an 
incident is highly subjective leads to high variation in incident reporting from airline to airline 
(Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011).    
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Injury event. An injury event is a non-fatal accident with at least one severe injury but without 
substantial damage to a part 121 aircraft (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). 
Interorganizational engagement. Organized and coordinated activities between at least two 
self-governing organizations, each having independent organizational goals, to produce 
something. 
Load factor (LF). A ratio that compares the amount of airline output available (either seats for 
passengers or capacity for cargo) to the amount of airline output consumed.  	
()%*	+%,-)$ = !A$BA<#	)C-DC-	,)<ECF#*!A$BA<#	)C-DC-	,)<ECF#* 
For example, the 100-seat aircraft that transported 75 passengers on a 500 km flight had a load 
factor of 75%.  
()%*	+%,-)$012345 = 75	E#%-E	DC$,ℎ%E#*100	E#%-E	%"%AB%LB# = 75% 
Major accident. A major accident occurs when either a part 121 aircraft is destroyed beyond 
economical repair, a part 121 aircraft is damaged and there is one fatality, or any accident where 
there are multiple fatalities (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). 
Non-reciprocal communication. A method of communication, defined for this study, as being 
characterized as one-directional in which the initiation organization defines the content, format, 
and distribution of information. There is no opportunity for the organization receiving the 
information to follow-up or respond.  
Part 121 aircraft. Any aircraft meeting the criterion of Title 14 Part 121 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. 
Partially reciprocal communication. A method of communication, defined for this study, in 
which the initiation organization sends a request for information to the second organization. In 
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initiating organization defines the information requested, however the responding organization 
determines the content and format of the information to include in the response. In this study, 
requests for information using the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) website are 
categorized as partially reciprocal communication.    
Revenue passenger kilometer (RPK). Airline output measured as the number of paying 
passengers transported by the distance transported.   One RPK is defined as one paying passenger 
transported 1 kilometer.  An alternate of this unit is Revenue Passenger Kilometer (RPM). 
RPKflight = (number of paying passengers) * (distance of flight) 
RPKtotal = Σ RPKflight 
For example, if an airline transports 75 passengers on the 100-seat aircraft a flight length of 500 
km the airline has generated 37,500 RPK. 
RPKflight = (75 paying passengers) * (500 km) = 37,500 Revenue Passenger Kilometers 
Rotable program. To accelerate embodiment of a service bulletin or airworthiness directive or 
to minimize disruption to an airline’s operation the aircraft engine OEM will release rotable 
units. These rotable units are used to replace affected parts or modules installed on engines that 
are installed on aircraft. The removed part or module can be sent to a designated repair facility 
for the repair or embodiment of the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. During this time 
the engine, and aircraft, can remain in operation due to the rotable unit being installed.  
Rotable unit. A part or module of an aircraft engine supplied to an airline that is used to replace 
the same part or module already installed on an aircraft engine.  
Serious injury. A serious injury is any injury, harm or pain inflicted during an aviation event 
that requires at least 48 hours of hospitalization, or results in broken bones, injury to internal 
organs, or severe burns (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). 
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Substantial damage. Substantial damage is any damage requiring major repair or replacement 
of affected components or that affects the structural strength, performance, or flight 
characteristics of the aircraft (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011).    
Serious accident. A serious accident occurs when an aviation event either results in a single 
fatality but does not result in substantial damage to a Part 121 aircraft or when there is a single 
serious injury and a Part 121 aircraft is substantially damaged (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011).    
Service bulletin. A formal communication from a manufacturer, or OEM, notifying the operator 
or owner of a product improvement. The reason for the product improvement can range from 
reducing the cost of using the product to addressing unsafe conditions (Abbott, 2015). A sample 
service bulletin in presented in Appendix E.   
Yield. Average fare paid by all passengers per kilometer transported on a route.  This is calculated 
by dividing the total revenue of a flight by the RPK for the flight.  
NA#B*012345 = =#"#<C#5O5P1=>?012345  
For example, if an airline generated $15,000 USD in revenue transporting 75 passengers 500 km 
the yield would be $200 USD.  This is essentially the average ticket price.
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Aviation will change the face of Africa and the rise of Africa will change the face of 
aviation across the globe. 
–Hassan El-Houry (as cited in “How Aviation Can Help,” 2018, para. 5) 
In 2012, the average economic growth for all African countries, at 15%, was much higher 
than the rest of the world. With this understanding, it is not surprising that six of the top 10 
fastest growing economies in the world at the time are in Africa (General Electric, 2012). The 
African Development Bank has identified Africa as the world’s second fastest growing economy 
(African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, & 
United Nations Development Programme 2017) with Ethiopia being the fastest growing country 
in Africa (Giles, 2018). Due to the historic and projected growth in the region, Africa has 
consistently been an opportunity for foreign direct investment. Despite a slowdown in foreign 
direct investment in other regions, in 2019 foreign direct investment in Africa increased by 11%. 
The biggest beneficiaries of this increased investment being Egypt, South Africa, Congo, 
Morocco, and Ethiopia (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019).   
A natural side effect of increased foreign investment is an increase in passenger and 
cargo air traffic (Lubbe & Shornikova, 2017). However, despite the exponential growth of 
investment in Africa, 88% of the airline traffic in Africa is outsourced to international carriers 
outside Africa (Brophy, 2016). Norton Rose Fulbright (2015) stated that although the number of 
airlines in operation make up 15% of the global population, they represent less than 6% of the 
world’s commercial passenger and freighter traffic. Norton Rose Fulbright (2015) presented four 
reasons for this underperformance of African airlines: 
• Protectionist policies that favor the national airline 
• Discriminatory practices in favor of other continents carriers 
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• Severe restrictions placed on African airlines for many reasons, but primarily for 
safety.  
• Non-physical barriers such as documentary requirements and shortage of foreign 
exchange.   
Challenges Facing the Aviation Industry in Africa 
Protectionist policies include a lack of de-regulation due to fears about the effect on the 
national flag carrier (“Africa’s Aviation Industry,” 2012). The government often supports such 
policies as they view the airline as a symbol of sovereignty and a tool for international diplomacy 
and not a for-profit business. In addition, many African governments use airline sales as a way to 
increase revenue through high taxes and fees. These types of policies have resulted in a very 
fragmented condition in the African continent where the only viable transportation routing within 
Africa may require traveling across the continent multiple times (African Development Bank, 
2012). For example, for a business to send a shipment from Luanda, Angola to Malabo, 
Equatorial Guinea, a distance of about 1,500 km, would be about 90 minutes by direct flight. 
However, no direct flight exists, and the only option is to send the shipment to Malabo from 
Angola, via Addis Ababa. This routing needs about 24 hours of total shipping time, including 
transit time. In addition, the cost to send this shipment is increased due to the longer route 
required, handling costs in Addis, and taxes imposed by Ethiopia. The African Development 
Bank Group (2012) stated that better-connected African countries and cities is a key factor to 
increasing economic prosperity in Africa.  
The Yamoussoukro Declaration of 1988 and the Yamoussoukro Decision of 1999 were 
agreements to take measures to deregulate air services and open the domestic and regional 
markets to transnational competition, liberalize tariffs and fees, encourage fair competition, and 
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ensure airlines comply with international safety standards (Schlumberger, 2010) as defined by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). However, there has been very little 
progress in adopting the agreements despite projections that liberalization, also called de-
regulation, could increase passenger volume over 100% in some countries. (Norton Rose 
Fulbright, 2015)  
Also listed by Norton Rose Fulbright as a top driver of underperformance of the airline 
industry in Africa are the challenges associated with the lack of foreign currency exchange as 
well travel document requirements, such visa requirements, for intra-Africa travelers. There are 
41 different currencies used in Africa, not counting the Euro or the U.S. dollar. In many 
countries with a struggling economy the U.S. dollar has become the de facto currency due to 
value stability. When an airline makes sales in another country, revenue is received and 
recognized in the currency of the country. Many currencies in Africa are difficult to convert to 
the Euro, U.S. dollar, or the currency of the airline’s home country. For example, if Ethiopian 
Airlines sells a ticket in Sudan the ticket would be paid in Sudanese pounds. Exchange of 
Sudanese pounds to any other currency is difficult due to restrictions imposed by the Ministry of 
Finance in Sudan.  
Fortunately, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Currency Clearance 
Service enables airlines to repatriate their world-wide sales revenue (IATA, n.d.). However, this 
is an added step in reclaiming earned revenue and ultimately increase costs and reduces the 
profitability of operating in some countries with tough foreign exchange policies.  
Many African countries have very strict immigration policies that require obtaining a visa 
before departure from the home country and limiting where a visa can be issued to only an 
embassy in a country where the applicant is a citizen or a resident. The visa application can be 
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very difficult as well and may require multiple levels of approval both in the country’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the country’s Embassy or Consulate. This has an effect of reducing 
demand for intra-Africa air travel.  
Another root cause of underperformance of the airline industry in Africa is inadequate 
infrastructure. Both the soft and hard infrastructure is severely lacking and cannot support the 
needs to an increased in the airline industry (“Africa’s Aviation Industry,” 2012). Soft 
infrastructure such as internet and mobile connectivity is vital to support airline operations. 
Reliable and fast internet is very limited in many African countries and continues to be a 
challenge even in some of Africa’s more developed urban areas. Aging infrastructure of airports 
and roads hinders further growth and expansion of airlines in Africa. 
My position as a field service engineer, working for an aircraft engine manufacturer 
based in Africa, inspired me to understand what someone in my position can do to influence the 
growth of the airline industry in Africa. A field service engineer generally cannot influence 
economic or fiscal policy in the country he or she is working. A field service engineer does not 
engage in many of the areas that are critical to growth of the airline industry. A field service 
engineer does work in the area of engine maintenance and airline maintenance operations. Based 
on my own experience, working in this area allows a field service engineer to influence the 
adoption of service bulletins, compliance of airworthiness directives, and proper performance of 
maintenance and inspection tasks. These items directly address exposure to hazardous conditions 
that can result in accidents and incidences. Thus, the field service engineer has the ability to 
influence the safety performance at an airline, which is identified as a critical area for the growth 
of the aviation industry in Africa.  
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The purpose of this study is to identify and understand the characteristics of engagement 
between aircraft engine manufactures and airlines in Africa that lead to successful outcomes, 
specifically with regards to adoption of service bulletins, compliance with airworthiness 
directives, and proper performance of maintenance and inspection tasks. 
The Importance of Airline Safety in Africa 
The final point discussed by Norton Rose Fulbright (2015) in their article on Africa as a 
major untapped market for the airline industry—and the inspiration and focus of this 
dissertation—is airline safety and airport security. In 2011 in the number of air traffic accidents 
in Africa was nine times higher than the global average (“Africa’s Aviation Industry,” 2012). As 
a result, the African Development Bank ranked safety and security as the number one most 
pressing challenge facing African airlines. The high number of air traffic accidents is due 
primarily to the lack of adoption of international safety standards and the lack of government 
regulations that strictly enforce these same international safety standards (“Africa’s Aviation 
Industry,” 2012).   
The presence of global terror groups based in many African countries, such as Boko 
Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabab in Somalia, and ISIL in many North African countries, is a major 
challenge for airport security organization. This challenge coupled with political and social 
instability in many African countries makes guarding the security of airports and aircraft an 
increasingly more important task    
Despite the many factors that hamper growth for airlines in Africa, there are shining 
examples of successful airlines. Most notable is Ethiopian Airlines, which has managed to reach 
over U.S. $800 million in profit in the last eight years while the other African airlines, including 
Kenya Airways, South African Airways, and EgyptAir had a combined loss of U.S. $1.5 billion   
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in the same period (Center for Aviation, 2016). A report from the African Development Bank 
pointed to factors of Ethiopian’s success being enlightened airline leadership, adequate 
infrastructure, and a government that is supportive but not meddlesome in the affairs of the 
airline (“Africa’s Aviation Industry,” 2012). 
In response to the urgent need for increased safety and security standards, and with the 
support of ICAO and IATA, the African Union drafted a strategic action plan called The Africa 
Strategic Improvement Action Plan. This action plan targets increased safety and security for 
African aviation. The goal of this strategic action was to establish independent civil aviation 
authorities for each country, implement effective and transparent oversight systems, complete an 
IATA Operational Safety Audit for all airlines in Africa, implement accident prevention 
measures focused on runway safety and loss of control, and complete implementation of Flight 
Data Analysis (FDA) and Safety Management Systems (SMS). 
The Impact of Safety on Airline Operations and Passengers 
The African Development Bank advised that the average number of aircraft-related 
accidents in Africa was nine times higher in 2011 than the global average (“Africa’s Aviation 
Industry,” 2012). In the same year African airlines accounted for nearly one-third aviation 
related fatalities, which led the European Union to ban at least 108 African airlines from 
European Union airspace (“Departure Delayed,” 2016).  
An example of the impact of safety, is the case of the crash of an Antonov AN-12 cargo 
aircraft into a nearby fishing village as it took off out of Juba, South Sudan in November 2015. 
This scheduled service was provided to transport local and international workers to the oil fields 
in Eastern Nile province in South Sudan. The death toll from this aircraft crash was officially 
listed as 37 but not all casualties may have been reported (“South Sudan Plane Crash,” 2015). 
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This aircraft was over 44-years-old and operated by Allied Services Ltd and is operationally 
based out of Juba but registered in Tajikistan. The reason for such an arrangement is that the 
fledgling government of South Sudan had not established a Civil Aviation Authority. The aircraft 
manufacturer completed its own investigation and advised the aircraft had not received required 
maintenance and was therefore had not been airworthy. In addition, the investigation found there 
to be excessive overloading of the aircraft (“Over 40 Killed,” 2015) and further learned that 
South Sudan security forces routinely place family members on board regional flights without 
placing them on the aircraft manifest (Bariyo, 2015).  
This accident directly resulted from airline negligence regarding following the guidance 
from the aircraft original equipment manufacturer (OEM) on maximum take-off weight 
allowances and inspection and maintenance requirements. Tragically, around 40 people lost their 
lives. This includes passengers on the cargo airplane and residents of the villages where the 
aircraft unfortunately came down. Such a fatal accident means a loved one will be mourned and 
missed. The emotional impact on the family and loved ones of those killed in aviation accidents 
cannot be quantified. A more tangible effect of a fatal accident is that a family in Africa may no 
longer have a breadwinner to provide financial stability for the extended family.  
For the airline, such a fatal accident has a significant impact on many aspects of the 
airline’s operations. The most immediate impact will be the loss of use of the aircraft. In the 
example above, the aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair. This means that repair was 
not even an option of the aircraft. The airline would have to decide whether to buy another 
aircraft to support operations or scale down operations to reflect the reduction in fleet size. This 
decision would have implications on long-term cost of the airline and the ability of the airline to 
generate revenue. Another cost that the airline would likely incur is the compensation paid out to 
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the families of those that suffered a fatality during the accident. This cost would likely vary 
depending on the country the fatal accident occurred. Regardless it would likely be substantial.  
Lastly, the airline would likely suffer from irrevocable damage to their brand and 
reputation. This would make selling tickets in the future more difficult and might reduce future 
revenue. These types of costs coupled with the loss in revenue would be a difficult financial 
position for the airline to navigate and could lead to the airline ceasing operations and declaring 
bankruptcy. This would have a long reaching effect on the employees of the airline as they 
would now become unemployed. The cessation of operations could also impact the operations at 
the airports used by the airline and could cause the slowed operations at the airport and reduced 
need for staffing.  
Finally, the customers of the airline and its service would be impacted; especially on 
routes with already limited service to remote destinations. In Africa, many rural or isolated 
destinations may only be served by a single airline. For example, SA Airlink is the only 
commercial operator to provide passenger air transport service to the remote island of St. Helena, 
a British overseas territory 1,200 miles off the coast of Angola. This is the island where 
Napoléon Bonaparte lived his final years in exile. Without this air transport service residents of 
the tiny island were connected to the outside world by a six-hour boat service that operates every 
other week (Buckley, 2017). Without this service, tourism would decrease, and local business 
will be impacted. Likewise, shipping goods to the island will be more expensive and take much 
longer. This would increase the cost of living for the residents of the island and could hinder 
emergency medical evacuations.  
Individual incidents or incidents can impact an airline’s operations and their financial 
position. Poor safety practices can cause specific aircraft, airlines, or all aircraft and airlines from 
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entire countries to be banned to fly into other regions. For example, TAAG Angola was banned 
from flying into the European Union and the United Kingdom in 2007 citing safety concerns. 
TAAG Angola reported this ban on operating into the European Union cost the airline U.S. $5 
million per month (Buyck, 2007). The reduction in air transport service meant that options for 
traveling or shipping cargo were reduced and resulted in less convenient and longer shipping 
times along with increased costs. This meant an increase in the cost of these imported goods for 
the residents of Angola.  
The Definition and Measure of Airline Safety 
In the United States, Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs all aviation 
related activities. Title 14 is further divided in to parts that focus on a specific activity. For 
example, Title 14 Part 137 focuses on activities related to agricultural aircraft operations. This 
study, and the terms used, focus only on aircraft that have a seating capacity of greater than 20 
passengers and operates commercial flights that are public charter, meaning they can accept 
business from anyone will to pay and meet their criteria (Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.). 
Activities of aircraft meeting this criterion are covered in Title 14 Part 121. The well-known 
commercial airlines such as Emirates, Delta, United Airlines, and British Airways operate on a 
Part 121 certificate.  
The accepted measure of airline safety performance is the accident rate. However, some 
studies also consider the incident rate (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). The following are terms used 
in the aviation industry to review to different events. The different events have different 
characteristics—with different reporting requirements. For example, the terms accident and 
incident may be used interchangeably by a layperson, but as described below terms refer to 
different events and the accident rate and incident rate are reviewed and analyzed as two separate 
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types of safety data. The terms below are formally defined by the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB), which is an agency of the United States government responsible for leading civil 
and commercial transportation investigations (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). The following are 
terms commonly used in reference to airline safety, as paraphrased from Rodrigues and Cusick 
(2011):  
Accident: An accident in an event that happens after a person has boarded an aircraft, 
with intention for flight, and before all passengers and crew exit the aircraft after the flight and 
involves a fatal injury or substantial damage to the aircraft. 
Fatal injury: A fatal injury would classify any aviation event as an accident. Any death 
related to the aviation event that occurs within 30 days of the aviation event is considered a fatal 
injury. 
Serious injury: A serious injury is any injury, harm or pain inflicted during an aviation 
event that requires at least 48 hours of hospitalization, or results in broken bones, injury to 
internal organs, or severe burns. 
Substantial damage: Substantial damage is any damage requiring major repair or 
replacement of affected components or that affects the structural strength, performance, or flight 
characteristics of the aircraft. 
Incident. An incident is any event that is not classified as an accident but affects or could 
affect the safety of operations. An incident is loosely defined as a near accident such as a near 
mid-air collision, runway incursion, in-flight fire, and failure of flight critical equipment. There 
is a defined list of incidents that require reporting (Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 
2019).  Most incidents are not required to be reported and coupled with the fact that the 
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definition of an incident is highly subjective leads to high variation in incident reporting from 
airline to airline. 
Major accident: A major accident occurs when either a part 121 aircraft is destroyed 
beyond economical repair, a part 121 aircraft is damaged and there is one fatality, or any 
accident where there are multiple fatalities. 
Serious accident: A serious accident occurs when an aviation event either results in a 
single fatality but does not result in substantial damage to a Part 121 aircraft or when there is a 
single serious injury and a Part 121 aircraft is substantially damaged. 
Injury event: An injury event is a non-fatal accident with at least one severe injury but 
without substantial damage to a part 121 aircraft (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). 
Damage event: A damage event is an event in which no person was killed or injured but 
in which a part 121 aircraft was substantially damaged. 
The terms listed and defined above reveal a fine line between an accident that is required 
to be reported, and an incident that may not be required to be reported. The difference between 
an accident and an incident depends on the severity of the event outcome and as well as the 
context of the event. Both accidents and incidents provide evidence of safety hazards. There is 
no empirical evidence that incident rate provide insight into the probability of accidents. 
However, some researchers and safety officials estimate the incident rate can be between 10 to 
100 times the accident rate (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). However, incidents do reveal the 
hazards that also cause accidents (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011).  
Service bulletins are a formal communication from a manufacturer, or OEM, notifying 
the operator or owner of a product improvement. The reason for the product improvement can 
range from reducing the cost of using the product to addressing unsafe conditions (Abbott, 
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2015). Airworthiness directives are issued by civil aviation regulating authorities, and not by the 
manufacturer. Airworthiness directives are issued when there is a known safety issue. As the 
name indicates, for an aircraft to remain airworthy it must comply with all instructions in the 
airworthiness directive per the deadline in the airworthiness directive. If an aircraft is not 
compliant with the airworthiness directive, the local civil aviation authority will revoke 
allowances for the aircraft to operate (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009). 
Airworthiness directives and some service bulletins address exposure to hazardous 
conditions that can lead to an accident or an incident. Likewise, incorrectly performing routine 
and non-routine maintenance and inspection tasks can also lead to an increase in exposure to 
hazardous conditions that can lead to an accident or an incident. 
Purpose of Study 
As described in the previous section, safety is a critical area of focus for all airlines and 
an area of needed improvement for airlines in Africa. The effects of an accident or incident can 
have severe implications on airline itself, its employees, its passengers, and the communities 
where the airlines flies. When airlines operate with a lowered safety performance the airline 
employees, passengers, and surrounding community are exposed to unsafe conditions. These 
unsafe conditions can cause fatalities, personal injury, or loss of financial security. 
Beyond the immediate effect that airline safety has on employees, passengers, and those 
living near airports, poor airline performance and practices can have a large economic impact. 
Airlines with poor safety records can have truncated operations due to regulatory actions (Kacou 
& El-Houry, 2017). These types of actions can cause reduced connectivity with trade partners 
and can reduce the overall trade of a country. This not only increases cost of living as imported 
items would need to be shipped by longer and more costly routes, but it also reduces the standard 
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of living since imported items are most expensive and not affordable to many people. For 
example, many people in Africa opt to purchase counterfeit medication since the real medication 
is more expensive than they can afford. These counterfeit and expired drugs account for nearly 
100,000 deaths in Africa every year (Hirschler, 2017).  
 Improved airline safety alone will not immediately remedy the challenging economic 
conditions in Africa. As pointed out by Norton Rose Fulbright (2015), the aviation sector in 
Africa has many areas that need improvement in order for the aviation industry to flourish. 
Kacou and El-Houry (2017) also emphasized how impactful the development of the aviation 
industry in Africa would have on the economy of Africa but also on global commerce.  
To support the need for improvements in safety, ICAO released a report that identified a 
series of actions required as part of the effort to improve aviation safety in Africa (ICAO, 2015). 
One action was “to increase the number of qualified personnel at the industry and oversight 
levels” (p. 12). The current study looks beyond having qualified personnel at industry and 
oversight levels and instead investigates the critical characteristics of their engagement.  
The purpose of this study is to identify and understand the characteristics of engagement 
between aircraft engine manufacturers and airlines in Africa that lead to successful outcomes, 
specifically with regards to adoption of service bulletins, compliance with airworthiness 
directives, and proper performance of maintenance and inspection tasks. It is my hope that 
airlines, OEMs, and regulatory bodies can use the results of this study to develop effective 
engagement plans between airlines in Africa and the appropriate OEMs to drive an outcome of 
improved airline safety performance.  
It should be noted that FAA regulation CFR 121.363 states that the airworthiness, and 
hence safety, of aircraft and their operation are solely the responsibility of the certificate holder 
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(Federal Aviation Administration, 2014). The certification holder is the aircraft operator or 
owner. The purpose of this study is not to transfer airworthiness and safety responsibility to the 
OEM.  
Significance of Study 
The intent behind this study is to identify and understand the characteristics of 
engagement between aircraft engine manufactures and airlines in Africa that lead to successful 
outcomes, specifically with regards to adoption of service bulletins, compliance with 
airworthiness directives, and proper performance of maintenance and inspection tasks. It is in the 
best interest of the OEM, airline, and passenger that airline equipment such as aircraft and 
engines are operated in a safe, responsible, and efficient manner. Such actions would reduce the 
exposure of the OEM’s product to being involved in an accident or incident. Likewise, it would 
reduce the exposure of the airline to having a costly accident or incident and, as previously 
discussed, an improved safety record will open new destinations and regions where the airline 
may fly. Finally, the passenger benefits by being able to access needed air transport services 
without risking exposure to unsafe conditions. Ensuring safety of air transport services in Africa 
is a critical element that will allow the industry to thrive and which is projected to lead to 
increased economic growth in Africa.  
The key to the economic success of Africa is the airline industry (Button, Martini, & 
Scotti, 2018). and one the keys to a developing the airline industry in Africa is improving the 
safety of airline in Africa (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015). To support the need for improvements 
in safety, ICAO released a report that identified several actions required as part of the effort to 
improve aviation safety in Africa. One item identified was, “to increase the number of qualified 
personnel at the industry and oversight levels” (ICAO, 2015, p. 12). The current study took 
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inspiration from this recommended action item and seeks to identify the key characteristics of the 
relationship between qualified personnel from the OEM and the airline.  
During preparation for this dissertation I discovered a lack of literature available on the 
airline industry in Africa. Likewise, there is a lack of literature available on effective airline 
support models or studies regarding OEM-airline engagement. I hope this dissertation will not 
only supplement the recommendations in the ICAO report but will also contribute to the existing 
literature, which is minimal. I also hope it this dissertation will spark a newfound interest on the 
topics of airline support, specifically in Africa, which will lead to an increase in academic 
publications on the topic.     
Research Questions 
 This study is designed to answer the following research questions (RQ): 
RQ1: What are the critical touchpoints between engine OEMs and airlines in Africa that 
lead to successful outcomes during the adoption of service bulletins and the compliance with 
airworthiness directives? 
RQ2: What are the critical touchpoints between engine OEMs and airlines in Africa that 
lead to successful outcomes during the performance of maintenance and inspections tasks? 
RQ3: What are the characteristics of the touchpoints that facilitate efficient transfer of 
needed information?  
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Author’s Background 
Since I was young, I have had dual passions for aviation and business. As an 8-year-old, I 
was asking my father how to read the Dow Jones report from the newspaper. Although I did not 
have money to invest, I had my favorite stocks that I would follow from day-to-day and           
week-to-week. These stocks were companies I knew like Nike and Whirlpool, my father’s 
employer. I would ask why stocks go up and why do they go down, and who buys them.  
My father traveled often for business, and so I also spent much time taking my father to 
the airport. I found myself fascinated by the aircraft and the engines. I would theorize why the 
aircraft can remain in the air and how the engines created thrust.  
These two passions would eventually lead to my pursuit of a Bachelor of Science and 
Master of Science in Engineering before completing an MBA where I focused on international 
business and on change leadership. These two fields of study have fundamental differences. In 
engineering, the focus is holding fixed as many variables as possible to understand the singular 
relationship between a dependent variable and independent variable. This level of detail allows 
aircraft engines to be design, manufactured, and operated. Conversely, as an MBA student I 
learned the importance of considering all influencing factors when making a decision. This type 
of decision making allows businesses to enter new markets and develop new products. It taught 
me to understand the known-knowns, knowns-unknowns, and unknown-unknowns in managing 
risks and making decisions based on limited information. A business leader must always 
consider the strengths and weaknesses of the organization and people they lead. They must be 
keenly aware of threats, such as disruption technology, and opportunities such as emerging 
markets. None of these items are well defined. A leader must make calculated decisions on 
limited information. Finally, the MBA taught me the power and impact a leader can have. Either 
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for good or bad. My introduction to Change Leadership in the MBA led to my enrollment in the 
PhD in Leadership and Change at Antioch University. 
Through the PhD program I learned more about what it means to be a leader and the need 
for leaders to drive positive change. For a majority of the time I have been in the PhD program, I 
have been a field service engineer for General Electric’s aviation business. I am based onsite 
with Ethiopian Airlines, the largest airline in Africa, where I provide technical and operational 
support as they use GE manufactured aircraft engines. I also remotely support many airlines in 
Southern Africa, West Africa, and African islands in the Indian Ocean. Through the PhD 
program I have been able to reconcile my personal and professional passion for the development 
of Africa’s aviation industry with the need to win a victory for humanity.  
Study Assumptions 
The study being completed as part of this dissertation will focus on first interviewing 
individuals employed by a wide range of African airlines. I collected data by engaging in       
semi-structured interviews with fourteen aviation professionals working for airlines in Africa. 
The interview data was transcribed before being coded. Analysis of the coded interview data was 
analyzed in order to identify critical factors of successful engine OEM engagement with airlines 
in Africa. 
This study does not include an analysis of actual accident or incident data. Instead, the 
study relies on the expertise of the interview participants and considers them subject matter 
experts. This study assumes that the individuals who took part in the interview were 
knowledgeable about airline operations and had an expert level of knowledge regarding the 
function of the airline they worked in. This assumption is critical to establishing the validity of 
the responses, and hence the results of the study. To ensure the interview participants were 
 
 
 
18 
subject matter experts only individuals that had over one-year experience working in positions 
that directly engaged with OEMs were considered for inclusion in this study.  
The current study assumes that airlines and OEMs alike will use the result to improve 
engagement with a common goal of reducing exposure to exposure to conditions that could lead 
to accidents or incidents. This study also assumes that both OEMs and airlines are risk adverse 
organizations who are continuously looking for opportunity to reduce exposure to the occurrence 
of accidents and incidents. I also assume it that both organization types are ready and willing to 
change their engagement strategies to minimize exposure to conditions that can lead to accidents 
or incidents. 
Study Limitations  
This study, like all studies, has several limitations. One of the primary limitations is that 
it uses self-reported data. The hierarchical structure of airlines often varies. This meant that 
individual roles and titles from airline to airline often not exactly the same. This interview 
targeted airline professionals working in engineering positions related to aircraft engine 
maintenance. The interview considers the participants subject matter experts in the area of airline 
maintenance operations. The data collection looks solely at the perception of the subject matter 
experts and does not compare the responses to airline operational data. I further discuss this in 
Chapter V as an area for future work. 
I have taken great care to include as many different types of airlines in this study as 
possible. However, due to many airlines being in isolated regions with little knowledge of their 
existence it makes ensuring that all airlines are reached a significant challenge. This has a 
limiting effect on the generalizability of the results.  
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In 1951, at the request of ICAO, English was designated to be the universal language for 
aeronautical communication for pilots and air traffic control (“Aviation English,” 2017). 
Although this was only a recommendation and was only targeted at pilots and air traffic control, 
English has become the de facto official language of international aviation. For this reason, I 
conducted the interviews in English. Despite English being the de facto official language, many 
employees of airlines do not speak English fluently. And even if the participant was fluent in 
English, their use of colloquialisms, idioms, and direct translation from their mother tongue to 
English meant that I had ensure the points the participants were trying to make were accurately 
understood. To do this, I often would follow up with questions to ensure my understanding of 
their response was consistent with their intention. Most often, what I as the interviewer 
understood was the same as what the interviewee was communicating.  
Study Delimitations 
Besides study limitations there are several study delimitations. The interviews were only 
open to those employees working in a technical support or engineering position that regularly 
engages with the engine OEM. Furthermore, the interviewee was required to be in the role for at 
least one year to ensure they had sufficient experience engaging with OEMs. The purpose of 
setting minimum experience was to ensure the participants were knowledgeable with regards to 
the OEM support and engagement required. Thus, they could provide more insight into the 
support needed for the airline to reduce exposure to occurrences of accidents and incidents.  
The two largest OEMs that engage with the airlines are the aircraft and engine 
manufacturers. However, there are many other companies that supply systems or assemblies to 
the aircraft. For example, landing gears and braking systems are part of the aircraft but supplied 
by a separate OEM. In this type of situation, the airline would engage with the aircraft OEM for 
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any technical or commercial issues on this assembly. This is similar for all systems or assemblies 
that operate as part of the aircraft. The only exception is the engine. In case of a technical or 
commercial issue on the engines the airline engages directly with the engine OEM. The 
management of the engine program differs from the aircraft program, and thus it is assumed that 
engagement with an engine OEM differs from engagement with an aircraft OEM. As such, this 
study focuses only on engine OEM engagement. 
As pointed out earlier, FAA regulation CFR 121.363 states that the airworthiness, and 
hence safety, of aircraft and their operation are solely the responsibility of the certificate holder. 
The purpose of this study is only to identify how the OEM can best support the aircraft and 
engine operator to meet their obligations defined in FAA regulation CFR 121.363. The intent of 
this study is not to transfer any part of this responsibility to the OEM.  
The current study only included commercial airlines that fly scheduled routes and include 
major airlines and regional operators. These types of airlines are categorized in FAA regulations 
as Part 121 operators. Aircraft operators that do not fall under the Part 121 category include 
business jet operators, training schools, commuter, and on-demand operators, as well as general 
aviation. General aviation can include individuals that operate private aircraft for leisure or for a 
person's business such as crop dusting. These types of aircraft operators were not included in the 
interviews. Likewise, operators of military aircraft or government use aircraft were not included 
in any portion of the data collection. 
It is common for individuals to work at multiple airlines over the course of their career. It 
is likely that many of the participants had previously worked at another airline potentially in 
another region. The intent of this study is to identify the characteristics of OEM-airline 
engagement that lead to successful outcomes in the adoption of service bulletins, compliance of 
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airworthiness directives, and correct execution of maintenance and inspection tasks . Another 
delimitation of this study is that only the participant’s current role was included, and previous 
experience was excluded.    
Chapter Overviews 
 Chapter II is written with the intent to describe previous studies and literary works on the 
subject of this dissertation. As previous efforts during the pre-candidacy portion of this PhD 
program have revealed, a lack of works and studies on the aviation industry in Africa but also on 
the relationship between OEMs and airlines, this chapter will focus on the critical success factors 
of support organizations in general.  
 Chapter III presents the data collection and analysis methodology. This study approaches 
the data collection and analysis from a perspective of systems analysis. An overview of systems 
analysis will be covered along with a detailed review of the data collection and analysis.  
 Chapter IV presents the analysis of the qualitative data collected through the interviews. 
The results of the analysis are organized and presented to address the three research questions 
identified previously in Chapter I. 
 Chapter V provides a summary and synthesis of the research completed as well as 
provides discussion of the results of the study. Recommendations for engaging the results of the 
study in to practices are included in the discussion as well as recommendations for future studies.  
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
Africa, where the accident rate of airlines in Africa is nine times higher than the rest of 
the world (“Africa’s Aviation Industry,” 2012), is the last growth market within the aviation 
industry. One critical area that needs to be addressed is improved airline safety performance 
(Norton Rose Fulbright, 2015). As mentioned in Chapter I, to improve the safety of airlines, 
ICAO released a report identifying required actions to improve airline safety in Africa. One of 
the action items listed was to, “to increase the number of qualified personnel at the industry and 
oversight levels” (ICAO, 2015, p. 12).   
The study presented in this dissertation seeks to understand the contribution of the 
collaborative relationship between OEMs and airlines towards the improvement of safety 
performance of airlines in Africa. To be consistent with previous studies (Y. Chang & Yeh, 
2004) this dissertation will take the definition of airline safety performance to be the combined 
accident and incident rate. The condition that leads to both accidents and incidents is called a 
hazard (Cusick, Cortés, & Rodrigues, 2017). This dissertation assumes that OEMs are the center 
of gravity for knowledge with respect to proper operation, maintenance, and financial planning 
of their product. The OEM’s ability to sharing knowledge is critical to proper operation, 
maintenance, and support of their product. Despite the critical nature of knowledge sharing 
between OEMs and airlines, numerous literature reviews returned no studies focusing on the 
interorganizational collaboration between airlines and OEMs. 
The current study approached the problem statement, defined in Chapter I, from the 
perspective of effectiveness of interorganizational collaboration between airlines and OEMs. 
This study focused on how OEMs can better engage with airlines to meet their needs the 
literature review was completed in two portions. First, to fully understand and summarize work 
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that has previously been completed a systematic literature review was completed on 
interorganizational engagement. The second portion of the literature review presents a 
background on the airline industry with respect to airline operations and performance metrics. 
Chapter II starts by reviewing the factors that motivate organizations to engage, which 
then leads to a presentation of the characteristics of different strategies of interorganizational 
engagement. The benefits of collaborative engagement are discussed before presenting the 
definition of interorganizational collaboration. This chapter then focuses on understanding the 
characteristics of successful interorganizational collaborations. There is a duel focus on 
characteristics at an interorganizational level as well as an interpersonal level.  
Stakeholder engagement, trust, and knowledge sharing and their contribution to                
interorganizational collaboration (IOC) outcomes are presented. Although these three 
characteristics are presented separately, they are very much intertwined. Although each element 
is presented separately, the other elements are referenced as part of the discussion due to the 
nature of the relationship between them.  
After defining and discussing the critical success characteristics of an IOC this chapter 
then offers insight on the operations and management of an airline. Although there are many 
aspects to an airline’s operation, this literature review makes every effort to understand those 
operations and aspects of an airline relative to the OEM engagement. Finally, financial and 
safety metrics by which airlines are measured are discussed.  
This study views the safe operation of aircraft and engines as a common goal of both the 
airline and OEM. Understanding how organizations successfully collaborate to meet a common 
goal will provide input as to how OEMs can improve their engagement strategies with airlines in 
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Africa. Understanding of how airlines operate provides insight as to those functional areas where 
OEMs should engage those airlines. 
Interorganizational Engagement 
For this study, interorganizational engagement will refer to the organized and coordinated 
activities between at least two self-governing organizations, each having independent 
organizational goals, to produce achieve some outcome. This section will present the motivation 
for interorganizational engagement, types of interorganizational engagement, and the important 
of interorganizational engagement  
Motivation for interorganizational engagement. Organizations, by themselves, exist to 
serve a purpose and achieve some type of defined outcome. Both external and internal forces 
may cause a change in an organization’s goal or ability to achieve that goal. One mistake that 
organizations often make is trying to develop a solution using only those resources internal to the 
organization. This type of siloed approach to problem solving can lead to redundant efforts and 
use of limited resources that result in solutions that are not effective at addressing the primary 
issue (Kania & Kramer, 2011). Reitan (1998) argued that for organizations to develop effective, 
sustainable solutions they to need to work collaboratively. It is inevitable that an organization 
will interact with other organizations in pursuit of achieving a desired outcome. An organization 
may need to interact with suppliers to negotiate contracts or communicate technical requirements 
for a new part. The same organization may need to interact with regulatory bodies to demonstrate 
how their new product meets regulations or how newly proposed regulations could potentially 
affect their business. The business might then engage with governmental or political 
organizations to discuss the impact of a tax increase has on their business. The organization 
could also engage with their customers to develop a product that better meets the customer’s 
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needs and to help the customer improve how they use the current product. The conditions that 
motivate organizations to collaborate are not limited to the examples provided above. However, 
the dynamics of the engagement often depend on the motivating factors. Ultimately, 
organizations interact because it is beneficial for them (Nathan & Mitroff, 1991) because 
different organizations have a different perspective of the common problem and, when there is 
constructive engagement, can devise better solutions (Gray, 1989).  
Types of Interorganizational Engagement 
 There are different ways that organizations can engage. The engagement could be a      
one-time engagement or could be a long-term joint venture. The relationship could be defined as 
transactional or reciprocal (Gray, 1989). Hardy and Phillips (1998) sought to better understand 
interorganizational engagements by studying the interactions within the interorganizational 
domain. The interorganizational domain is made up of the individuals, acting on behalf of their 
parent organization, that directly engage with other individuals from different organizations 
(Tsasis, 2009). Tsasis (2009) goes on to refer to these individuals as actors in the 
interorganizational domain. These individuals differ from others in their organization in that they 
have direct contact or communication with individuals from external organizations. 
McGuire (1988) described an interorganizational domain as a process of social 
construction. Gray (1989) continued and suggested that social hierarchy is established by this 
process. Through this social process stakeholders also communicate their values and a create a 
shared vision. The development of the domain and shared vision can be affected by the power 
distribution within the domain. The three aspects of power distribution within a domain are 
decision making ability, control of scarce resources, and discursive legitimacy (Hardy & Phillips, 
1998; McCann & Gray, 1986). I have portrayed these three aspects in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1. Power distribution within a domain. 
 
Decision making ability. Stakeholders that have the formal authority to make a decision 
(French & Raven, 1959) are considered to have decision making ability. This can be anyone in a 
hierarchal position whose decisions will be actioned by their subordinates. Additionally, a person 
with decision making ability can also be in a position that either holds a position or is recognized 
as being the responsible person for making decision on behalf of the organization. When 
considering an interorganizational domain between an airline and an OEM the decision-making 
ability most often would rest with the senior leadership of the airline as they have the decision to 
action recommendations from the OEM. 
 Control of critical resources. One of the primary benefits of participating in an IOC is 
the pooling and sharing of resources. By having control over one or more of the critical resources 
a stakeholder will have a power advantage over stakeholders that are dependent on that resource. 
Critical resources can include, but are not limited to, financial resources, intellectual property, 
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expertise, property rights, and physical assets. In the case of the OEM-airline relationship the 
OEM is the possessor of expertise on how best to operate and care for the specific equipment. 
Discursive legitimacy. The final aspect of power discussed by Hardy and Phillips (1998) 
is the power to influence other stakeholders through the perception that one is speaking on behalf 
of the issues or those effected by the issues. People or organizations that have discursive power 
speak on behalf stakeholders that may not have a united voice. For example, an organization 
such as the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) or Greenpeace are perceived as 
speaking on behalf of those stakeholders without a voice. This aspect of domain power is termed 
discursive legitimacy.  
The way that power is distributed among stakeholders and actors in the 
interorganizational domain can shape how stakeholders and actors engage. Hardy and Phillips 
(1998) introduced four types of interorganizational engagement strategies, based on the 
distribution of power among the stakeholders as well as the existence of a common goal. These 
engagement strategies are collaboration, compliance, contention, and contestation. These 
strategies are diagrammed in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2.  Four types of interorganizational engagement. 
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Collaboration and compliance are engagement strategies that are established on the 
foundation of a cooperative relationship. Whereas contention and contestation are engagements 
build on conflict. Each strategy is discussed in more detail below.  
Compliance. Compliant engagement is characterized by engagement of organizations 
that have a common goal but for which there is either a lack of voluntary participation or a lack 
of power distribution among stakeholders. A compliant engagement occurs when two 
organizations share a common goal, but one organization provides direction and instruction and 
the other organization complies with that instruction or direction (Hardy & Phillips, 1998). An 
example of a compliant type of engagement in the aviation industry is the when the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) issues an Airworthiness Directive (AD). An AD is published to 
notify equipment operators of a safety deficiency that requires inspection, repair, or 
modification. The FAA has the authority to revoke certification of any operator that does not 
comply with the recommendations (FAA, n.d.). Before publishing an AD, the FAA sends 
notification the airlines and OEM for feedback, which can result in a modification of the AD. 
Once the AD is published the operators comply as they understand the actions address a safety 
deficiency and this is a common goal of the OEM, airline, and FAA. 
The FAA has the authority to revoke certification of any operator that does not comply 
with the recommendations (FAA, n.d.). Before publishing an AD, the FAA sends notification the 
airlines and OEM for feedback, which can result in a modification of the AD. Once the AD is 
published the operators comply as they understand the actions address a safety deficiency and 
this is a common goal of the OEM, airline, and FAA.  
Contention. Contentious engagement occurs between two organizations that do not share 
a common goal and are seeking to full different outcomes from the other stakeholders. In this 
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type of engagement there is a more equal distribution of power between the stakeholders. This 
allows the stakeholders to leverage their power during engagement with each other (Hardy & 
Phillips, 1998). In this manner, the interorganizational engagement may seem more like 
negotiations. An example of this type of relationship would be the relationship with a customer 
and supplier during the negotiation of contract. Both organizations have a goal to increase their 
profit margin and write the contract in terms favorable to themselves. They may leverage their 
power in the negotiation to put pressure on the other organization and meet their outcome.  
Contestation. Contestation is an engagement strategy used by stakeholders looking to 
establish legitimacy or those stakeholders whose power position is based solely on discursive 
legitimacy. Like contentious engagements, engagements defined by contestation occur when the 
two organizations are working to achieve different outcomes. However, unlike contentious 
engagements, contestation engagements occur when the power within the domain is concentrated 
among one or few key stakeholders other (Hardy & Phillips, 1998). In this type of engagement 
stakeholders only source of domain power is through discursive legitimacy, however if 
unsuccessful at establishing themselves as a legitimate stakeholder they risk marginalization.  
Collaboration. Collaboration typically occurs when two or more organizations engage to 
achieve a common goal. Reaching the final goal is of benefit to all stakeholders and thus the 
engagements will tend to be more cooperative and supportive. However, unlike             
compliance-based engagements, power is typically distributed more evenly amongst the 
stakeholders. Even those stakeholders that only hold power of discursive legitimacy still carry a 
great deal of influence, and unlike in contestation, their risk of being marginalized is low other 
(Hardy & Phillips, 1998).  
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The OEM-airline relationship can, at times, take on characteristics of either collaboration 
or contestation. While negotiating a purchase of new equipment or services agreements the 
relation may develop traits associated with contestation. This is due to a difference in the vision 
of the different organizations and each is focused on protecting its own position. However, 
ensuring the equipment operates without occurrence of accidents or incidences is a common goal 
of both the airline and the OEM. As a result, this aspect of the OEM-airline relationship is more 
collaborative in nature.  
For this reason, this dissertation will focus on the collaborative aspects of the engagement 
between the OEM and airline and how it pertains to the mitigation of exposure to conditions that 
can lead to accidents and incidents. To better understand how OEMs and airlines can better 
engage in interorganizational collaboration (IOC), this chapter will review the defining 
characteristics of IOCs as well as those critical elements of the IOC that lead to successful 
outcomes.  
A Description of Interorganizational Collaboration 
In this section a definition of interorganizational collaboration is presented as well as 
some of the key elements. Basic characteristics of a collaborative interorganizational engagement 
were presented above. These characteristics aided in the discernment of collaborative 
engagement from other types of interorganizational engagement. This section will provide a 
more in-depth review of the defining characteristics of an IOC and well as the importance of 
IOCs to an organization’s ability to achieve some outcome.   
Hardy, Phillips, and Lawrence (2003) define an interorganizational collaboration as “a 
cooperative, interorganizational relationship that is negotiated in an ongoing communicative 
process, and which relies on neither market nor hierarchal mechanisms of control” (p. 323). A 
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more fundamental aspect of an IOC that can be added to this definition is that it is fundamentally 
an engagement between two or more organizations that have a common vision (Gray, 1989).  
Stakeholders. It is clear that an IOC is a type of engagement between two external 
organizations, or stakeholders. This definition is meant to clearly delineate and IOC from an 
intra-organizational collaboration. In an IOC the collaborating organizations are autonomous 
with distinct leadership, organizational goals, and cultural values. An intra-organizational 
collaboration involves two organizations that ultimately reports to the same leadership and would 
have goals that are aligned as part of a higher-level strategy (Gray, 1989).  
Interorganizational domain. When organizations decide to engage in an IOC, there will 
be several people from each stakeholder organization that will interact with members of the other 
organizations. Those individuals from each of the stakeholder organizations are called actors 
(Tsasis, 2009). Trist (1983) defines the IOC domain as a set of actors representing the interests of 
different organizations that become joined to address a common problem. As previously noted, 
the development of the domain is a process of social construction (McGuire, 1988). During this 
social process a hierarchy is established, and the actors establish the legitimacy of their 
organizations as stakeholders. In addition, the distribution of power within the domain is 
determined. The distribution of power within the domain will dictate how the actors engage.  
Motivation. There are many reasons why different organizations would collaborate with 
other external organizations. Some organizations collaborated due to regulatory or political 
changes in the environment. These IOCs are generally due to external factors and are not 
voluntary, and so the engagement may take on the characteristics of a compliant engagement as 
opposed to a collaborative engagement. Other reasons organizations might collaborate is to 
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address a common problem or may be part of a long-term strategy aimed at developing a 
competitive advantage.   
 IOCs also facilitate increasing capacity, leveraging of expertise (Huxham, 1996) and 
pooling of resources (Hamel, 1991). In many cases IOCs are created to solve a common goal. 
Even if this is not the case, a successful IOC is one in where stakeholders in the IOC are able to 
learn what they need to support the vision of their organization.  
In an IOC, the different stakeholders can communicate their interest in solving the 
problem as well as values internal to their organization. This ensures that the final solution meets 
the needs of the various stakeholders. The open communication that is typical of IOCs ensures 
that the values of the different stakeholders are respected within the IOC domain (Keast & 
Mandell, 2014).  
The Importance of Interorganizational Engagement 
Competition in nearly every global market is increasing. Once local firms are now forced 
to enter global markets with different customer demands where goods and services supplied to 
the new markets require more specialized and sophisticated knowledge to design, produce, sell, 
and support. In most cases it is not feasible for a single organization to have superior expertise in 
all functional areas related to a new product. One such example is the development of the CFM1 
engine, a joint venture between GE Aviation and SNECMA Aircraft Engines (Doz, 1996). This 
collaborative relationship was based on a collaborative engagement where both organizations 
recognized the expertise of the other organization. The resulting product leveraged the most 
advanced technology from both organizations and became arguable the most success aircraft 
engine program in the history of the aviation industry.  
 
1 CFM International is the name of an engine manufacturer joint venture between General Electric and Safran 
Aircraft Engines (Aerocontact, n.d.)  
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Often organizations will encounter some problem that exceeds their capability or capacity 
to address. External factors can drive these types of problems (Gray, 1989). For example, an 
organization may want to establish operations in another county and regulations in the country 
may require that that foreign organizations must have a local sponsor. Perhaps an organization 
wants to complete in a new market but do not have technical expertise. These types of problems 
are described as large scale “messes” (Ackoff, 1979, p. 99) and “wicked problems” (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973, p. 155). Aldrich (1976) suggested these large problems lacked any means to 
segment or divide them into separate issues. Gray (1989) stated that interorganizational 
collaborations can address large problems that no single organization could solve alone. Gray 
went on to explain that through sharing of tangible resources, financial resources, and intellectual 
resources these indivisible problems can be addressed, and solutions developed.  
However, the presence of an indivisible problem is not the only reason that organizations 
would seek to establish an IOC. Organizations may seek to engage in interorganizational 
collaboration if traditional adversarial methods of addressing problems are perceived to have 
sufficient limitations (Hardy & Phillips, 1998). If those other engagement strategies, such as 
those previously discussed, do not enable the organization to meet their intended goal the 
organization may adopt a collaborative strategy. Organizations may also seek to engage in 
interorganizational collaboration if the current independent actions taken by organizations 
creates an unstable and inharmonious operating environment for the different organizations in 
order (Trist, 1977). 
So far, this chapter has presented different strategies of interorganizational engagement 
and explained how a collaborative engagement is fundamentally different from other 
engagement strategies. Then a definition of an interorganizational collaboration was presented 
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along with a description of the fundamental elements of an IOC. The importance of IOC as a 
strategy for achieving outcomes was also presented. The discussion will now focus on presenting 
those characteristics of a successful IOC, both from an interorganizational level as well as an 
interpersonal level.  
Characteristics of Successful IOC Domain Creation 
One of initial steps that occur when organizations engage is for people with the different 
organizations to be introduced and start working together and sharing information. Gray (1989) 
emphasized that for IOCs to be successful the stakeholder organizations need to develop an 
environment that facilitates the domain actors’ conceptualization of problems and empower the 
them to organize solutions. After observing the development of teams in the interorganizational 
domain McCann (1983) presented three sequential phases for developing the domain that are 
critical to the success of the interorganizational collaboration. Those sequential phases are 
problem setting, direction setting, and structuring (Figure 2.3). McCann described this as a 
natural process as natural but did go on to advise that internal or external forces will influence 
the development of the domain. These additional forces can either have a positive effect on the 
domain, a negative effect, or no effect. 
 
Figure 2.3. Sequential phases of domain development. Adapted from “Design Guidelines for 
Social Problem-Solving Interventions” by J. E. McCann, 1983. Journal of Applied Behavioral 
Science, 19(2). Copyright 1983 by SAGE. Adapated with permission. 
 
Problem Setting
•Agreement on 
common problem
•Stakeholder 
acknowledgement 
and inclusion
•Recognition of 
interdependence 
and power sharing
Direction Setting
•Agreement on 
values that will 
guide behavior and 
actions
•Facilitated by 
broad, but not 
even, distribution 
of power
Structuring
•Development of a 
governing system 
for long term 
management of 
the domain
•Influenced by 
stakeholder 
independence
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Problem setting. Problem setting is the first of the three phases of domain development 
suggested by McCann (1983). In this phase of development stakeholders first agree upon what 
the common problem is that will be addressed or will agree upon a common goal. Unless the 
domain has a clear understanding of purpose it will not be successful. After understanding the 
common problem or common goal stakeholders will seek to be acknowledged and included in 
the domain. It is very possible that previously unrecognized stakeholders will then negotiate to 
have their positions and interests reviewed to confirm the legitimacy of their inclusion in the 
domain. Once the list of stakeholders to be included in the domain is finalized, the various actors 
in the interorganizational domain start to develop an understanding of the interdependence that 
exists.  
A critical factor in accurately determining the common problem, identified above as 
being a critical element in determined the success of the IOC, depends on ensuring all relevant 
stakeholders are included. Vickers (1965) showed that allowing more stakeholders to share their 
perspective of the problem and its impact on them, enables improved understanding of the 
problem to all stakeholders. This broad understanding allows the domain to develop more 
appropriate and precise solutions. These solutions will then be more widely accepted, especially 
if those who must abide by the solution take part in the development of the solution (Van de Ven 
& Delbecq, 1974). 
One may think that inclusion of stakeholders is a relatively easy task. However, Gray 
(1989) pointed out that stakeholders are not always easily identifiable because the timing of their 
concern with the situation may not coincide with all potential stakeholders. Hay (1983) pointed 
out that potential stakeholders will first need to be unsatisfied with the current situation and 
possibly have tried other approaches for improving the situation. Organizations and individuals 
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become aware of problems at different time and the problem begins to affect their operation or 
daily life in different ways. For this reason, all stakeholder may not be aware of the problem at 
the same time or may not have the same sense of urgency at the same time. To address this, Gray 
(1989) proposed the inclusion and exclusion of stakeholders should be treated as a continual 
process.  
Collaboration does take an amount of effort and investment from the stakeholders. For 
this reason, the various stakeholders need to firmly believe that collaborating will produce 
positive outcomes before they invest in a collaborative problem-solving approach (Davidson, 
1976; Schermerhorn, 1975; Schmidt & Kochan, 1977). Gray (1989) suggested that stakeholders 
will enhance their efforts if they expect the benefits of collaborating to outweigh the cost. This 
indicates that stakeholders not only need to be aware of the problem but also need to be 
convinced the benefits of collaborating outweigh the cost of collaborating. Gray suggested that in 
the absence of positive expectations, there will need to be other incentives to attract stakeholders 
to participate.  
Another strategy for attracting stakeholders to collaborate is for them to understand their 
interdependence on other stakeholders. Davidson (1976), Hooyman (1976), and Terreberry 
(1968), all discovered an inherent need for stakeholders to recognize their interdependence with 
the other stakeholders as fundamental requirement to establishing a collaborative relationship. 
Gray (1989) postulated that the extent to which the stakeholders recognize interdependence with 
other stakeholders is an indicator of success in the collaboration. As such, recognition of 
interdependence is an important element when establishing a domain. Clear communication of 
goals and openness on the topic of interdependence is absolutely required to ensure a deep 
understanding of interdependence.  
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Recognizing interdependence among stakeholders is necessary for stakeholders to 
establish their legitimacy and for other stakeholders to recognize their legitimacy (Hooyman, 
1976). Gray (1989) encourages the inclusion of all legitimate stakeholders as it leads to a more 
effective solution and positive IOC outcome. Gray also strongly warned against the exclusion of 
legitimate stakeholders as it will have a negative effect on the quality of the solution and the 
ability to execute on the solution. For this reason, open communication amongst potential 
stakeholders early in domain creation is important as it facilitates recognition of 
interdependence.  
To facilitate the problem setting phase of a domain’s development a leader needs to be 
identified as a person that will initiate the collaborative problem solving (Gray, 1989). Selecting 
a leader of the domain may be easily based if amicable relations between all stakeholders exist 
(Provan, 1983) or could be chosen based on the power dynamics within the domain (Friend & 
Jessop, 1969). In the case that the stakeholders are unable to choose a leader from within the 
existing stakeholders a neutral party may be required to manage the actives of the domain. In this 
situation it is important that the convener possess respect and legitimate authority as well as 
appreciative skills to bring together the different stakeholders. 
Direction setting. Once the common goal is established, the inclusion of stakeholders in 
the domain finalized, and there is a clear understanding of stakeholder interdependence, the 
stakeholders in the domain will discuss the values that will guide the behavior and actions of the 
individual organizations in the IOC domain (McCann, 1983). Knowing the values of all 
stakeholders in the domain will allow for either an informal understanding or a formal and 
published guideline that gives direction on how the domain will proceed forward. This guideline 
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provides guidance on how stakeholders can act and interact while ensuring their activities hinder 
the domain from achieving the stated goal (Gray, 1989). 
Facilitation of the direction setting phase during the establishment of interorganizational 
domain is based on the ability of stakeholders to recognize the values of other stakeholders and is 
most effective when those values are coincidence with the values of the other stakeholder 
(McCann, 1983). Studies by Schermerhorn (1975) and Cheng (2011) showed evidence that 
stakeholders that had harmonious or common goals also had strong coordination when working 
together. Burns (1966) also showed that stakeholders that held similar beliefs and values about 
the problem could more easily agree to the root cause of the problems. This allowed them to 
develop solutions to address the problem. Having an agreed upon goal is important, but also 
having agreed upon values and being aligned with how to achieve the common goal is an 
important element in when establishing an interorganizational domain.  
Direction setting is further facilitated by distribution of power among the stakeholders 
(McCann, 1983). It is very often in interorganizational domains that some stakeholders possess 
greater power than other stakeholders (Aldrich, 1976). This often arises as a direct result in 
unequal access to valuable resources such as financial resources or intellectual property. With 
limited or no access to critically needed resources, some stakeholders can become marginalized 
in this phase of the domain development (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977). There is abundant data 
showing that effective collaboration cannot occur unless there is a sufficient distribution of 
power within the domain (O’Toole & O’Toole, 1981). It is recommended that mechanisms be 
implemented in the governance of the domain to ensure sufficient distribution of power (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1977). However, the mechanism should also avoid equal distribution of power 
within the domain as this will often lead to a stalemate and stagnation of process towards the 
 
 
 
39 
common goal. It is important in the establishment of an interorganizational domain that every 
stakeholder be given a voice. However, equal distribution of power should be avoided because it 
can lead to stagnation (Gray, 1989).        
Structuring. Often in long-term collaborations the common problem and individual 
values of the stakeholders can be dynamic. As stakeholder leadership changes or actors change, 
the perception of what constitute correct values may change. Some stakeholders could leave the 
interorganizational domain and other could enter the domain. Because of these dynamics 
occurring over time it is necessary to have some time of governing system to support long-term 
problem-solving activities, govern stakeholder interactions in a systematic manner, and ensure 
tasks are properly assigned and executed (Kashyap & Sivadas, 2012). In long-term 
collaborations, the role of domain governance become more formal with previously information 
operating norms become institutionalized. 
To facilitate the ongoing governance of the stakeholders in the domain requires continued 
recognition of interdependence of other stakeholders. This acknowledgement will drive the 
stakeholders to continually formalize the details of the domain governance (Van de Ven & 
Walker, 1984). It is also just as critical that as the structure of the governance changes that 
stakeholders are empowered to meet their obligations, as defined in the previous phase of 
domain development. Continued structuring is the preferred method of ensuring a stakeholder is 
not marginalized when there is a high level of interdependence among stakeholders. However, 
IOCs in which stakeholders that are less dependent on each other will tend to have less structured 
engagement (McCann, 1983).  
Another facilitating factor in the structuring phase of domain development is the presence 
of external forces. Hall, Clark, Giordano, Johnson, and Van Roekel (1977) pointed out that 
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external forces will have a varied effect on the structuring of the domain based on the motivating 
factors that initiated the establishment of the domain. For example, coordination within domains 
that interact in more of a voluntary manner are closely associated with the stakeholders having a 
positive perception of the other stakeholders’ competence, compatibility of values, engagement 
frequency, and negotiated power distribution. However, when interorganizational engagement is 
mandated, or forced, many of those collaborative characteristics in the domain structuring are 
absent (Milward, 1982). In situations of mandated interorganizational engagement care must be 
taken to develop a framework of domain governance that ensure balance of power and 
recognition of interdependence amongst stakeholders (Gray, 1989).  
It was discussed how in the direction setting phase, power distribution facilitates the 
establishment of operating rhythms and ensures the values of smaller stakeholders are not 
marginalized. However, the same power distribution that facilitated earlier phases of the domain 
development may not be the optimal power distributions in the structing phase. In the structuring 
phase it may become more desirable to concentrate the power within a few stakeholders if this 
proves to be more efficient at governing stakeholder interactions within the domain (McCann, 
1983). Any change to the power distribution within the domain will likely see some stakeholders 
losing power. This could be perceived in a negative way and so additional incentives might be 
required to complete a redistribution of power (Gray, 1989)     
Proximity of the stakeholders can facilitate collaboration during the structuring phase on 
the interorganizational domain (Schermerhorn, 1975). Geographic proximity increases the 
frequency of interaction and in many cases the critical understanding of interdependence is 
already established (Gray, 1989). Conversely, stakeholders that are geographically dispersed will 
have an increase in cost of engagement due to travel and living costs. Geographically dispersed 
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engagement can also be hindered by time zone differences as well as language and other cultural 
differences.  
Characteristics of Successful IOC Domain Dynamics  
After IOC domains have completed the development phase, they enter in to the period 
where they are expected to perform. Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Bagherzadeh (2015) studied the 
dynamics across the IOC life cycle. They observed that IOCs are exceedingly unstable. They 
defined instability as any change to the way participants in the IOC interact, exchange 
information, make decisions. Previous studies (Franko, 1971; Parkhe, 1996) have suggested that 
such instability is the result of a poorly managed IOC. However, Majchrzak et al. presented data 
indicating domain instability is actually a characteristic associated with positive IOC outcomes. 
These six categories of domain instability are presented in Figure 2.4. Those categories are goal 
dynamics, contracts frame dynamics, interactions style dynamics, decision making control 
dynamics, organizational structure dynamics, and actor composition dynamics. These categories 
of domain dynamics are further described below. 
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Figure 2.4. Characteristics of interorganizational domain dynamics. Adapted from “A Review of 
Interorganizational Collaboration Dynamics,” by A. Majchrzak, S. L. Jarvenpaa, & M. 
Bagherzadeh, Journal of Management, 41(5). Copyright 2015 by SAGE. Adapted with permission. 
 
Goal dynamics. Throughout the duration of an interorganizational collaboration there 
may be a change to the common goal or set of common goals. Goal change may be described as 
either the adjustment to current goal, inclusion of an additional goal, or exclusion of a goal due 
either to completion of the goal or a goal becoming irrelevant (Majchrzak et al., 2015).  
As goals change, are added, or are excluded, the participation of stakeholders in the 
domain will need to be reviewed and some stakeholder may be removed from the domain while 
other may be added. When goals change, and stakeholders are added or removed the power 
distribution will need to be reassessed and new mechanisms developed to ensure efficient power 
distribution (Gray, 1989)  
Contract frame dynamics. Majchrzak et al. (2015) described the contract frame as how 
the collaboration is defined in terms of a combination of transactional and relational based 
 
 
 
43 
governing mechanisms. Dynamics in the contract frame are often driven by change in level of 
trust. In some situations, trust can be lost (Ariño & de la Torre, 1998). However, trust can also be 
increased (Inkpen & Pien, 2006). Trust between stakeholders can evaporate as when 
transactional elements of the relations, such as price, start increasing in importance. Likewise, 
when organizations demonstrate to other stakeholders that they act in the best interest of 
collaboration the level of trust improves and the contract governing mechanism begins to adopt 
relational characteristics founded in trust and respect. Majchrzak et al. (2015) identified 
relational based contract frames as a factor of success in interorganizational collaborations. 
Hence, establishment of trust and respect is a critical success factors for IOCs.       
Interaction style dynamics. Majchrzak et al. (2015) referred to the transparency of 
engagement, motivation, and openness of data sharing, as the interaction style dynamics. This 
category really refers to the style of interpersonal engagement the actors have, although the 
interaction style can be influences by the attitude of the stakeholder. Lack of open in sharing data 
can be a result of lack of trust, misaligned values, common goals developed without sufficient 
stakeholder input, or preference of one or more stakeholders to not share sensitive information. 
Conversely, interorganizational collaborations that adopted a more cooperative interaction style 
based on trust and mutual respect were more likely to success achieve their goals. In this aspect it 
is important for stakeholders to adopt a positive attitude with regards to the IOC, this will impact 
how the actors in the organization approach working in the interorganizational domain. It is also 
important to select the people who have a positive disposition towards IOC, from within the 
organization, to participate within the interorganizational domain.  
Decision making control dynamics. This point refers not only to how the              
decision-making process occurs within the interorganizational domain, but also, to the level of 
 
 
 
44 
empowerment of the actors from the different stakeholder (Majchrzak et al., 2015). IOCs in 
which the domain actors are empowered can propose and even test potential solutions without 
review and approval from leadership. Actors that are not empowered to make decision are 
required to engage internally within their organization before suggesting a new solution or 
agreeing to a proposition from another stakeholder (Tsasis, 2009). This can cause the interactive 
process to become very slow. Slow processes will be slow to deliver any type of result and could 
affect the moral of those actors in the interorganizational domain. Decision making control 
dynamics, or the level of empowerment, can also change over time (Majchrzak et al., 2015). The 
ability to make decisions can move in one of two directions. Either the senior leadership at a 
stakeholder will empower its technical team working in the interorganizational domain or they 
will themselves become more involved in making decisions. Majchrzak et al. (2015) showed that 
interorganizational collaborations that empowered the technical team to have direct input and 
control over decision making had increased chances of achieving positive and successful 
outcomes.  
Organizational structure dynamics. Majchrzak et al. (2015) used the term 
organizational structure dynamics to refer to the degree by which processes and roles within the 
interorganizational domain are standardized and formalized. Standardizing the formalizing the 
roles and processes within the domain provides an opportunity to clearly communicate 
expectations from all actors. With standardized and formal roles and processes the actors 
understand what they are expected to do or the standard process to use. This will ensure there is 
no dropped communication or missed assignments. Majchrzak et al. concluded that increasing 
the structure within the interorganizational domain with regards to processes, rules, and role 
development had a significant impact on the success of the interorganizational collaboration.  
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When changes to the scope of the interorganizational collaboration and the number of 
participants from the stakeholders occur, the domain will also benefit from having standardized 
and formal roles and processes. For example, the alliance between General Electric and 
SNECMA developed new sets of organizational processes in parallel with the increased 
engagement of the partner firms (Doz, 1996). In this example, the collaboration between two 
organizations increased and the standardized and formal roles and processes increased to 
accommodate the change in engagement.   
Actor composition dynamics. The actors within the interorganizational domain are those 
individuals who are either stakeholders themselves or are working as part of the stakeholder 
organization and are working together within the interorganizational domain (Majchrzak et al., 
2015). Often, especially in the cases of long-term interorganizational collaboration, that 
individuals working within the domain may take new positions within their organization or leave 
the organization (Salk & Shenkar, 2001). This will force the stakeholder organization to either 
replace them as an actor in the domain or continue with few actors representing their interest. 
Likewise, an entire organization may remove themselves from the IOC for voluntary or 
involuntary reasons. White (2005) provides an example of a ruling by the European Union that 
forced the Dutch government to withdraw from a joint venture with NedCar. In this case, a legal 
ruling forced a stakeholder to withdraw from the IOC. 
Characteristics of Successful Stakeholder Engagement 
The previous section identified those elements of domain establishment and dynamics 
associated with successful IOC outcomes. This section looks more closely at the interpersonal 
engagements within the domain to understand the characteristics and collaborative patterns that 
drive successful IOC outcomes. When organizations collaborate individuals, acting on behalf of 
 
 
 
46 
their organization, will engage with other individuals from different organizations. As one of the 
primary benefits of IOC is the sharing and creation of knowledge, it understood that the 
individuals interacting will have expertise in different areas and will have different experiences. 
If all actors in the IOC domain have the same knowledge, interpret the knowledge in the same 
way, and have the same experience then there is little to no opportunity benefit from knowledge 
sharing (Majchrzak et al., 2015). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) identified one of the most 
valuable types of shared information as tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge, or implicit 
knowledge, can be very beneficial to an organization; however, it is very difficult to transfer this 
knowledge to another person or organization.  
There can be many challenges faced when two organizations engage. One challenge can 
materialize while trying to communicate. Collaborating organizations often use different jargon 
and it may actually seem like they speak a different language (Majchrzak et al., 2015). To avoid 
confusion, actors in the interorganizational domain need to use clear language when 
communicating across organizational boundaries. This means using phases and full terms instead 
of acronyms. Also, organizations should seek to eliminate the use of colloquial or informal 
words or phrases.  
Organizations participating in an IOC may have different internal processes (Majchrzak 
et al., 2015). This is particularly important with regards to compliance or financial approvals. 
Organizations based in different countries may have different regulatory and audit requirement 
that require different processes. An actor in an IOC domain should not assume the other 
stakeholder organizations use the same internal processes as their organizations. Cross-boundary 
communication should not focus on following a process but achieving specific outcomes and 
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allowing the respective actors to work with their internal processes to achieve those specific 
outcomes.  
  Organizations and individuals can also interpret information and assign value to 
information in different ways based on their knowledge, experience, and desired outcome 
(Majchrzak et al., 2015). In this type of situation organizations within an IOC may see the same 
information and interpret it differently. Fisher and Ury (1981) help to illustrate this point. In their 
example, two individuals are fighting over an orange. Only after open and transparent discourse 
do they realize the orange has different value to each of them. One of the individuals is a chef 
who wants the skin of the orange to add orange zest to a dish they are working on. The other just 
wants the fruit of the orange because they are hungry! This is a great example about how 
individuals, acting on the interest of their organization, can assign different meaning and value to 
the same information.       
In the example describe above, through a pattern of engagement the individuals were able 
to share information as well as the value of the information with each other. Stakeholder and 
actor engagement require the same time of open engagement to avoid stagnation of process and 
facilitate successful outcomes. This section will focus on the characteristics and elements of this 
engagement that help lead to successful outcomes.  
Tsasis (2009) interviewed directors and managers with IOC experience and asked them to 
identify critical factors of the inter-stakeholder relationship that facilitated a collaborative 
relationship. The results from the 41 interviews showed that having complimentary goals, a 
shared vision, and clearly negotiated roles were critical to creating a collaborative environment.  
Goal alignment. Common or complementary goals allows for reciprocal exchanges 
among individuals and organizations (Tsasis, 2009). A shared vision enables the different 
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individuals and organizations to learn how to work together more effectively and helps them 
understand or predict actions of the other stakeholders and actors. These findings are consistent 
with Dougherty (1992) who showed one critical aspect of the team in the interorganizational 
domain is having the ability to create a shared perspective.  
Clear roles and responsibilities. Tsasis (2009) highlighted that having clearly negotiated 
roles within the IOC domain are a factor critical to the success of the IOC. Dougherty (2017) 
also confirmed that undermanagement can result in confusion in the roles of others and 
expectations of others in the group. People collaborate to complete what is expected or 
demanded of them. For this reason, the actors inside the interorganizational domain need to 
know what is expected of them and what they should expect from others.  
Social interaction. Social activities and engagement do play an important role in 
knowledge sharing and knowledge creation (Tsasis, 2009). Social activities facilitate the 
development of trust within the interpersonal relationships found in the IOC. Tsasis found that, 
even in situations where engaging organizations had differing agendas, trust improved the 
engagement of the stakeholders as the individuals felt confident that the others would respect 
each other’s interest. The development of trust between engaging organizations and actors is 
facilitated by social interaction.  
Characteristics of Unsuccessful Stakeholder Engagement 
In addition to the characteristics of stakeholder and actor engagement that are associated 
with positive IOC outcomes this chapter will also consider characteristics associated with 
negative IOC outcomes. Black (2002) identified knowledge inaccessibility, discrepancies among 
the collaborators in role-specific experience, and perception of threats from working outside of 
expected roles as critical elements of engagement that negatively impact collaborative patterns.  
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Stakeholders and actors within the IOC domain should continually review the IOC domain for 
these characteristics as presented below.  
Knowledge inaccessibility. The first characteristic of uncollaborative engagements is 
lack of access to shared knowledge for some stakeholders (Black, 2002). Lack of sufficient 
access may not be the result of one stakeholder intentionally restricting the access of another 
stakeholder, but rather through the use of inappropriate knowledge sharing mediums. A medium, 
in this context, is any object or technology that aids in communication.  
For example, when giving directions, one person may point to a building as reference or 
motion with their hand to indicate the correct direction to turn. However, when the topic being 
discussed becomes more detailed or more technical the knowledge transfer medium needs to 
support the transfer of knowledge. Communicating design requirements for a new aircraft 
requires much more than hand gestures. A discussion about details of a new regulation would 
likely benefit by the use of a visual aid, such as a series of PowerPoint slides. These aids can 
visually highlight the main points and help others understand the connection between the 
different points. A PowerPoint slide may not be as useful during a discussion of the ability of an 
aircraft part to be manufactured. In this case, a 3D model may be more appropriate.  
It should be recognized that access to mediums may not the same for all stakeholders 
(Black, 2002). For example, some regions of the world have very unreliable internet while other 
regions take for granted a reliable and fast internet connection. Those stakeholders that have a 
fast and reliable internet connection may not understand the internet connectivity problems of the 
other stakeholders. This can result in an uneven amount of knowledge transfer among different 
stakeholders.  
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Role-specific experience. A second characteristic of uncollaborative engagements is 
having a large discrepancy in the knowledge or experience of the stakeholders. In IOCs in which 
there are mismatches in knowledge or role experience, those stakeholders with more knowledge 
or role experience would likely take control of the domain (Black, 2002). Those stakeholders 
with less experience or less knowledge often feel intimidated by the more knowledgeable and 
experienced stakeholders. As a result, they are less likely to provide input into the discussions 
and the resulting outcomes of the IOC do not fully address the needs of some of the stakeholders. 
An organization can only control who they send as actors into the IOC domain, they do 
not have influence who the other stakeholders send into the IOC domain. For this reason, it is 
difficult to manage the actual experience or knowledge of the other actors in the domain. 
Organizations can prepare for this by coaching actors on how to engage someone that has less 
knowledge or experience as well as someone with more knowledge and experience (Black, 
2002).  
Working outside of expected roles. A third characteristic of uncollaborative 
engagements occurs when different stakeholders feel threatened by other stakeholders. As actors 
in the IOC domain and share knowledge is it possible that some actors will learns skills that 
other actors feel to be in their domain (Black, 2002). Black provided an example were hospital 
technicians experienced with using a new CAT scan technology had learned how to interpret the 
results of the CAT scan. Many of the doctors new to this technology felt threatened when the 
technicians interpreted the result. The doctors viewed analysis of test results as being within their 
area of ownership and having a technician explain the result to them felt threatening.  
Black (2002) also identified elements of the stakeholder interactions that can be used to 
change the engagement from uncollaborative to collaborative. These elements consist of the 
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artifact, action, location, and timing associated with the interactions. The key to using these 
elements to change the direction of the collaboration, lies in the ability of the stakeholders to 
self-review the effectiveness of the ongoing collaborations and identify areas of improvement.  
As two stakeholders engage, they must review their knowledge of the collaboration and 
determine if they are receiving sufficient knowledge from the other stakeholder. If they are not, 
they must assess the engagement in terms of location of the engagement, timing of the 
engagement, use of knowledge sharing mediums, as well as the activity that occurs during the 
engagement. Stakeholders must also seek to understand if the other stakeholder is able to access 
and understand the information being discussed sufficiently for them to meet their commitments. 
The engaging stakeholder need to be able to provide feedback so that the cross-boundary design 
of the cross-boundary engagement can evolve to facilitate and not hinder the transfer of 
knowledge between the stakeholders (Black, 2002).  
 Black (2002) also highlighted the importance of trust though social interaction as a means 
of transforming a noncollaborative engagement into a collaborative one. Trust can be defined as 
the willingness of actors to engage with each other is strongly influenced by trust and trust is 
strongly influenced by a history of successful outcomes (Tsasis, 2009) and positive engagement 
(Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Hardin (2001) described the synergy between trust and engagement 
as a type of positive cycle in which each element continually compliments the other. Luna-Reyes 
and Andersen (2007) studied the relationship between trust and stakeholder engagement. Figure 
2.5 provides a visual representation of interconnected process of stakeholder engagement and 
trust development in an IOC.  
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Figure 2.5. Process of engagement. From “Towards a Theory of Interorganizational 
Collaboration: Generic Structures of Cross-Boundary Requirements Analysis” by L. Luna-Reyes 
& D. Andersen, 2007, from Proceedings of the International Conference of the System Dynamics 
Society. Copyright 2007 by Luis Luna-Reyes & David Andersen. Used with permission. 
 
The progress of engagement is an iterative process. Therefore, it is difficult to choose a 
starting point in the process. Considering the case of two organizations with little or no history of 
interaction it is reasonable to assume that these organizations would initially rely solely 
institutional trust (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2007). When organization enter into an IOC, they 
will have a formal agreement or contract that details the arrangement. The contracts can add 
clarity to the expectations of each stakeholder as well as how the profit will be shared. 
Institutional trust refers to the penalties written into contracts for not meeting expectation or 
commitments. Institutional trust can also refer to regulatory consequences imposed by a 
governmental organization.  
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Institutional trust is often the first type of trust developed simply because it is not 
dependent on a relationship. Institutional trust also organizations to predict the behavior and 
actions of another stakeholder. Repeated engagements allow the relationship two develop 
between two organizations (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2007). This relationship will facilitate trust 
between the organization, especially if the organizations demonstrate that they act in the best 
interest of the IOC and not themselves. Trust in anther organization is a combination of the 
reputation of the other organizations, an assessment of the risks and rewards of engagement, as 
well as experiences of previous engagements.  
Once an organization is comfortable with the level institutional trust established their 
willingness to engage will increase and the organizations will perform some level of work 
together. The act of engaging with another organization has two effects. First, each organization 
will understand the project from the other’s perspective. In other words, each organization will 
begin to understand how the other stakeholder interpret and value data. This common 
understanding will facilitate knowledge transfer and understanding of the organization’s needs 
with respect to the project (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2007). The common understanding of how 
stakeholders interpret, and value information is visualized by the smaller circle in Figure 2.5.  
The second effect of the interorganizational engagement is that each organization will 
have experience collaboration with the other. A positive collaboration experience will increase 
the perception of trustworthiness in the other organization. A positive collaboration experience 
can be a collaboration that successfully achieved a common goal or desired outcome. A positive 
collaboration experience can also be one in which the goal or outcome was not achieved, but the 
stakeholders and actors demonstrated they are willing to work in the best interest of the IOC. In 
this case trust between the stakeholders is established. Increased perception of trustworthiness in 
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the other stakeholder will lead to an increased willingness to work together. This is represented 
by the larger process loop in Figure 2.5.  
Characteristics of Successful Knowledge Sharing in an IOC 
One of the primary motivations for an organization to engage in collaborative 
relationships with other organizations is to develop a competitive advantage through the pooling 
and sharing of resources (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2007). As previously described, one of these 
resources that is often shared is knowledge. The benefits of interorganizational knowledge 
sharing are widely acknowledged (K.-H. Chang & Gotcher, 2007; B. Chen, 2010; Selnes & 
Sallis, 2003). It is also widely agreed that a critical characteristic of successful IOCs is their 
ability to effectively and efficiently share knowledge in order to create competitive advantages 
(L.-Y. Li, 2006; Liu, 2012). A great example of interorganizational knowledge sharing is the 
example of the CFM engine program, which is arguably the most successful aircraft engine 
program in the history of aviation (Doz, 1996). This engine program is the result of a joint 
venture between GE Aviation, an aircraft engine manufacturer based in the United States, and 
Safran Aircraft Engines, based in France. Both parent organizations brought their knowledge and 
ability into the joint venture domain to complement the knowledge and ability of the other 
organization (Doz, 1996). The purpose of this section of Chapter II is to understand the 
facilitating factors for interorganizational learning (IOL).    
Wang and Noe (2010) defined knowledge sharing as providing “task information and 
know-how to help others and to collaborate with others to solve problems, develop new ideas, or 
implement policies and procedures” (p. 117). The interactive process of knowledge sharing is 
termed interorganizational learning (Huang & Chu, 2010). IOL is defined as a joint activity 
where parties share information, interpret it, and integrate it (Selnes & Sallis, 2003). The process 
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of interorganizational learning allows organizations to have access to new knowledge, 
techniques, and resources (Fang, Fang, Chou, Yang, & Tsai, 2011). It is agreed that knowledge 
exchange is required for IOL, however there is no consensus what actions result in IOL. This 
section of Chapter II provides insight from previous studies on the factors and conditions that 
facilitate knowledge sharing and IOL.  
The number of studies and publications addressing interorganizational learning is quite 
limited. The gap in research has been identified by other researchers (Crossan, Lane, White, & 
Djurfeldt, 1995; Easterby-Smith, Lyles, & Tsang, 2008; Lane, 2001; Mariotti, 2012). However, 
the limited information available does reveal that interorganizational learning is complex. 
Mariotti (2012) developed a framework for understanding IOL as a series of underlying 
processes. Those processes were identified as learning how to collaborate, learning how to share 
knowledge, and how to create knowledge. This view of IOL as a series of processes is consistent 
with the perspective of IOL as a series of interorganizational engagements that lead to the 
establishment of interorganizational relationships (Y. H. Chen, Lin, & Yen, 2014). The following 
section will present and discuss critical aspects of the IOL process that are associated with 
successful IOC outcomes.  
Type of Knowledge Being Transferred and Type of Engagement  
Fundamentally, there are two different types of information. Explicit knowledge is easily 
communicated and does not require context (Collins, 2010). An example of explicit knowledge 
in the aviation industry would be the knowledge communicated between pilots and air traffic 
control (ATC) during take-off and landing. This information exchanged is clear. ATC 
communicates the path the pilot should follow. This will include speed, direction, and altitude. 
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There should be no need for reciprocal discussion for the pilot to understand what the ATC is 
communicating. 
The other type of information exchanged is tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge heavily 
contextual and based on experience. It is not easily codified and communicated (Collins, 2010). 
An example of tacit knowledge in the aviation industry would be how to share technical 
information within an airline organization. Engine manufacturers provide best practice 
information on performing inspection and maintenance tasks. Best practices are                     
experience-based knowledge that cannot easily be included verbalized or textualized. To 
effectively share this information a demonstration needs to be performed and reciprocal 
communication allowed in which the intended audience can ask clarifying questions.  
Due to the fundamental difference between tacit and explicit information, the transfer and 
communication of these different types of information is facilitated by different methods. 
Explicit information can be communicated using one-way communication such as manual, 
public service announcements, or customer portals. Conversely tacit knowledge, which is highly 
contextual, may require engagement included back-and-forth communication to be effectively 
transferred (Collins, 2010). Tacit knowledge may have a different meaning for different 
functional groups and as such would be interpreted differently from stakeholder to stakeholder.  
As discussed before, understanding the value of information to each organization is a 
critical step to understanding how best to communicate. Scott (2000) defined interorganizational 
transfer of explicit knowledge as lower-level IOL. In lower level IOL, an organization 
communicates explicit knowledge while the receiving organization adjusts operations and 
behavior accordingly. This is one-way data sharing. Scott went on to define interorganizational 
transfer of tacit knowledge as higher-level IOL. Higher-level IOL requires increased engagement 
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from different functional groups and internal changes within each organization to interpret, 
internalize, and disseminate the acquired knowledge within the organization.  
To facilitate IOL it is important that the type of information being transferred is 
understood as either tacit or explicit knowledge. Appropriate engagement is optimized based on 
the type of data being shared. Scott (2000) also identified information technologies that facilitate 
the different types of data sharing. Explicit knowledge that requires one-way communication can 
be shared through web portals or one-way emails. However, tacit knowledge cannot be 
communicated by the same use of information technologies. Instead, communication of tacit 
knowledge requires more engagement and reciprocal communication. Information technologies 
that support informal communication are well suited to facilitate higher-level IOL. These types 
of information technologies include emails, phone calls, teleconference, and video conference.  
Relational factors. Relational factors refer to the characteristics of the relationship 
between stakeholders in any type of interorganizational engagement, including an IOC (Das & 
Teng, 2001). As stated earlier, the similarities or dissimilarities in the goals, stratifies, and values 
of the collaborating organization will influence how engage with each other. Likewise, the power 
distribution within the IOC will also affect the way organizations interact with each other. There 
are generally two types of governance mechanisms used to manage interorganizational 
engagements: trust and contract (Das & Teng, 2001).  
Contract is a type of relational engagement used when the relationship between two 
stakeholders is transactional in nature or the stakeholders do not share either common values or a 
common goal (Das & Teng, 2001). Stakeholder engagement that is based on equal power 
distribution, common values, or common goals is more often based on trust between the 
stakeholders and trust between the actors. These types of stakeholder holder engagements are 
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governed by relational governance (Cheng, 2011). Interorganizational knowledge sharing is 
facilitated by IOCs that develop a strong social relationship and mutual trust at an 
interorganizational level. The use of trust as a mechanism of governing stakeholder relations in s 
an IOC is shown to facilitate interorganizational knowledge sharing (Hoejmose, Brammer, & 
Millington, 2012). Likewise, having a common goal, organizational values, and similar strategies 
are facilitating factors of IOL (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).    
The ability of individuals to understand each other, by use of a commonly understood 
language, is a critical element to effective knowledge sharing. Likewise, the ability of an 
individual to establish themselves as trustworthy as well as establish trust in the those they are 
engaging with is critical to IOL (Soekijad & Andriessen, 2003). The establishment of trust 
between individuals is a key factor in determining the amount of knowledge shared as well as the 
nature of the knowledge sharing (Panteli & Sockalingam, 2005).  
Trust. “Interorganizational trust is the cornerstone of business partnerships and nurtures 
the intention of knowledge acquisition and sharing outside organizational boundaries” (Panteli & 
Sockalingam, 2005, p. 599). Organizations approach opportunities for interorganizational 
knowledge sharing from a perspective of risk versus benefit perspective (Ke, Liu, Wei, Gu, & 
Chen, 2009). The greater the benefit, relative to the risk, the organization perceives the 
engagement the more likely they will enter in to a collaborative and reciprocal relationship. A 
high degree of trust, whether due to contractual or relational reasons, reduces the perceived risk 
and facilitates the interorganizational exchange of information (Cai, Jun, & Yang, 2006).  
Factors of Successfully Establishing Trust in an IOC 
 The importance of trust as a critical element in the sharing of knowledge across 
interorganizational boundaries and improving stakeholder engagement has been discussed 
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previously in this chapter. This section will focus on those critical elements that helps to 
establish an organization as trustworthy and sets the foundation for engagement governed by 
trust. When organizations engage and share of knowledge across boundaries there is an amount 
of risk that each organization accepts. This risk could be related to financial exposure or 
exposure due to a loss of intellectual property or competitive advantage. For example, an 
organization may allocate fund to develop new facilities physically closer to the organizations 
they are engaging. In this case, the organization may not receive a return on their investment into 
the IOC. Organizations also take a risk when sharing information with other external 
organizations (Rajala, 2018). The risks they accept is that the other organization, once having 
received information, may act in an opportunistic manner (Williamson, 1991) by using acquired 
knowledge to complete against the former organization.  
With regards to is importance in an IOC, trust encompasses two aspects of the 
relationship. The first aspect of trust refers to the stakeholder’s competence to meet their 
commitments to IOC (Nelson & Cooprider, 1996). This aspect is fundamentally focused on 
whether the organization can do what is expected of them. The second aspect of trust refers to 
the assertion that an organization has the intentions fulfill commitments and act in the best 
interest of the IOC without the need to be monitored. In other words, this aspect is fundamentally 
focused on whether the organization will do what is expected of them. Being able to assess an 
organization’s trustworthiness is affected by several factors. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) 
identified three relationship phases that are primarily driven by trust: calculus-based trust, 
knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust.  
Calculus-based trust. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) described calculus-based, or 
calculative trust (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2007), as solely dependent on an economic analysis 
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of the cost of maintaining an interorganizational engagement and the projected benefit. This type 
of trust is based on clear, explicit expectations defined in contracts and penalties for breach of 
the contract. Using contracts as a basis for stakeholder engagement gives organizations the 
ability to calculate the exposure they are accepting by entering into a relationship. They can also 
build safeguards into the contract to mitigate their risk. This provides stakeholders with 
institutional trust (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2007).  
Knowledge-based trust. As organizations engage and collaborate, they develop 
knowledge of each other. This knowledge allows an organization to assess the trustworthiness of 
the other organization (Y. H. Chen et al., 2014). This view of trust development as a process of 
continued interorganizational engagement is consistent with the interorganizational trust 
development model developed by Luna-Reyes and Andersen (2007) in Figure 2.6. This model 
describes the process for developing interorganizational trust.  
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Figure 2.6. Process of development of trust. Adapted from “Towards a Theory of 
Interorganizational Collaboration: Generic Structures of Cross-Boundary Requirements 
Analysis” by L. Luna-Reyes & D. Andersen, 2007, from Proceedings of the International 
Conference of the System Dynamics Society. Copyright 2007 by Luis Luna-Reyes & David 
Andersen. Adapted with permission. 
This iterative process depends on re-occurring engagement for organizations to 
understand the needs of the other organization as well as their own needs. Through these 
repetitive engagements organizations also determine the trustworthiness of the other 
organization. Previous engagements, where positive or negative, impact the desire of the 
organizations to engage in future collaborations.  
Organizations collaborating for the first time will rely primarily on calculative trust, 
which is founded in institutional trust, as well as a priori perceptions (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 
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2007). A priori perceptions are biases or stereotypes that effect the development of 
interorganizational and interpersonal trust. A priori perception can have a very strong influence 
in the trustworthiness of the other individuals as well as organizations. As a result, this influence 
may be stronger than the knowledge and calculative based trust mechanisms early in the 
relationship (Kanter, 1994). This could lead to a lack of trust early on in the relationship and 
would have negative impact on the collaboration and development of trust (Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Identity-based trust. The third characteristic presented by Lewicki and Bunker (1996) 
focuses on similarities of the engaging organizations with regards to value, strategies, and 
common goals. Morgan and Hunt (1994) presented a definition of shared values as a common 
belief with regards to what is right and what is wrong. Common values also include a common 
belief on the importance and appropriateness of items or actions. Common values, goals, and 
strategies act as a guide to understanding the other stakeholders in the IOC (Pavlou, 2002). 
Based on this understanding organizations can better predict the behavior of other stakeholders; 
this allows a better understanding of the risk of engagement. Shared goals have been identified 
by previous studies as critical to the establishment of trust and effective collaboration (Chow & 
Chan, 2008; L. Li, 2005).  
Background on Airline Management and Performance 
The first part of this chapter focused on the nature of interorganizational collaboration 
and those critical elements that lead to successful outcomes. This portion of the literature review 
was important as it identifies those characteristics of the OEM-airline engagement that the 
dissertation focuses on to understand better those strategies that OEMs can use to drive more 
effective engagement with airlines, particularly in Africa. Understanding how airlines operate 
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and how their performance is measured is critical to understanding their goals, values, as well as 
how they likely would interpret data such as maintenance requirement communicated from either 
an OEM or regulatory entity  As discussed earlier in  this chapter, two of the fundamental 
elements associated with successful IOC outcomes are having aligned goals and values and 
understanding how the other stakeholder interprets information.  
Airline management and performance are each a driving factor in the way that airlines 
make decisions and interpret data. Airline management consist of the day-to-day activities 
needed to ensure the airline is providing the services that customers have paid for. Airline 
management include cleaning and maintenance of aircraft. In the case aircraft are delayed or 
unavailable the airline must recover from the disruption by reassigning aircraft to different routes 
and by rebooking passengers on different routes. Airline operations also include the selling of 
tickets and the setting of a price for a specific ticket.  
After reviewing airline operations, I then focus on performance metrics used to assess 
how well the airline is performing both from a financial and safety perspective. Financial metrics 
will drive actions by airline leadership because these metrics communicate to potential investors 
and lenders the financial health of the airline. An airline that wants to grow its operations in 
terms of fleet size or wants to upgrade the equipment being used by the airline would need to 
raise capital. The interest rate on bank loans or the required dividend the airline would need to 
pay is affected by the financial metrics of the airline. To keep an airline’s cost of capital low, its 
leadership must ensure that financial metrics are achieved. Likewise, an airline that wants to 
grow its fleet by adding up service to other countries will find that safety performance is a factor 
is being approved to fly and land in many countries. Ensuring the airline has sufficient safety 
record to increase operations is also another priority of the airline leadership.  
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Airline management. The focus of this dissertation is to understand how OEMs can 
better engage with airlines, particularly in Africa, so that critical information regarding 
maintenance and operation of the aircraft or engine is transferred effectively. The desired 
outcome of this improved engagement would result in reduced exposure to accidents and 
incidents. Understanding the other stakeholders in an IOC is a fundamental, yet critical, element 
in the establishment of effective engagement and collaborative engagement. Understanding how 
airlines operate, what they value, and how they interpret data will improve an OEM’s ability to 
effectively engage and transfer knowledge. Fundamental elements of airline management are 
presented in detail below.  
Like any business, airlines incur cost through business operations. The ability of an 
airline to manage costs in such a way as to maximize profit is an important measure of the 
leadership of an airline. For this reason, it is important to understand how costs are reported on 
required financial reports. Knowing how to read and parse out relevant data from an airline’s 
financial report and interpret these data is critical to understanding the financial health and 
profitability of the airline. Financial reports are the primary indicator of success for airline 
operations. In addition, the cost data can be compared to other airlines for purposes of 
comparison.  
Most airlines are required to provide financial data to the United States Department of 
Transportation (US DOT), for airlines registered in the United States, or ICAO for all other 
airlines. There are two techniques used for categorizing costs. The first is method for 
categorizing data is to categorize the airlines costs as production costs that result in an output of 
the airline, or what would be considered direct costs. This method is considered an 
administrative categorization. Administrative cost categorization is typically used in financial 
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reports but can be difficult to analyze. A detailed review of administrative cost categorization 
would provide little benefit, in terms of dissertation preparation since data categorized in such a 
way is not usable. As such, this chapter will not include a detailed review of administrative cost 
categorization. 
 Aircraft and engine maintenance costs, along with the cost required to maintain other 
equipment, are categorized in flight operations costs (Belobaba, 2009). All aircraft, engines, 
components, and systems on the aircraft must follow a strict maintenance program in order to 
meet airworthiness certifications. Without these certifications the respective equipment cannot be 
operated. For example, the typical aircraft has inspection requirements on various structural and 
systems related components. These repetitive inspection inspections have intervals that are based 
on aircraft utilization in terms of cycles or flight hours. Likewise, engines and other components 
on the aircraft also require regular inspections and component replacement. Airlines generally 
schedule the engine and other maintenance to coincide with the aircraft maintenance to 
maximize the availability of the aircraft to generate revenue.  
During the airline schedule optimization process a careful and detailed planning review is 
completed to ensure aircraft are allowed time for required periodic maintenance checks 
(Barnhart, 2009a). All aircraft are required to complete periodic maintenance checks, and if they 
are not able to complete the maintenance checks they must be grounded until the maintenance is 
performed; grounded aircraft can result in flight cancellations and other major disruptions to 
operations.  
Unplanned maintenance, such as maintenance caused by issuance of service bulletins and 
airworthiness directives, disrupts this carefully optimized airlines schedule and can cause the 
airline to pull aircraft out of planned service to perform the maintenance tasks. Pulling an aircraft 
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from service reduces the availability of the aircraft to support operations and can cause an 
aircraft to be grounded until the maintenance is performed.  
 When the carefully optimized schedule is disrupted, the airline must engage in schedule 
recovery efforts. The goal of this effort is to reschedule, re-allocate, and reassign aircraft and 
crews in order to return to optimal network schedule, fleet type assignment, and crew pairings. 
Schedule recovery efforts require a great deal of effort and engagement with operations 
controllers, crew planners, customer service coordinators, dispatch, and air traffic control.  
To manage normal operations and disruptions, known as irregular operations, airlines 
utilize an Airline Operations Control Centers (AOCC), commonly called Integrated Operations 
Control Centers (IOCC). The purpose of the IOCC is the ensure safe airline operations; they 
constantly communicate with Air Navigation Service providers as well as other airlines to 
monitor network operations and intervene where there is a disruption in the schedule. If a 
disturbance does occur it is the responsibility of the IOCC to manage aircraft, crew, and 
passenger recovery efforts, to recover from irregular operations (IROPS). IOCC is comprised of 
the following functional groups (Barnhart, 2009b) operations controllers, crew planners, 
customer service coordinator, dispatch, and air traffic control.  
Airline safety performance. In 2011, the number of air traffic accidents in Africa was 
nine times higher than the global average (“Africa’s Aviation Industry,” 2012). As a result, The 
African Development Bank ranked safety and security as the number one most pressing 
challenge facing African airlines. The high number of air traffic accidents is due primarily to the 
lack of adoption of international safety standards, as well as the lack of government regulations 
that strictly enforce these same international safety standards.  
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In response to the urgent need for increased safety and security standards, the African 
Union drafted a strategic action plan, the Africa Strategic Improvement Action Plan (ASIAP), 
with the support of the ICAO and IATA that targets increased safety and security for African 
aviation (ICAO, 2012). The goal of this strategic action was to establish independent civil 
aviation authorities for each country, implement effective and transparent oversight systems, 
complete an IATA Operational Safety Audit for all airlines in Africa, implement accident 
prevention measures focused on runway safety and loss of control, and implementation of Flight 
Data Analysis (FDA) and Safety Management Systems (SMS). 
In 2015, ICAO released a report (ICAO, 2015) that identified actions required as part of 
the effort to improve aviation safety in Africa, one of which was “to increase the number of 
qualified personnel at the industry and oversight levels” (p. 12). Based on the input from 
previous academic, industry, and regulatory reports and studies it is exceeding clear that one 
critical aspect improving safety conditions in airline industry in Africa is the strategic 
engagement of original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and the individual airlines. As such, my 
dissertation focuses on critical success factors of the OEM-airline engagement in terms of 
reducing exposure to accidents and incidents and improving airline safety.  
Before engaging in an exercise to identify the critical elements of the OEM’s engagement 
with the airline that facilitate improved safety performance it is important to understand the topic 
of airline safety and become familiar with the internationally recognized reporting standard. A 
systematic literature review revealed that accident rate is the accepted metric for airline safety 
performed. However, an overwhelming number of academic publications also included incident 
rate as an indicator of airline safety. Some researchers and safety officials estimate the incident 
rate can be between 10 to 100 times the accident rate (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2011). There is no 
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empirical evidence that incident rate provide insight into the probability of accidents. However, 
the occurrence of an incident reveals the hazards that can also lead to accidents (Cusick et al., 
2017). This dissertation investigates how OEMs can improve their engagement with airlines to 
reduce hazards, which can lead to occurrence of accidents and incidents.  
Folasade Odutola, former Airworthiness and Safety Director Nigerian Federal Civil 
Aviation Authority and now independent consultant to ICAO in Montreal, pointed out that one 
of the most challenging safety issues in Africa is the attitude and approach to maintenance (F.  
Odutola, personal communication, December 16, 2017). Maintenance for aircraft and engines is 
one of the largest operational costs that an airline must financially plan for. Often, smaller 
African airlines purchase older aircraft and engines to reduce cost. However, it is often not well 
understood that older aircraft, although less expensive to purchase, could result in much greater 
financial commitments later, when heavy maintenance is required. The lack of understanding of 
a concept called maintenance reserve, an accounting method used to save money to cover the 
cost of the required maintenance, can lead to shortage of financial resource to pay for needed 
maintenance.  
Creating an appropriate maintenance reserve requires a technical support team to 
understand the incremental maintenance cost incurred during every flight cycle and flight hour. 
Folasade continued by pointing out that often the smaller airlines lack trained and qualified 
personnel to understand the short-term and long-term maintenance tasks required on the aircraft 
(F. Odutola, personal communication, December 16, 2017). It is very easy, and very common, to 
underestimate the actual cost of the maintenance and thus will not have sufficient funds available 
when maintenance is due and will cut costs as the determine of the aircraft   
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Chapter Summary 
This literature review first focused on those characteristics and elements of 
interorganizational engagement that are associated with positive outcomes of IOCs. The review 
sought to differentiate collaborative engagement from other types of engagement strategies that 
organizations utilize. Collaborative engagement occurs when engaging stakeholders have 
common values and goals that are aligned. Collaborative engagement was focused on because 
this type of engagement closely matches the engagement of an airline and an OEM when the 
motivation for engagement is the common goal of safe operation aircraft and engines. 
After identifying the type of interorganizational engagement that best describes the 
relationship between the airline and OEM with regards to maintaining safe operations, the 
literature review focused on critical characteristics of IOC. The critical characteristics fell into 
two categories, interorganizational characteristics and interpersonal characteristics.  
The critical characteristics from an interorganizational perspective focus on the 
establishment and management of the interorganizational domain. When first establishing the 
domain, it is important that the collaborating stakeholders take time to clearly define the problem 
the IOC is being established to address. Without this clear understanding, the interorganizational 
engagement will have no hope of a successful outcome. After all stakeholders have agreed upon 
the problem statement, the next step is to agree upon the values that will guide the stakeholder 
engagement, this step is called direction setting. The final, critical step required to establish an 
IOC is to agree how the IOC will be governed. This step allows for the provision of some type of 
leadership within the IOC domain.  
Previous studies indicated that at least some level of dynamic instability within the IOC is 
associated with successful outcomes. Instability is considered as any change to the way 
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stakeholders communicate or share information. Instability can be caused by the addition or 
reduction of stakeholders or actors from the IOC. It can also be driven by changing goals or 
changes to the environment of the IOC. Intuitively this make sense. If an IOC is working on the 
same goal, and there are no changes to the way the stakeholders or actors interact than the IOC 
has likely stagnated. If goals are changing, because goals are being accomplished, this suggests 
the IOC is successful. 
The literature review also considered the IOC from an interpersonal perspective. Previous 
studies have highlighted the value of trust and respect between stakeholder as well as actors. The 
aspects of trust were presented and defined as they relate to both interorganizational and 
interpersonal engagement. Calculative-based trust is typically the basis for initial engagements. 
Based on this type of trust, organizations depend on penalties written into contracts to mitigate 
their risks and to govern interorganizational engagement. The experience gained by engaging 
with another organization will add to the knowledge-based trust that the organizations have in 
each other. When organizations act in the best interest of the IOC, and not necessarily in their 
own best interest, they are perceived as a trustworthy organization. The third type of trust is 
identity-based trust. This is trust established between organizations and actors who share certain 
values.  
Finally, in the discussion of collaboration, the review surveyed the elements required for 
an IOC to ensure sufficient stakeholder engagement, knowledge sharing, and establishment of 
trust as all three were shown to be associated with successful IOC outcomes. Important to 
establishing effective stakeholder engagement is the need to ensure all stakeholders have access 
to the same information and ensure that actors are aware of the experience of the other actors and 
can engage with them appropriately. Effective knowledge sharing depends on the ability to 
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classify the data to be shared as either tacit or explicit, and this using the most effective means to 
communicate this information. Above all, establishing trust between stakeholder and actors is the 
most important element needed to establish effective stakeholder engagement and facilitate 
knowledge sharing. Trust, as described above, is a result of multiple engagements between 
stakeholders and actors in which they prove themselves to be trustworthy. Having common goals 
and values also act as catalyst in establishing trust between organization and actors.  
The purpose of then presenting background on airline management and performance was 
to introduce the challenges that airline leadership faces daily. The airline leadership have a 
priority to maintain operations and ensure that people and cargo arrive at their destinations on 
time and with no disruptions. When disruptions do occur, as they often do, it is the responsibility 
of leadership to mobilize their teams to recover from the disruption while minimizing delays to 
scheduled passengers and cargo. One of the primary metrics in schedule disruption recovery is 
ensuring minimal costs are incurred because of the disruption. The leadership also has the 
responsibility to assess the overall industry and project those markets that will be profitable and 
how the airline can enter into these markets. The leadership must also consider if changes to the 
fleet are needed and how to finance those expansions. However, one of the most important 
priorities airline leadership must focus on is maintaining a superior safety record. Safety not only 
affects the brand of the airline; it can also avoid costs. Maintaining a superior safety record will 
ensure the airline is restricted from flying into certain airspace. This allows increased options for 
network expansion.  
The review then focused on the safety performance of an airline. It was pointed out that 
accident rate is the standard measure by which and airlines safety performance is measure. 
However, very often studies also included the incident rate as a measure of airline safety. An 
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ICAO report attributed the occurrence of both accidents and incidents to similar condition. These 
conditions are called hazards. This dissertation focuses on how the OEM can improve its 
engagement with airlines to improve airline safety through minimization or elimination of 
hazards.  
Chapter II has focused on understanding the airline industry to highlight those functional 
areas the OEM should consider engaging with airlines. Chapter II also focused on effective 
strategies and tactics for engaging. This will help OEMs understand how better to engage with 
airlines. Still required is a method to quantify and measure the different aspects of the 
engagement. To address this question Chapter III discusses the methodology and research design 
used in this study. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
The overarching question this study is designed to address is how engine OEMs 
effectively engage with airlines in Africa to successfully drive reduced exposure to conditions 
that otherwise could lead to accidents or incidents. In order to address this question, I designed a 
study that identifies and analyzes the key OEM touchpoints during four critical maintenance 
processes. I also designed the study to analyze the key engagement characteristics of these 
touchpoints. The primary source of data came from interviews with experienced airline 
professionals working for airlines in Africa. I framed this research as a study in effective 
interorganizational engagement within the context of the airline industry in Africa.  
Despite the abundance of literature on the study of interorganizational engagement and 
collaboration, numerous literature searches did not return any studies that focused on OEM 
engagement with airlines. Interorganizational engagement and collaboration has not been studied 
for this niche application; as such this study is exploratory in nature. This exploratory study 
applies system analysis to examine individual experiences of airline employees engaging with 
OEMs throughout the processes of service bulletin adoption, airworthiness compliance, and 
sharing of best practices for performing inspection and maintenance tasks. These items can 
directly affect the accident and incident rate, which are the standard measurements of airline 
safety.  
This chapter first presents the research questions developed to address the overarching 
study question. The chapter then presents the study design before providing a more in-depth 
review on the method for data collection, interview protocol, and data analysis.  
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Research Questions  
To understand the critical factors that facilitate successful outcomes I have designed a 
study based primarily on semi-structured interviews with experienced airline professionals 
working for airlines in Africa. This study analyzes the characteristic of the needed touchpoints an 
engine OEM has with an airline during the adoption of service bulletins, compliance with 
airworthiness directives, and proper completion of maintenance and inspection tasks. The 
following research questions were developed to identify the critical touchpoints and analyze the 
characteristics.  
RQ1: What are the critical touchpoints between engine OEMs and airlines in Africa that 
lead to successful outcomes during the adoption of service bulletins and the compliance with 
airworthiness directives?  
RQ2: What are the critical touchpoints between engine OEMs and airlines in Africa that 
lead to successful outcomes during the performance of maintenance and inspections tasks? 
RQ3: What are the characteristics of the touchpoints that facilitate efficient transfer of 
needed information? 
To answer these research questions a study was designed to understand the elements and 
interconnections of those elements that exist in interorganizational engagement between aircraft 
engine OEMs and airlines in Africa during the adoption of service bulletins, compliance with 
airworthiness directives, and completion of maintenance and inspection tasks. I sought to 
approach and interview airline professionals in positions that, based on my experience working 
for an aircraft engine OEM supporting airlines in Africa, are directly involved in the 
aforementioned processes. The use of semi-structured interviews allowed participants to discuss 
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topics they find important. Giving participants the space to take the interview in the direction 
they felt most relevant was critical to this exploratory study.  
Overview of Study Design 
This study has been designed to provide understanding about how engine OEMs and 
airlines in Africa engage during the adoption of service bulletins, compliance with airworthiness 
directives, and during the performance of maintenance and inspections tasks. The primary source 
of data was collected by performing semi-structured interviews with experienced airline 
professionals working at airlines in Africa. During these interviews, the participants reported on 
their own experiences working with engine OEMs during the course of service bulletin adoption, 
airworthiness directive compliance, and the performance of maintenance and inspections tasks. 
The study assumes the interview participants are experts in the field of aircraft engine 
maintenance and airline maintenance operations. Thus, they have an accurate knowledge of the 
support the airline needs from the engine OEM in order to drive successful outcomes.  
A secondary source of data included in this study is my accumulated knowledge working 
as a field service engineer for one of the largest engine OEMs. In this role I have gained 
experience working with small regional airlines as well as large international airlines, all based 
in Africa. This experience has given me exposure to airline maintenance operations, airline 
financing, and engine maintenance. While this accumulated knowledge did not directly 
contribute to the primary data collected, it did provide context to understand the interview data.  
During the coding of the transcribed interview data, my accumulated knowledge did 
provide insights in how to analyze and categorize the data. As I collected and analyzed the 
interview data, I reflected on it using my accumulated knowledge. The reflexive process allowed 
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for the creation of relevant tacit knowledge. This tacit knowledge was not explicitly stated during 
the interviews but was created through this reflexive process.  
The PhD in Leadership and Change program at Antioch University in an interdisciplinary 
program. Neither the business of aviation, nor aviation safety are fields of study included in the 
program. However, organizational development and organizational leadership are areas of study 
for which Antioch University does have expertise. For this reason, this study has been developed 
and framed as a study in effective interorganizational engagement in the context of the African 
aviation industry.  
Systems Analysis  
This study has been developed to understand the critical engagements between engine 
OEMs and airlines in Africa that lead to successful outcomes during the adoption of service 
bulletins, compliance of airworthiness directives, and execution of maintenance and inspection 
tasks. To identify, understand, and analyze these engagements I approach this research study 
using a methodology of systems analysis. 
System analysis is "the process of studying a procedure or business in order to identify its 
goals and purposes and create systems and procedures that will achieve them in an efficient way" 
(Systems Analysis, n.d.). Systems analysis uses a problem-solving technique that breaks down a 
system into its component pieces for the purpose of the studying how well those component parts 
work and interact to accomplish their purpose (Bentley, Whitten, & Randolph, 2007)  
To understand systems analysis, it is first required to understand the concept of systems 
theory and, even more fundamentally, what a system is. A system is an entity with 
interconnected, yet independent elements that serve a purpose or function (Rutherford, 2018). A 
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system can be man-made or natural (Katz & Kahn, 1978) and can even be used to understand 
organizational behavior (Miller, 1978).  
According to Rutherford (2018), the elements of systems are typically tangible. For 
example, a basketball team has players. These players would be considered elements of the team 
whose goal is to score. There would also be intangible elements of the team such as relationship 
and respect for each other. All of these elements work together to for the team, the system, to 
achieve its goal of scoring. Interconnections are flows of material or information. One element 
requires an output from another element. If the output is not received it can affect the ability of 
the system to function.  
Systems theory was first presented by von Bertalanffy (1968), one of the founders of 
general systems theory, as a complex interaction of elements that should not be viewed as a sum 
of the individual elements, but rather holistically (Katz & Kahn, 1978). The elements of the 
whole interact through a mutual feedback process that corrects or enhances the system. Changes 
to either elements or the connections of the elements can affect other parts of the systems, either 
directly or indirectly (Mele, Pels, & Polese, 2010).  
Von Bertalanffy (1968) went on to describe organizations as living organisms and 
suggested they should be viewed holistically. This approach to organizational management 
helped to introduce the concept of equifinality into discussions of organizational management. 
Equifinality is the principle that similar organizational outcomes can be achieved in numerous 
ways based on the competencies of the organization and environment in which it is operating 
(Cummings & Worley, 2005). This was a deviation from classical management theory that 
viewed organizations as mechanical in nature and that could be studied as if they were machines 
(Cole, 2004). Frederick Taylor (1911), one of the founders of classical management theory, also 
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introduced the concept of scientific management. Scientific management is based on the 
fundamental belief that there is one best way to perform any task or process (Bookwalter, 2013). 
A system has been defined as any entity with independent elements that are working 
together to achieve outcome. The activities of the separate elements have a direct or indirect 
effect on the other elements in the system and the ability of the system, as a whole, to achieve the 
desired outcome. Systems theory tells us that organizations can be analyzed as complex systems. 
Systems analysis is simply the method of studying a system, such as an interorganizational 
collaboration, in order to learn more about the system and how the individual elements 
interconnect to achieve the desired outcome.   
The use of systems analysis brings a unique perspective to the analysis of organization 
engagement, or achieving outcomes, and especially to this study. Classical management theory 
asserts organizational leadership must create changes to the organization in order to achieve 
outcomes in the most effective and efficient way (Bookwalter, 2013). Systems theory, 
conversely, stresses the importance of leadership to understand the potential of the system in 
which they are working, and to understand strengths and weakness of the organization. Meadows 
and Randers (2004) stressed the importance of learning about the behavior of a system before 
making any changes to the system. With this understanding of the system, strategic changes in 
the elements and interconnections can be made to adjust to changes in the systems purpose or an 
external operating environment (Rutherford, 2019).  
Conclusion on Systems Theory and Analysis 
Systems analysis is adequately suited for this study because, as opposed to confirming 
generic elements of successful interorganizational engagement and collaboration, it allows for a 
holistic understanding of the process that airline personnel experience when complying with an 
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airworthiness directive, embodying a service bulletin, or completing maintenance and inspection 
tasks. Using a systems analysis approach allows for the identification and analysis of the key 
elements and interconnections that work together to during the process of complying with an 
airworthiness directive, embodying a service bulletin, or completing maintenance and inspection 
tasks. This knowledge allows for the development of effective and efficient engagement 
strategies for both the OEM.  
Data Collection 
The primary source of data collected for this dissertation was interviewing airline 
professionals working at different airlines in Africa. Basic demographic information of the 
airlines represented was gathered for each of the airlines during the interview. The primary 
demographic data collected was the number of engine OEMs with which the participant engages. 
The number of OEMs the participant engages with was assumed to be a critical factor in their 
ability to engage with engine OEMs. An individual engaging with only one OEM would likely 
have more time to focus on OEM specific communications and information, while those who 
must engage with multiple OEMs would need to split their time between OEMs.   
Selecting participants. Interview participants were selected from individuals currently 
employed by any airline operationally based in the continent of Africa. For this study, Africa is 
considered to include the 54 sovereign states, two disputed states, two dependent territories, and 
eight territories of non-African states. It is important to include all these territories as there are 
airlines based is these areas. Employees of airlines based in Africa, but whose operations extend 
outside the continent of Africa, were also be considered for inclusion in this interview. 
 Individuals employed by airlines based in Africa were eligible for inclusion in the study 
if they had worked in a position that directly engages with an engine OEM. This study only 
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considered engagement with an engine OEM as qualifying experience. Although there are many 
OEMs that supply other, different parts and components, the engine OEMs stand out from other 
OEMs for several reasons. Primarily, the technical complexity and financial investment and 
planning required to operate aircraft engines leads to a need for OEM support to manage the 
engine program, especially at larger airlines.  
To be included in the study, individuals must have had at least one year of experience 
engaging with an engine OEM in their current role. This criterion was applied to ensure the 
participant has sufficient experience working with engine OEMs in order to establish themselves 
as an expert in airline maintenance operations and in what support is required from an OEM. 
This criterion was also used as a method to prevent experience in previous roles or engagement 
with other types of OEMs from influencing the participants response. Individuals not working in 
roles that directly engage with OEMs were excluded from participating in the interview. 
Likewise, individuals that have had less than one-year experience engaging directly with an 
OEM were selected to participate due to lack of qualifying experience. 
 Participants were selected from two pools of individuals. As an aviation professional 
working directly with several airlines in Africa, I have developed a professional network of 
engineers, managers, and senior leaders at several airlines in Africa. My professional network 
served as the first pool of potential participants. My professional network also included 
individuals working for OEMs and supporting other airlines in the region. The second pool of 
potential participants came from professional networks of other individuals working for OEMs in 
Africa.  
Africa is home to thousands of languages. I do speak basic Arabic, Amharic, and Swahili 
but I am not proficient enough in these to facilitate an interview in each language. I am fortunate 
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that the de facto language of aviation is English, which is my native tongue. Therefore, for a 
participant to qualify for inclusion in the study they had to be sufficiently fluent in English as to 
clearly communicate. For those in the first pool of participants, those that I am very familiar 
with, I proactively applied this criterion and only extended invitations to those I knew were 
sufficiently fluent in English. For participants in the second pool, whom I was not previously 
acquainted with, I assessed the ability of the participants fluency during the interview. If I was 
able to understand the participant and the participant demonstrated that they were able to 
understand me then the interviewee was considered to sufficiently fluent in English. Any 
interview with a participant that did not demonstrate sufficient fluency in English would be 
eliminated. All participants that I interviewed spoke English well enough that we were able to 
understand each other. In fact, no interviews had to be eliminated due to lack of fluency in 
English.  
Contacting participants. All potential participants received an email detailing the study 
and inviting them to participate. All email communication was completed using my Antioch 
University email account. Strictly limiting communication with potential participants to the 
Antioch University email served to separate research study-related communications from regular 
professional engagements. Using the Antioch University email address also helped to underscore 
that the study was performed as part of a dissertation program and not as an assignment or 
project for my employer.  
When I sent the introductory email, I initially include a copy of the consent forms as a 
PDF attachment. There were three different consent forms: one form for phone interview, one for 
face-to-face interviews, and one for video conferencing. The reason for the three types of consent 
forms was due to the different methods for information transmission.   
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I changed my practice of initially sending the consent form due to confusion of which 
form should be filled out. Subsequent email requests advised the participant to confirm the 
preferred method of interview. A follow up email was then sent with the appropriate consent 
form attached as a PDF file. The email instructed the individual to review the consent form 
(Appendix A). I advised the participant to return a signed copy of the consent form to me before 
I could proceed with the interview. In lieu of a signed copy, I also advised the participants that 
they could respond to me by email, attaching the consent form and stating that they agree with all 
details and contents in the consent agreement. All participants were able to provide a signed 
consent form prior to the interview.  
I sent follow-up emails to individuals who did not immediately respond to the initial 
request after two weeks. If a response was still not received after a third week, I sent a second 
follow up. If an individual did not response after a fourth week, a third and final follow up was 
sent one week later. I do work with many of the participants. As such, I needed to ensure that the 
line between work discussions and interview discussions were kept separate. Again, to 
underscore that my research was being performed independent of my work position or my 
employer, I did not initiate any discussion regarding the dissertation or the interview with 
participants during times that we would normally meet for work purposes. However, on 
occasion, individuals did ask questions about the dissertation process, interview, or results during 
our normal working hours. In those situations, I did answer individual questions but did not ask 
follow-up questions or try to drive the conversation. When appropriate, I suggested we could the 
interview more in depth at another time and would make an appointment with them. I took this 
approach to again highlight that this study is being performed independent of my professional 
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position. Follow-up questions and discussions sent by email, even to my work email address, 
were returned using my Antioch University email address.   
Interviews. With the study participants dispersed across the second largest continent on 
earth, the natural approach would be to use technology such as teleconferencing or video 
conferencing to facilitate the interviews. However, internet connection and telecommunications 
in Africa are notoriously unreliable, so I took the opportunity to conduct interviews face-to-face 
whenever possible. Of the 14 interviews completed, three were in a face-to-face setting while the 
remaining 11 were completed using Zoom video conferencing services. While using Zoom, the 
video capability of the tool was disabled in order to minimize the internet requirements and 
ensure the interview proceeded smoothly.    
Two of the face-to-face interviews were held during a business trip in which I visited an 
airline, and the third was performed in Ethiopia during the work-related trip of one airline 
professional. Immediately prior to the interviews, I reiterated that the interview and research 
study were being performed independent of my professional position. The face-to-face interview 
held in Ethiopia was at my work office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. I used my work office as it 
was the only space that allow for privacy in a quiet and comfortable space. However, I did make 
it clear that the office space was being used for convenience and that the study was independent 
of my employer. The face-to-face interviews performed onsite at an airline were held in different 
locations. The first interview was held in the participant’s office. The second participant did not 
have an office, so we sat in the technical documentation library. The library is considered a 
public space, but during the interview there was no one else in the room  
All interviews started with a kind greeting and pleasantries. I then reviewed the purpose 
of the study and why the participant was selected. I again thanked the participant for their 
 
 
 
84 
participation and reviewed the highlights of the consent letter, which can be found in Appendix 
A. I did not engage in any interview until both sections of the consent form were signed. After 
receiving consent to audio record the interview, I began recording the conversation.  
For face-to-face interviews, I used a commercially available app on my iPhone called 
VoiceRecorder. For Zoom interviews the audio recording capability of Zoom was used. Video 
was disabled for all interviews and no video data was recorded.  
The interviews each lasted between 30 and 75 minutes. Once the it was completed, I 
thanked the participant for their time. The audio file from the interview was immediately 
submitted to rev.com, a transcription company, for transcription. Three of the audio files were 
reported to be low quality and transcription was not completed. Those three files were submitted 
for automated transcription using a service from Temi.com. I then manually reviewed the 
transcription of all 14 transcribed files while listening to the corresponding audio file. I made 
corrections as needed. After the manual corrections were made, the file was sent to the 
participant for their review and comments. Only three participants provided any feedback to the 
manually corrected file.  
The interview followed a semi-structured interview format. The initial questions focused 
on how many OEMs the participant engages during the normal course of their work. I then asked 
the participant about their experience engaging with engines OEMs to adopt service bulletins and 
comply with airworthiness directives. Once this topic was exhausted, I asked about performing 
maintenance and inspections tasks and the use of best practices. Finally, I asked the participants 
to describe the characteristics of effective OEM engagement. The specific questions 
progressively changed during the overall interview process. As previous interviews provided 
additional insight, they influenced the questions being asked and the wording of those questions. 
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Interviews were transcribed, corrected, and coded in parallel to other interviews being 
performed. In most cases, the interview transcript was coded prior to the next interview. In some 
cases, the interviews were performed consecutively, before the coding could be performed. The 
reason for performing another interview before the previous interview had been coded was due 
to availability of the participants.  
Data Analysis 
This research study utilized a system analysis methodology to drive the collection of 
interview data. As described in the section on systems analysis, this approach allows elements, 
and interconnections of those elements present during adoption of service bulletins, compliance 
of airworthiness directives, and completion of maintenance and inspection tasks. A thematic 
analysis of the interview data was completed using grounded theory techniques for coding, 
constant comparison, and saturation. Following the guidance of Glaser and Strauss (1967) the 
collection and analysis of interview data was completed simultaneously. Doing so allowed the 
ongoing comparative analysis to provide feedback that allowed me to include, remove, modify, 
or re-word questions based previous feedback and experiences. Questions were also modified to 
further explore emerging ideas and topics.  
After each interview, the audio file was transcribed, corrected, and sent to the participant 
for confirmation. Once the corrected transcript was confirmed, a method of data analysis known 
as coding was used to identify the different ideas and themes in the data. Coding is a strategy 
used to understand qualitative data and assign a grouping of data some meaning (Maguire & 
Delahunt, 2017). As described by Charmaz (1996), using a constant comparative approach 
allowed the codes and themes to be defined by the data. Going into the data collection portion of 
this study I expect that, initially, additional interviews would identify new categories and later 
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interviews would identify and strengthen trends in the data. Interviews continued to be conducted 
until the interview data does not identify additional categories or trends, a condition referred to 
as saturation (Charmaz, 2006).  
Coding. Open coding is a critical step because in this step the data categories are 
developed and refined (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). Open coding was the first coding method to 
be applied in the analysis of the collected interview data. During open coding, I read through the 
manually corrected transcripts to understand what the participant was trying to say. Many of the 
initial interviews contained repeated occurrences of filler pauses and other type of verbal cues 
that indicated the participant was thinking and had not completed their statement. Likewise, due 
to occasional poor connections, the participant often had to repeat themselves or ask the question 
to be repeated.  
I performed a thematic analysis of the transcribed interview data, using an                
incident-by-incident coding approach to create categories that were later grouped together as 
themes. I then identified four overarching domains. I relied on my expertise and experience with 
airline maintenance operations to ensure I remained sensitive to subtle nuances in participant 
responses.  
To facilitate the coding, I used NVIVO qualitative data analysis software purchased 
online. This software package allowed me to create codes, group them together, and identify 
relationships between codes.  
Early in the coding process I identified the process for adopting service bulletins and 
complying with airworthiness directives as very similar. Instead of analyzing these as two 
separate processes, I analyzed them as the same process with small deviations. The common 
process for service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive compliance has four distinct 
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phases. Likewise, I confirmed that the process for ensuring maintenance tasks are properly 
performed and best practices are received from the OEM when there is a need is the same 
process used for inspections. As such, I analyzed performance of maintenance tasks and 
inspections as the same process with four fundamental phases. I established these a priori phases 
based on the initial review of the data and my own industry experience. I chose to organize the 
codes within these predetermined phased based on the interview data and my industry 
experience. 
Coded responses from the participants were identified as relating to one or more of these 
phases, for the specific process being discussed and depending on what the participant said—and 
the context of when they said it—during the course of the interview. The coded response was 
moved, in the software graphic user interface, to be associated with the specific phase.  
Memoing. Memoing, a data analysis strategy described by Charmaz (1996), is used by 
the interviewer to make note of their interpretation of the participants responses or potential 
connections to other interviews. Memoing is a way for the researcher, or the researcher’s coding 
team, to document any ideas or thoughts with regards to the data, categories, emerging trends, 
and potential connection between them. The memos are used to identify emergent trends and 
identify connections between the difference categories, much like the work described by 
Bergeron (2008).        
I had initially entered the data collection phase of this study with the intention to take 
memos during the interviews. Following the example of Valicenti (2012), I had written the 
memos after each interview and during the constant comparative process. However, after the first 
two interviews I felt the memos that I had taken did not provide insight beyond what was 
extracted during the coding phase. Memoing had required me to interrupt focus on the interview. 
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After two interviews I stopped memoing so that I could always stay present to the discussion, 
knowing that whatever information was extracted from the coding would be the same as what I 
would capture during memoing.  
Constant comparison. Constant comparison is an iterative method for analyzing 
qualitative data as described by Strauss (1987). Glaser (1965) presented the constant comparative 
method for analyzing qualitative data in which interview data is coded and analyzed immediately 
after being collected. Insights from the analysis are used to inform both the data collection as 
well as coding. Watling and Lingard (2012) further described the constant comparative method 
as an iterative process in which newly coded data and the memos recorded are compared to 
previously coded data, memos, and emerging categories. This process of comparison creates new 
insights and helps guide the interviewer on how to amend the data collection process in order to 
focus on areas of interest as well as adapt the coding based on the data already coded.  
During this study, newly collected data was compared to previous data, the existing 
coding, and relationships between codes. The new data was either added to existing codes or new 
codes were created. When driven by the data, new code relationship was created.  
Data saturation. The end of open coding is marked by data saturation. As I read through 
additional interviews the number of codes and the number of occurrences of existing codes 
increased initially. However, the more interview data introduced eventually began to return 
fewer and fewer new codes. Once additional interview data started returning no new codes, I 
understood that I had reached data saturation.  
Chapter Summary  
This chapter identified the methodology used during the collection and analysis of the 
primary data. Primary data was collected by coding transcriptions of semi-structured interview. 
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Secondary data, in the form of acquired industry knowledge and airline maintenance operations 
of the interviewer and author, was used along with the primary data to perform a systems 
analysis of the engagement between engine OEMs and airlines in Africa.  
 Chapter IV presents the results of the data analysis. The topics covered will include the 
four phases of the process for service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive compliance, 
as well as the four fundamental phases of the process for correct execution of maintenance and 
inspection tasks.  
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Chapter IV: Results 
The intent of this study is to understand engagement between aircraft engine 
manufactures and airlines in Africa during critical processes that can influence the safety 
performance of the airline. The processes considered during this study include adoption of 
service bulletin adoption, airworthiness directive compliance, and proper performance of 
maintenance and inspection tasks. The goal of this work has been to better understand the critical 
success factors of OEM-airline touchpoints during the processes. Investigation and analysis of 
the interorganizational engagement that occurs throughout these processes allowed for 
identification and analysis of the critical elements of this system that lead to successful 
outcomes. The following research questions were developed to address the overarching question 
this study was designed to answer. 
RQ1: What are the critical touchpoints between engine OEMs and airlines in Africa that 
lead to successful outcomes during the adoption of service bulletins and the compliance with 
airworthiness directives?  
RQ2: What are the critical touchpoints between engine OEMs and airlines in Africa that 
lead to successful outcomes during the performance of maintenance and inspections tasks? 
RQ3: What are the characteristics of the touchpoints that facilitate efficient transfer of 
needed information?  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 aviation professionals currently 
working for airlines in Africa. The participants work in positions primarily focused on 
engineering or technical support related to engine maintenance. The interviews were recorded, 
transcribed, and then coded. The interviews were analyzed applying an emergent coding process 
similar to grounded theory coding principles. This information was supplemented by the 
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interviewer’s knowledge of airline commercial and maintenance operations from working as a 
field service representative for an aircraft engine OEM. The interview data were then coded 
using procedures aligned with grounded theory. The findings from the interview analysis and the 
interviewer’s knowledge of this field of practice, were the basis of the systems analysis.  
The findings from the analysis of the coded interview data are presented in Chapter IV. 
The presentation of the findings is aligned with the research questions. The research questions 
focused on the adoption of service bulletins, compliance with airworthiness directives, and 
proper execution of maintenance and inspections tasks. The process of adoption of service 
bulletins and compliance with airworthiness directives were very similar as they both had four 
primary phases in the process. Those phases, which are presented in detail in Chapter IV, are 
Awareness, Assessment, Preparation, and Execution. The similarity in these two processes is not 
unexpected since very often airworthiness directives are based on existing service bulletins. The 
primary difference is that compliance with airworthiness directives is mandatory and enforced by 
regulatory bodies while service bulletins are recommendations from the aircraft engine OEM.    
After the findings related to the adoption of service bulletins and airworthiness directives 
are presented, I present findings related to ensuring proper execution of maintenance and 
inspection procedures. The process of service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive 
compliance was reported to be very similar across airlines. The process by which airlines and 
aviation professionals identify a need for support from the aircraft OEM, engage with the aircraft 
engine OEM, and disseminate the best practices with the airline organization, varied greatly from 
airline to airline and person to person based on the interview feedback. Finally, the interview 
data related identifying the elements of successful interorganizational engagement is presented. 
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Select quotes from interviews are presented to support the findings. Each quote is 
identified with a code that represents the different interviewees. For example, a quote followed 
by “(P05)” indicates that this quote was from the interview with Participant #05. Participants 
were provided a number based on the order in which they were interview. For example, 
Participant #01 was the first participant interviewed and Participant #14 was the 14th, and final, 
participant interviewed.  
Overview of Research Findings 
The 14 participants were asked to describe their experiences engaging with engine OEMs 
through the processes of airworthiness compliance, service bulletin adoption, sharing of best 
practices for performing inspections, and sharing of best practices for completing maintenance 
tasks. The research question initially considered service bulletin adoption and airworthiness 
directive compliance as separate processes. However, after the first three interviews it was clear 
the basic process for airworthiness directive compliance and service bulletin adoption are the 
similar, with some minor differences between the two. This is expected given that an 
airworthiness directive is often generated based on an existing service bulletins from the 
respective OEM (Abbott, 2015).  
The findings related to both airworthiness directive compliance and service bulletin 
adoption are organized and presented according to the common process of airworthiness 
directives compliance and service bulletin adoption, shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1. Process for Airworthiness Directive (AD) compliance and Service Bulletin (SB) 
adoption. 
 
Chapter III provided detail on the benefits of using a systems analysis approach for 
investigating this process and highlighted the analysis will focus on identification and analysis of 
AD/SB Awareness AD/SB Assessment AD/SB Preparation AD/SB Execution
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the elements and interconnections that work together during the process of complying with an 
airworthiness directive and adopting service bulletins.  
As discussed in Chapter III, interconnections are flow of material or information between 
two elements in the system. In this study, transfer of information, or request for information, 
between the aircraft engine OEM and airline are referred to as touchpoints. The presentation of 
the touchpoints includes details regarding the point in the process the touchpoint occurred, the 
type of information exchanged, the type of engagement, the type of engagement required to 
transfer the information, and the specific roles of the elements within their respective 
organization.  
The touchpoints are categorized based on which phase the touchpoint occurs, which 
organization initiates the touchpoint, the type of information transferred, and the type of 
communication used. The type of information transferred is classified as either explicit 
knowledge or tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is easily codified and communicated. An 
example of explicit knowledge in the context of service bulletin adoption and airworthiness 
directive compliance is the affected engine serial number, utilization threshold, or deadline for 
adoption or compliance. This information can be clearly understood without context or 
interpretation. Tacit knowledge is not easily codified or communicated. An example of tacit 
knowledge in the context of service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive compliance, is 
understanding the operations of the airline and how to facilitate internal communications to drive 
faster action. Another example of tacit knowledge is understanding how disruptions in an 
airline’s commercial operations will affect aircraft availability, and thus the schedule by which 
material is needed.  
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The type of communication is also identified as one of three categories. Those three 
categories are nonreciprocal communication, partially reciprocal communication, and fully 
reciprocal communication. For this study, these categories are defined in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2. Categories of communication used for this research study. 
Nonreciprocal communication is used to categorize communication that is one-
directional and does not allow for follow-up. When using non-reciprocal communication, the 
initiating organization defines the knowledge to be communicated as well as the format of the 
communication. They also determine who the information is sent to. An example of this type of 
communication is sending email notifications to distribution lists.  
Partially reciprocal communication, for the purpose of this study, is defined as 
communication requesting knowledge. The initiating organization or individual will identify the 
information needed and send a request to the second organization. The second organization 
provides a response to the initial request but there is no further communication. An example of 
partially reciprocal communication is when the airlines sends a request to the aircraft engine 
OEM. The aircraft engine OEM will review and respond through a function email address. After 
responding the case is closed and no further communication can occur. 
The final category of communication defined for this study is fully reciprocal 
communication. This type of communication allows for unrestricted back-and-forth 
communication between two individuals or organizations. During fully reciprocal 
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communication both the individuals or organizations can direct the conversation as they feel is 
important and can introduce new topics of discussion. An example of fully reciprocal 
communication, as used in this study, is the communication that occurs when a field service 
representative visits an airline and discusses open items and challenges with individuals at the 
airlines. Fully reciprocal communication can also take place by using the phone, online chat 
services like Skype for Business, or even email.  
The findings are organized by following the process for airworthiness directive 
compliance and service bulletin adoption that was presented in Figure 4.1, which shows the four 
primary phases of the service bulletin adoption and airworthiness compliance process. The 
touchpoints, and characteristics of these touchpoints, are presented based on the particular phase 
during which the touchpoint occurs.  
Process for Airworthiness Directive Compliance and Service Bulletin Adoption 
 As described in Chapter III, OEMs publish recommendations for the equipment they 
manufacture. These recommendations introduce product improvements that address product 
safety, product reliability, product durability, or produce cost of ownership. The process 
regarding how an airline becomes aware of a service bulletin, assesses it, prepares to embody it 
within their fleet, and executes the embodiment plan, is presented. Critical to this process is the 
support provided by the aircraft engine OEM during this process.  
 As discussed in Chapter III, airworthiness directives are issued by regulatory bodies but 
are often based on existing service bulletins. Any engagement between the aircraft engine OEM 
and airline during the process of complying with an airworthiness directive is also presented.  
Awareness: Airworthiness directive and service bulletin. The first phase of the process 
of adopting service bulletins and complying with airworthiness directives is ensuring the correct 
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individual at the airline is aware of the existence of an airworthiness directive or service bulletin 
a very critical step in the respective compliance and adoption process. An airline operating a 
specific type or model of engine would need for the right person in their organization to be aware 
of the recommended improvements from the OEM in order to initiate the process shown in 
Figure 4.1. Likewise, an airline would not take action to comply with an airworthiness directive 
unless the right person at the airline is aware that an airworthiness directive exists.  
When asked how they become aware of service bulletins and airworthiness directives, the 
participants responses highlighted three strategies used by the airline professionals for knowing 
if there is an airworthiness directive for service bulletin applicable to the type of engine at their 
airline. These three strategies, presented in Figure 4.3, are signing up with the OEM for 
automated email notifications, proactive online searches, and communication with the assigned 
field service representative.  
 
Figure 4.3. Strategies used by airline professionals for knowing if an airworthiness directive or 
service bulletin exists. Airplane image from publicdomainvectors.org. Retrieved from 
https://publicdomainvectors.org/en/free-clipart/Airport-pictogram-symbol/83493.html 
Automated notification. The source of automated communications depends on the entity 
that issues the document. Service bulletins are issued by the OEM while airworthiness directives 
are issued by the regulatory authority overseeing the country where the OEM is based. Although 
the airworthiness directives are typically based on existing service bulletins, the respective 
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regulatory body does not need to have the OEM’s approval or awareness before releasing an 
airworthiness directive. This can lead to the release of airworthiness directive without the OEM 
being aware such action will take place. Participant #05 highlighted that the process for releasing 
an airworthiness directive is solely the authority of the respective regulatory authority and the 
OEM itself may not be aware of the details of the release.     
There were three, four or five ADs which [the OEM] was not expecting to be released at 
a certain time but then the European Aviation and Safety Agency decided to release in 
this directive on a certain date. Then the ADs came, they were surprise for us, they were a 
surprise to the OEM. (P05) 
The release and communication of an airworthiness directive is done so at the direction of 
the respective regulatory body. OEMs, at least on occasion, are not aware of when the AD will 
be released.  
Although automated communications of airworthiness directives are not considered as 
OEM touchpoints, the release of an AD does immediately get attention from senior leadership 
and the affected airlines, as the following quote from participant #10 highlighted this.   
But recently I'm not sure if I need to come up to the engineer, because it's right now, they 
are running with that and I know it gets escalated very quickly to the RPA, the 
responsible person for the aircraft, and that goes straight to the CEO. (P10) 
When senior level and executive leadership at the airline become aware that their fleet is 
exposed to an airworthiness directive, they instruct their teams to take immediate action. This 
results in immediate engagement with the respective OEM, since airworthiness directives are 
often based on an existing OEM service bulletin. The OEM will have touchpoints with the airline 
after the AD is released, particularly to understand technical and commercial support details. 
This can see understood based on the following response: 
I know the engagement process happens immediately as soon as we see the 
[airworthiness directive] of which they would most likely be at the facility during the 
week to discuss more details into it and how else it can be done. (P10) 
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Overwhelmingly, the participants identified automated emails as the primary means by 
which they are notified of impending service bulletins. An automated email is an OEM 
touchpoint in which airline is notified of the existence of a service bulletin. During this initial 
touchpoint the OEM sends an email to an email distribution list. Participant #5 advised that in 
order to be included on this distribution list an individual must sign-up on the OEM’s website: 
“They sign in and they subscribe to the notification from the OEM websites and that's how they 
receive the revision and the release of SBs [service bulletins]” (P05). 
The OEM sends an automated email, which notifies individuals on the distribution list 
that an SB has been released. At this point there is a transfer of information, the information 
being primarily that an SB has been released. The automated notification will also contain a copy 
of the service bulletin, which contains additional details regarding the condition being addressed 
and applicability.  
The feedback from the interviews indicated there is a process for setting these automated 
notifications. The process requires the individual to log-on to an OEM’s portal and select the 
engine type and model for which they need to be notified of new or updated service bulletins. 
The ease or difficulty of this process has a direct effect on the ability of the airline professionals 
to correctly sign-up for the correct email distributions. Participant #5 described some of the 
challenges they have experienced when navigating OEM portals. They clearly stated that with 
some OEMs it is not easy and can lead to some confusion on the selection of the appropriate 
engine model or engine type.   
Out of confusion sometimes they subscribe into a totally different engine model than the 
one we do, they sometimes send us service bulletins, which are not directly related to our 
work. The problem is, the way you search for service bulletin or you subscribe for service 
bulletin is not as simple as OEM's because they manufacture and support so many small 
engine models, so choosing between the engine models and following a particular engine 
model is not very easy between websites. (P05) 
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In addition to the challenge of selecting the correct engine model or engine type, airline 
professionals reported that often they feel overwhelmed with the quantity of automated emails 
being received from the OEMs. Participant #7 described their experienced being overwhelmed 
with automated notifications from a single OEM. “I can tell you, for [specific OEM], we receive 
a piece, one, or two, or three, or four emails per day concerning document modification or 
technical variant. It's incredible” (P07). 
Receiving many automated emails can overwhelm the individual at the airline 
responsible for reviewing these communications. This can result in service bulletins being 
reviewed or in reduced quality and time spent reviewing each service bulletin notification. 
Delays in reviewing service bulletins and the potential for reduced review quality and time spent 
reviewing them can be increased for airline professionals working with multiple engine OEMs or 
airframe OEMs  
Online search. Airline personnel reported also proactively searching the OEM’s portal 
for newly release service bulletins. The feedback from these participants indicated that these 
proactive online searches were used only when automated emails were not available or when the 
airline personal didn’t feel comfortable that they had signed-up correctly. Participant #10 
described their weekly rhythm of reviewing the OEM portal for new service bulletins. “I check 
weekly on the websites regarding the [specific engine model] in the latest revisions and updates 
to both SB's related on engines” (P10). 
Airlines searching the OEM website for recently issued service bulletins would be 
considered an airline-initiated touchpoint, whereas automated email notification would be 
considered an OEM-initial touchpoint. However, the same explicit information is shared through 
both touchpoints  
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The airline personnel also mentioned the responsible section at the airline would also 
search for new airworthiness directives on the respective regulatory websites. This is highlighted 
in the response from Participant #4: “And if is AD, we go through faa.gov. There is a site 
through which we receive all ADs” (P04). 
As described earlier in this section, searches of the regulatory websites are not considered 
OEM touchpoints. However, awareness of an airworthiness directive can lead to OEM 
touchpoints during the airworthiness directive compliance process.  
Engagement with assigned field service engineer. When asked how they become aware 
of the service bulletins and airworthiness directives, the participants overwhelmingly highlighted 
the importance of engagement with the field service representative assigned by the respective 
OEM. Responses by Participant #5 and Participant #10 highlight the importance of engagement 
with the assigned field service representative in the awareness of service bulletins: “[SB 
Adoption and AD Compliance process] depends on the excellence of the OEM representative” 
(P05). “We also have a field service engineer who would send me [the service bulletins] and 
[airworthiness directives]” (P10). 
The method of communication varied. Nearly all respondents advised that the field 
service engineer would send an email, bringing the participants attention to either a recently 
released SB or impending SB. The FSE would also ensure if the airline personnel were aware of 
recently released or impending airworthiness directives. For airlines that had a field service 
representative onsite with them, the participants advised the field service representative would 
follow-up the email with a face-to-face reminder. Participant 09 described how the onsite field 
service representative follows up with additional details of the importance of adopting a specific 
service bulletin as well as details on how to action the recommendation.  
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For example, we had a fleet issue for engine fleet, and the onsite rep sent me an email 
with the SB attached and said the SB will solve the suspected the problem and the SB 
should be embodied like this. (P09) 
 The results from the interview revealed that the intervention of the Field Service 
Engineer in the process of notifying the airline personnel of both service bulletins and 
airworthiness directives is critical for airlines to first become aware of the service bulletin or 
airworthiness directive and to prioritize appropriately for follow-up. Participant 04 indicated that 
a field service representative intervention in this process is critical. “We very much engage with 
the rep. And the rep give [sic] us instruction when there is a new service bulletin, which is 
critical” (P04). 
Notification from maintenance service provider. Airlines often outsource maintenance 
support and activities to airlines maintenance service providers. Much like notification from the 
respective regulatory body, communication from maintenance service providers is not 
considered as an OEM touchpoint for the purposes of this study. However, the communication 
from the maintenance service providers can lead to OEM touchpoints later in the process.  
Assessment:  Service bulletin and airworthiness directive. After the airline becomes 
aware that a service bulletin or airworthiness directive has been released an assessment is 
required to confirm if any of the aircraft engines in the airline’s fleet are affected by the service 
bulletin or airworthiness directive. The assessment also is used to identify the timeframe to act 
and if any engines should be prioritized. The assessment process is very similar for both service 
bulletins and airworthiness directives, as highlighted by Participant #09: “There's not much, any 
difference” (P09). 
The difference in the assessment processes is primarily due to the priority placed on 
compliance of airworthiness directive since compliance is compulsory and enforced by 
regulatory bodies. For this reason, airworthiness directives are reviewed on an expedited 
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timeline. Participants #11 described this as follows: “With airworthiness directives we have a 
hard timeline. What we do is, the moment an airworthiness directive is issued we evaluate it 
within the same day to be sure we meet the timeline which has been set” (P11). Participant 13 
commented, “Once the AD is released, our company policy, is to take a decision within 48 
hours” (P13). 
The results from interviews help identify the critical inputs the airline needs when 
performing the assessment and highlighted that assessment occurs in two parts. The first part of 
the assessment focuses on identifying the extent to which the airline’s fleet is affected. I have 
termed this the technical assessment. Although airline may need to engage with the OEM to 
clarify fleet exposure, as presented later in this chapter, the fleet exposure is clear. An engine or a 
part is either affected or it is not affected. It is binary.  
Airworthiness directive compliance is compulsory, and so additional analysis is not 
required. Participant #14 stated that if the fleet is affected by an airworthiness directive, the next 
step is to implement the airworthiness directive. There is no additional analysis required. The 
participant stated: “The [airworthiness directives] at least are mandatory that. So, if the 
[airworthiness directive] affect my fleet, I should implement this [airworthiness directive] within 
the compliance date mentioned in the [airworthiness directive]” (P14). 
Likewise, service bulletins that address potential flight safety or operational disruptions 
are often implemented immediately, by policy, without additional analysis. However, some 
service bulletins address conditions that can reduce cost of operations or avoid minor 
inconveniences, such as a delayed departure. In these cases, the airline may opt to perform a 
cost-benefit analysis of the service bulletin. The outcome of this analysis will be used to 
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determine if the service bulletin should be adopted. Participant #11 discussed the need to use a 
cost-benefit analysis to justify the embodiment of some service bulletins: 
That works well in terms of adoption of that service bulletin. If there's no commercial 
support than we have to go back and create a business case to justify that we need to 
improve the availability or reliability by embodying the service bulletin. (P11) 
 Interviews with the 14 airline professionals identified several inputs included during the 
technical assessment and the cost-benefit analysis of service bulletins. These different inputs are 
presented in Figure 4.4. The inner circle shows information taken into consideration during the 
technical assessment. The outer circle shows information taken into consideration during the 
cost-benefit assessment.  
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Figure 4.4. Inputs considered by airline professionals during technical assessment of both service 
bulletins and airworthiness directives. This shows airworthiness directives and mandatory high 
priority service bulletins as the inner circle (blue) and cost-benefit assessment of optional service 
bulletins as the outer circle (green).  
 
Technical assessment. Detailed analyses of the participants responses related to the 
technical assessment of service bulletins and airworthiness directives is now presented. 
Compliance location during shop visit or on-wing. Some service bulletins and 
airworthiness directives can be completed with the engine still installed on an aircraft or sitting at 
the airline facility as a spare engine. Other service bulletins and airworthiness directives require 
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the engine to go to a repair facility. Knowing where the compliance can be completed is a critical 
piece of information when assessing service bulletins and airworthiness directives. As Participant 
#07 pointed out, in many cases it is preferable if the service bulletin or airworthiness directive 
should be carried out at a repair facility. “It's different if this SB can be applied on the wing or 
during overhaul because it will more difficult for us to apply SB on-wing than during an 
overhaul” (P07). 
Part of the reason why service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive compliance 
at a repair facility is preferred is because the specified work can normally be performed during a 
scheduled visit to the repair facility. Service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive 
compliance performed on-wing often had not been included in the original maintenance plan and 
thus results in unscheduled maintenance. Unscheduled maintenance increases the time the 
aircraft is pulled from commercial operations. Unscheduled maintenance causes disruptions to 
the airline’s maintenance operations that can spill over into the commercial operations. 
Recovering from these operational disruptions can take days or weeks and result have associated 
costs. Participant #11 highlighted this as a reason why compliance of service bulletins and 
airworthiness directives during a scheduled visit to a repair facility is preferred.   
There is a cost of availability that is never factored in. That's a challenge. Having an 
aircraft down for maintenance. Yeah. And especially mostly if things don't fall under 
scheduled maintenance that becomes a maintenance cost that is not compensated for. 
(P11) 
Deadline for completion. The deadline for completing the service bulletin or 
airworthiness directive is normally stated in the respective document. The timeline for 
completion is usually related to the location where the service bulletin or airworthiness directive 
would be completed. For tasks to be completed on-wing, the timeline is much shorter than for 
 
 
 
106 
work to be done in a repair facility. Participant #08 described that deadlines in both service 
bulletins and airworthiness directives are taken very seriously.  
The timelines are really, really strict to be clear that we understand what is needed to get 
this accomplished and any kind of support that we need, we're able to ask of it and agree 
on how we can get us done. (P08) 
As described earlier in this chapter, not complying with an airworthiness directive can 
have severe consequences, such as grounding the aircraft and revocation of certifications. 
Service bulletins recommendations, although not mandated by regulatory bodies, are taken very 
seriously by airlines. In some cases, if the deadline defined in the service bulletin would be a 
significant burden for the airline operations, someone in a technical or planning position may 
approach the aircraft engine OEM for an extension to the timeline. Participant #08 described 
how they often approach the aircraft engine OEM for deadline extensions: “So usually our first 
approach is to go the OEM and try to request for a more friendlier [sic] accomplish by time. So 
maybe extension of the time or something of the sort” (P08). 
Engine or part applicability. The previous sections on timeline and location for 
completion focused on parameters of the service bulletin or airworthiness directive related to 
when or where the maintenance defined in the service bulletin should be performed. This section 
will focus on inputs related to the engine or part, which are used to determine if an engine or part 
is affected by the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. The engine and part parameters 
mentioned as being important to identification of affected parts or engines include the part 
number and serial number, the part utilization, the engine type, the engine model, the engine 
serial number, and the engine utilization.   
Engine parameters that are relevant to the applicability service bulletin or airworthiness 
directive are explicitly stated in the text of the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. With 
regards to OEM engagement, the service bulletin serves as the touchpoint with the airline. The 
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service bulletin is one-way communication of explicit knowledge initiated by the OEM. As 
discussed above, airworthiness directives are issued by regulatory bodies and thus the issuance of 
an airworthiness directive is not considered an OEM touchpoint. However, if the airworthiness 
directive references the service bulletin and the airline refers the service bulletin than this is 
considered an OEM touchpoint. This section will not discuss the details of every engine or part 
number in depth but will present participant feedback regarding occasions the text of the service 
bulletin was not clear and additional engagement with the OEM was required to clarify 
applicability of the service bulletin.  
Engaging the OEM for clarification. The text of the published service bulletin or 
airworthiness directive is meant to be very clear. However, in some instances the information 
provided may not be easily located or there may be some misunderstanding the airline would like 
to resolve. Many participants advised their first strategy is to re-read the service bulletin to 
ensure they did not miss a critical piece of information. As participant #14 pointed out, their first 
approach is to read through the SB: “I review [service bulletins and airworthiness directives] 
myself” (P14). 
If, after reading through the service bulletin, there is any detail still not clear the airline 
will act to engage with the respective OEM. The method for engaging with the OEM depends on 
if a field service representative is available. Participant #02 describes the preference and standard 
process would be to engage with the onsite field service representative as a preference but will 
send an email if not able to contact a field service engineer. “But if we have any doubt, we will 
need a second option. We speak with the rep, if we don't have a rep onsite, we would send an 
email for the OEM engineering department” (P02). 
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 Sometimes the applicability of the service bulletin is not clear. For example, if the part 
number listed in the service bulletin is part of an assembly, the assembly part number may be 
listed on all official engine documents and not the individual part number. This makes 
confirming applicability difficult. Likewise, sometimes the information given in the service 
bulletin may not be clear or may be conflicting. In cases where simply reading the service 
bulletin is not sufficient to confirm applicability an individual at the airline will reach out to the 
OEM. The preferred method of engagement for this touchpoint is through the field service 
representative, but if one is not available the airline individual will reach out to the OEM 
engineering via email. In both cases, the type of knowledge shared will still be explicit but will 
use reciprocal communication to ensure all points are fully clarified.  
Additional assessment. Airworthiness directives are mandated by the respective 
regulatory authority. Service bulletins are not mandatory and is up to the discretion of the airline 
to adopt them. Only when a service bulletin becomes an airworthiness directive does it become 
mandatory (Abbott, 2015). The interview participants described additional inputs used to decide 
whether to adopt a service bulletin. Those criteria are described below.  
Service bulletin category. To help airlines understand the urgency or importance of a 
service bulletin, OEMs will include the category within the service bulletin. This category is a 
number that indicates the seriousness of the condition addressed. There are no strict rules for 
how to categorize the service bulletin, this is done at the discretion of the OEM. Participant #07 
described how important this piece of information in the decision to adopt a service bulletin.  
Of course, I have also to determine, because you have, on an [service bulletin], you have 
a number which determines the level of the [service bulletin]. So, this is also very 
important to determine if it's really important or not to apply this [service bulletin]. (P07) 
In many cases the airline will, by policy, decide to adopt the service bulletin based on the 
severity of the service bulletin. Participant #01 explained that per their airline policy, action may 
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be required based on the OEM category of the service bulletin: “Actually, when I receive a 
Category 2 [service bulletin], I know that I have to take action” (P01). 
If the airline doesn’t have such a policy of airline’s policy doesn’t apply to a service 
bulletin than further assessment of the service bulletin will need to be completed using the 
additional inputs are required to complete the assessment of the service bulletin. 
Service bulletin background. When an airline is notified that a service bulletin or 
airworthiness has been released one of the first questions asked is regarding the underlying 
engine condition being addressed and circumstances that led to the release of the service bulletin. 
This is referred to as the background of the service bulletin. As Participant #14 pointed out, 
understanding this background of the service bulletin is a critical input in the decision-making 
process.  
And after that, [I] study category of the SB and description and the background of this SB 
and . . . its effect on the engines and how it is important or no based on the category and 
the background on this SB on other fleets. After that, I study the cost of the SB [sic]. 
(P14) 
The airline will also need to understand the operational impact of adopting the service 
bulletin or complying with the airworthiness directive. The operational impact can refer to two 
types of impact. The first type refers to the potential operational disruptions that can occur if the 
service bulletin is not adopted. These operational impacts can range from small delays that occur 
when a part needs to be replaced unexpectedly up to major disruption, such as an aircraft being 
unserviceable for days or even weeks. “I know a small thing in a certain engine can make the 
whole engine to cause in-flight shut down” (P03). 
The service bulletin document typically contains information regarding the underlying 
condition being addressed. To understand the background of the service bulletin, some 
participants stated they read the through the service bulletin document, while others mentioned 
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they would reach out to the assigned field service representative for this type of information. 
Reading through the service bulleting document is an OEM-initiated touchpoint used for 
nonreciprocal communication of explicit knowledge. Reaching out to the field service 
representative is an airline-initiated touchpoint that uses reciprocal communication to 
communicate both explicate and tacit knowledge. 
Effect on global fleet. Understanding how this condition addressed by the service bulletin 
will affect airlines globally is also a consideration when deciding to adopt a service bulletin. This 
piece of information is important as it allows those performing the service bulletin assessment to 
understand if their airline fleet is more exposed to the condition than other airlines. Participant 
#12 described how this information can influence the decision to adopt the service bulletin. 
“Maybe our reliability is worse in this area, is worse that is worldwide. In this case we will be 
willing to do this SB” (P12). 
Depending on the specific data needed to perform a comparative review, the data could 
be found in the service bulletin document, which is an OEM-initiated touchpoint used for 
nonreciprocal communication of explicit knowledge. Participant #12 described that in order to 
determine the effect on the global fleet they would contact the OEM either through contacting 
the field service representative or raising a request on the OEM website. Reaching out to the 
field service representative is an airline-initiated touchpoint that uses reciprocal communication 
to communicate both explicate and tacit knowledge. Submitting an inquiry on the OEM’s 
website is a partially reciprocal airline-initiate touchpoint that can used to request both explicit 
and tacit knowledge.  
 Experience at airline. Airlines will review their own experience to confirm if the root 
cause has adversely affected them in the past. If an airline has already been affected by a 
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condition for which a service bulletin exists, they are motivated to quickly address this condition 
in their fleet to avoid additional operational disruptions for the same reason. Participant #07 
described during their experience assessing service bulletins that a history of previous 
occurrences of the service bulletin affecting the airline’s fleet is an important input for making 
the decision to adopt a service bulletin: “In fact, I will check on our IT system, because when I 
analyze an SB, I have to check on our system if we already have some issue regarding this 
[service bulletin]” (P07). 
 Based on the responses from the interview participants, and the nature of this 
information, the airline would engage internally to confirm this information. Although this is an 
important piece of information, the primary source of this information is not the OEM and thus 
not a required touchpoint. 
The second type of operation disruption considered is related to how long the task takes 
to perform. This point also takes in to consideration if the task can be performed whilst the 
engine is installed on the aircraft, on-wing, or if it would need to be removed from the aircraft 
and sent to a repair facility. Generally, tasks that can be completed on-wing are less disruptive 
than engines that require engines to be sent to a repair facility. “It's different if this SB can be 
applied on the wing or during overhaul because it will more difficult for us to apply SB on wing 
than during an overhaul” (P07). 
Cost and commercial support. Another critical aspect of the assessment phase is 
understanding the cost to adopt a service bulletin as well as understanding the commercial 
support the OEM is willing to provide. It should be noted that commercial analyses are typically 
only performed on service bulletins that address cost of operating the engine, such as improving 
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fuel efficiency. Service bulletins addressing safety issues or major operational disruptions are 
typically adopted without the need for a cost benefit analysis. 
The commercial support the OEM will provide to the airline if they chose to adopt the 
service bulletin, is a critical input. The lack of commercial support can be a big challenge for the 
airline technical teams to get approval to implement the service bulletin. Participant #11 
provided insight in this review process, stating that without commercial support from the OEM 
they would have to create a business case to support adoption of the service bulletin. “If there's 
no commercial support than we have to go back and create a business case to justify that we need 
to improve the availability or reliability by embodying the service bulletin” (P11). 
The inclusion of commercial support can avoid the need for the approval request to be 
escalated to airline senior leadership. Participant #10 pointed out that at their airline the total cost 
will dictate the level of approval needed. 
If it's over a certain amount, then it would have to go to certain people in management to 
get approval. Like I know if it's over [a specific threshold], then management can 
approve it. If it goes over [another specific threshold], then it would have to go CEO level 
of which, if it goes beyond that, it will go to board of directors and it will be discussed 
with the board of directors of the company. (P10) 
The commercial support provided to the airline is defined is often in the text of the 
service bulletin, and would be categorized as an OEM-initiated, nonreciprocal communication of 
explicit knowledge. If the commercial support is not defined in the service bulletin, the airline 
employee would then reach out to the OEM. Based on feedback from the interview participants, 
reaching out to the OEM can include contacting the assigned field service representative or 
submitting an inquiry on the OEM’s website. Both of these touchpoint types have been described 
earlier in this chapter. 
If the airline believes the cost of adopting the service bulletin is too high or the commercial 
support already provided is not enough to offset the original cost of the service bulletin, they will 
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request additional support from the OEM. The airlines know they will need to justify their 
request for additional support. Participant #11 described that this process not only includes a 
review of the airline’s fleet but also challenges OEM’s assumptions and calculations. 
Yeah, sometimes we go back to the OEM to try and justify the need for support because 
the OEM will come and tell you that if you replace this specific part, you're going to see 
reliability go up by a certain factor, or a certain percent. Then we go back to the OEM for 
more details as to how? We asked for how they're going to add value the reliability 
figures and to how they arrived at it, the numbers they've arrived at in the service 
bulletin. So that's the kind of support we need when doing the business case, So, if 
someone has said the reliability will go up, we challenge that and ask by how much so 
that can calculate and see if there is value. (P11) 
To influence the OEM to provide additional commercial support the airline participants 
describe that they need to engage with the OEM to communicate these challenges. Participants 
mentioned approaches they use to request additional commercial support are related to previous 
operational impact caused by the underlying condition as well as costs not accounted for by the 
OEM. Participants responded that to raise this request with the OEM they would approach the 
field service representative and explain the need for additional support. The airline employee and 
field service representative would then work together to put the request in the right context so as 
to get the needed attention and understanding. Participant #08 described their experience 
requesting additional support. 
The first point of contact would be our field rep who directs us to the [customer support 
manager] and he would sort of help us in packaging the request in a way that would draw 
attention of the [customer support manager]. (P08) 
This example highlights the role of the field service representative as a facilitator of 
communication. Given the subjective nature of requests for additional commercial support and 
the need to include context of the request, the knowledge shared during this engagement is 
classified as tacit. The OEM initiates this touchpoint and utilizing fully reciprocal 
communication to resolve the request. 
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 Once of all the relevant information is collected, the airline staff responsible for making 
the decision to adopt the service bulletin will make a complete assessment. The result of the 
assessment will be used as input in determining if the airline will adopt the service bulletin. 
Assuming the airline decides to adopt the service bulletin, the process would then enter the next 
preparation phase. 
Preparation: Service bulletin and airworthiness directive. Once the airline personnel 
responsible for assessing the service bulletin have decided to adopt the service bulletin, the 
responsible people and teams within the airline organization will need to act to prepare to ensure 
the airline is ready to complete the service bulletin. The same type of preparation will be 
required for airworthiness directives. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, compliance with 
airworthiness directives is mandatory and enforced by the appropriate regulatory body.  
 During the course of the interviews, participants were asked to describe how they worked 
to ensure the airline was prepared to adopt service bulletins and comply with airworthiness 
directives. Their feedback is presented along with quotes from the interview. 
Compliance location. Completing a service bulletin or airworthiness directive at an 
engine repair facility can be easier for the airline than performing the required actions while the 
engine remains installed on the aircraft. Maintenance on an aircraft engine is scheduled during 
maintenance checks. The exact amount time the aircraft is removed from service depends on the 
time required to perform all required tasks. Removing an aircraft from service creates an 
additional burden on the rest of the airline’s fleet to support operations until this aircraft returns 
to service. If adopting a service bulletin or complying with an airworthiness directive requires a 
longer time to complete than the aircraft is scheduled, then the maintenance scheduled will need 
to be amended and this will likely affect the airline’s commercial operations. If the actual time 
 
 
 
115 
required to complete the service bulletin or airworthiness directive exceeds the time allocated in 
the maintenance plan this will cause a disruption to the maintenance operations and likely the 
commercial operations.  
Removing the engine and sending it to a repair facility also ensures the assigned airline 
individual or team will not need to acquire the parts, consumables, and tooling. Likewise, there is 
no need to review the training and certification of the airline technicians since they will not be 
doing the work.  
There are some reasons why the airline would prefer to complete the service bulletin or 
airworthiness directive without the need to send the engine to a repair facility. Sending the 
engine to a repair facility can be more expensive due to shipping cost and additional maintenance 
items that may need to be performed. While the engine is at the repair facility it is not available 
for airline use if needed. Some airlines may not have a spare engine and sending an engine to a 
repair facility would mean they pull the aircraft out of service until the engine returns or lease a 
spare engine, which can increase operational costs.  
If the airline decided to lease a spare engine to support the commercial operations, the 
interview participants indicated that engaging with the respective aircraft engine OEM would be 
the first step. Participant #10 stated that is very important to work closely with the aircraft engine 
OEM during this process, although no specific point of contact was identified. Leasing an engine 
will require approvals, documents, and agreement on price. The documents and approvals would 
be considered explicit knowledge using partially reciprocal communication while negotiations on 
price would involve tacit knowledge and require fully reciprocal communication. “We would 
have to start procuring the lease engine for the time being or otherwise with something else 
which then OEM engagement would be very important” (P10). 
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Once the decision has been made to send the engine to a repair facility there remains only 
one action item. They responsible parties at the airline must ensure the repair facility is approved 
for the airline to use. If the repair facility is approved, then no other action is needed.   
We do have depending on the [service bulletin], because like I know, know that 
normally, he you we say that the [maintenance task] has to be carried out be an [OEM] 
authorized facility. So, I know there's like only three, all I know, so technically we won't 
be able to do that onsite. (P10) 
 But if the facility is not approved then the airline would need to contact the repair facility. 
Participants’ responses indicate the first point of contract would be the assigned field service 
representative, who would be asked to provide the relevant contacts at the repair facility. The 
initial contact with the field service representative would not be considered a touchpoint, instead 
the contact with the repair facility would be considered the airline-initiated touchpoint.  
If the airline decides to complete the service bulletin or airworthiness directive while the 
engine is still in the airline facility, there are additional steps the airlines needs to take to ensure 
the tasks can be completed onsite at the airline. Those tasks require OEM touchpoints and a 
further discussed.  
Airline maintenance capability. The capability of an airline to complete a service 
bulletin or airworthiness directive depends on if it has the needed materials and tools to perform 
the specific task. The capability also includes whether the technicians performing the task have 
the required training or required certification. One critical part of preparing to complete a service 
bulleting or airworthiness directive is confirming the airline’s capability to complete all tasks. 
Participant #07 described how their airline had a limited capability; so, confirming the airline’s 
capability was a priority. “We have a limited scope of work, and so it will be the most important 
thing to check.” (P07) 
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The experience of Participant #07 is with an airline that has limited capability. 
Some of the participants worked for airlines with greater capabilities, but the feedback from 
them was consistent. Before scheduling the service bulletin or airworthiness directive the 
responsible individual or team would confirm the airline had the needed capability. Confirming 
the capability available is a review process internal to the airline. The needed capability is 
communicated through the service bulletin. Additional airline-initiated touchpoints are based on 
a need to clarify the required capability. The participants indicated they engaged directly with the 
assigned field service representative to clarify the required capability.  
 Based on the outcome of the internal airline capability review, there may be a gap in 
capability that would require the responsible person at the airline to engage with the aircraft 
engine OEM for support to acquire need parts, tools, or training.  The participants’ feedback is 
presented on this engagement is now presented. 
 Procurement of required materials. In aviation the terms “part,” “expendable,” and 
“consumable” refer to different types of material. A part is an item that can be repaired and if 
removed can be reinstalled. Expendables and consumables both refer to one-time use materials. 
Where the term extendable refers to items such as bolts or seals and consumables refers to 
lubricant of fluids (Mansour, 2011). Service bulletins and airworthiness directives often will 
require the use of all types of materials.  
 As Participant #05 pointed out, acquiring the needed material to perform a service 
bulletin or airworthiness directive can be big challenge especially if there are many airlines 
trying to acquire the same material.  
One of the biggest challenges for airlines in adopting service bulletins is availability of 
modification parts. Parts to be used for modification are not usually easily available 
because once a service bulletin is released, operators all over the world need to build it 
based on the priority of the service bulletin both based on the effect it has on the safety of 
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operator. All over the world will want the parts to be available for them, they want to 
modify the affected engines as urgently as possible so that honestly, creates problems. 
Sometimes, you want to modify your engine and parts may not be easily available. (P05) 
 For urgent service bulletins and airworthiness directives with short compliance deadlines, 
the demand for material might exceed the available supply. If this happens, delivery of the 
material may be delayed to the airline, and the needed material will not be available during the 
scheduled maintenance time. The airline can either adjust the maintenance schedule to 
accommodate the late arriving part or they can engage the OEM to ensure the needed material is 
allocated in order to meet their maintenance schedule. Participant #04 indicated that their 
company reaches out to the OEM, through the field service representative, in order to request 
support in getting needed material. “We go through the rep and then we say, okay, can you help 
us only getting this part? Okay, because we are facing this problem” (P04). 
 Participant #05 also stated the preferred method to engage the aircraft engine OEM for 
support on material requests is through the assigned field support representative. Participant #05 
stated that even though it is not the field support representative who will allocate the part, there is 
confidence the field support representative will notify the correct people or teams within the 
OEM organization and will be able to put the request in the right context in order to attract the 
needed attention within the OEM organization.  
Usually, the best way is to use a one-point contact. Then, that contact OEM 
representative assigned, if you need to negotiate or send for some information, or contact 
for further information, they will create a contact for you. They will initiate a contact then 
after that, you can go ahead with research. That's usually the best way to do it, has been 
and we always do it this way. It has been and it still is using the OEM representatives at 
site. (P05) 
Sometimes, despite the best efforts of the field support representative, the request of the 
airline cannot be fulfilled. If this happens, the airline team responsible for completing the service 
bulletin or airworthiness directive will inform senior leadership at the airline. The airline senior 
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leadership will then engage directly with the aircraft engine OEM senior leadership to impress 
the importance of their request and ask for resolution. Participant #05 described how the airline 
escalates matters internally and directly engages with senior leadership at the aircraft engine 
OEM.  
But sometimes because, like I said, all the operators around the world want to comply 
with the required modification or instruction at the same time, the OEM will decide and 
will prioritize some operators, the big operators or the more demanding operators or the 
financially stronger operators. When this happens, when you feel like you have been 
given less priority, what we do is, we escalate to our higher management and our higher 
management will escalate it to higher management of the OEM. They will ask why we 
are given less priority than other operators and they will ask to be given a better 
treatment, a better priority. (P05) 
Procurement of required tooling. Just as airlines need to have access to required material 
to complete service bulletins and airworthiness directives, often specialized tooling is also 
required. The aircraft engine OEM generally does not manufacture or selling the tooling, but 
often the engine OEM has the technical drawings for the tooling. The responsible team or 
individual at the airline will reach out to the aircraft engine OEM for access to these drawings. 
The airline can then contract with a local manufacturer to make the tooling or the airline can 
build the tooling on their own.   
To request the technical drawing, Participant #07 stated they first approach the field 
support representative or to the customer support manager through email. This is consistent with 
the responses from other participants. “I sent a mail, an email through fleet support engineer or 
customer support manager” (P14). 
Participant #12 highlighted that another strategy used by the airline to acquire needed 
tooling is to engage the field service representative and ask them to use their network of 
connections with other airlines to check on availability of tooling at other airlines. If the tool is 
available, the two airlines can work out lease arrangement. Contacting the field service 
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representative is a touchpoint previously noted in this chapter. Airlines using the broad network 
of field service representatives to facilitate inter-airline communication is very common. 
However, this was the only mention of this during the 14 interviews. “Sometimes the local rep           
. . . they go to [another airline]. He can contact the local rep there, they have already easy to 
contact there and they ask [for support]. [sic]” (P12). 
Procurement of required training. If the tasks in the service bulletin or airworthiness 
directive require the technicians performing the task to have specialized training to perform the 
task, then the responsibility party at airline would need to make arrangements to have the 
technicians trained. The training could require the technicians to travel to the OEM’s facility for 
training or the OEM may send instructors to the airline facility.   
If training is required, the responsible person at the airline will first reach out to the OEM 
to understanding the availability of the training, location of the training, and timing of the 
training. Participant #05 discussed this process and identified that, at their airline, the closest 
training facility is preferred.  
The usual way of communication we communicate to the OEMs is, we ask for available 
slots, how many people we can send and when they can get the certification. When the 
tools will be available, then based on that complication, we get our paper from our bosses 
and send the technicians and they go to, possibly, the most nearby place, and they take 
that training. (P05) 
Participant #11 specified to arrange training they reach out to the customer support 
manager. Many of the other participants indicated the reach out to the field service 
representative. Both of these airline-initiate touchpoints have been described earlier in this 
chapter.  
Regarding training, we contact the [customer support manager]. Like in our case we 
contacted the regional customer support manager and a we ask them approach training 
and then they find a way to engage the OEM training school. The training slots are 
booked, the airline makes the payment, and we then we attend the training. (P11) 
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If an airline completes the review of internal capability and identifies gaps in the 
capability, they may work to develop the capability. If the senior leadership of the airline decides 
that developing capability is not in the best interest of the airline than the responsible individuals 
or teams would contract with the aircraft engine OEM or other maintenance service provider to 
complete the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. 
Review of current services agreements. Airlines often contract with the aircraft engine 
OEM, or other maintenance, repair, and overhaul facilities, for engine maintenance. Long-term 
and exclusive contracts are entered as cost reduction strategy. If the airline has decided they want 
to outsource the work, instead of building capability, the current maintenance contracts are 
reviewed to confirm if the airline has a service agreement with any maintenance service provider 
to perform the work. Participant #07 describes how their first response is to ask the respective 
aircraft engine OEM for support, but also mentions that they have a contract with specific MRO 
service manufacturer. “If fact, most of the case, we ask [the respective aircraft engine OEM]. We 
also have got [sic] a contract with [specific maintenance service provider] and they are able to 
assist us onsite” (P07). 
This contract with the maintenance service provider gives the participant an additional 
option to consider if the work cannot be completed by airline technicians.  
Contracting work to the OEM. If there are existing service agreements with the aircraft 
engine OEM, or if there are no service agreements, the airline can work with the OEM to provide 
maintenance services. Participant #08 mentioned an occasion at their airline when the senior 
leadership decided to outsource the work to the OEM rather than develop the capability. “On one 
of our fleet, yes, we actually had such a scenario where we had to develop capability and we did 
not go pick that option. So, we opted to outsource [to the OEM’s technicians]” (P08). 
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If the airline decides to outsource the work the to OEM technicians, the responsibility 
parties at the airline will reach out to the assigned field service representative to help arrange the 
aircraft engine OEM technicians to perform the work. Participant #04 stated during their 
interview that they deal with the assigned field service representative. This was a common 
response from all participants. “We have been dealing with the rep. Through the rep is fast, is 
more effective with the rep. We tell him and then he look [sic] for help from the [OEM 
technician team]” (P04). 
Create a compliance schedule. For service bulletins and airworthiness directives 
completed on engines still installed on aircraft, the maintenance planning team at the airline must 
plan to remove the aircraft from commercial operations. The planner will request for the aircraft 
to be provided ground time based on the respective deadline and time needed to perform the task. 
Participant #10 highlighted the primary concern of both the maintenance planning and 
commercial planning teams are the impact to the commercial schedule. “I have to check how it's 
going to affect our flying schedule” (P10). 
As Participant #06 pointed out, finding available ground time to perform the maintenance 
tasks specified in the service bulleting or airworthiness directive. “A challenge would be to have 
available aircraft ground time” (P06). 
The aircraft engine OEM cannot change the compliance deadline for an airworthiness 
directive. However, if the timing of the service bulletin will cause a disruption to the commercial 
schedule the airline will approach the aircraft engine OEM to for additional time to perform the 
service bulletin. “If you need an extension on an [service bulletin], it has to come from OEM” 
(P10). 
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Feedback from the interviews also confirm that prioritization of specific engines is also 
very valuable for the technical teams and maintenance planning teams at the airline. This 
information allows for a scheduled to be created the reduces exposure to hazardous conditions 
that can result in operational disruption more rapidly. Information on engine prioritization is 
often included in the in the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. However, the responsible 
person at the airline will still engage with the OEM to ensure the recommendations are fully 
understood and being properly followed. The need for engagement with the OEM on this topic 
was highlighted by Participant #12.  
Maybe with this problem comes at before, we have according the performance of the 
engine, the OEM send a report, a report to tell us the priority of the maintenance of the 
SB on the engines. Maybe in some cases, the performance of the engine will affect which 
engine will perform the first. (P12) 
The feedback from the interviews indicated that the OEM engagement was accomplished 
by contacting the assigned field service representative. The field service representative would 
review the compliance schedule with the airline technical and planning teams to ensure the high 
priority engines were completed first.    
The need for material to complete service bulletins and airworthiness directives was 
discussed earlier in this chapter, along with the challenge that is often present in acquiring the 
required material. Feedback from the interviews highlight that the technical and planning teams 
communicate with the assigned field service representative to coordinate the allocation of 
required material with the project maintenance schedule for the affected engines.   
In the section on service bulletin and airworthiness directive assessment, the airline 
planning team may find it needs additional time to complete the service bulletin. Based on 
feedback from the interviews, in this type of situation, someone from the planning or technical 
teams at the airline will contact the assigned field support engineer to request an extension of the 
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service bulletin deadline. This does not apply to airworthiness directives as the deadline is 
enforced by the appropriate regulatory body and not the aircraft engine OEM.  
Service bulletin and airworthiness directive execution. The final phase in the process 
for adopting service bulletins and complying with airworthiness directives, after the airline has 
been notified, performed an assessment, and completed preparations, is to actually perform the 
tasks defined in the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. The completion of the step is 
dependent on the schedule developed for completion of the service bulletin or airworthiness 
directive. The feedback from the 14 interviews highlighted the significant need for OEM 
engagement during this final phase of the process.  
Adjusting to schedule changes. While planning for completion of a service bulletin or 
airworthiness directive, the airline technical and planning teams also must manage the scheduled 
maintenance on the airline fleet of aircraft and engines as well as deal with unplanned 
maintenance. Unplanned maintenance can disrupt both the airline’s maintenance and commercial 
operations resulting in a need to reschedule the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. 
Likewise, if there is a change in the availability of material, tooling, or human resources, the 
airline will need to know immediately so the maintenance schedule can accommodate the 
change.  Participant #04 pointed out that as soon as materials or other requirements are available 
the airline will plan to complete the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. 
No sooner than the parts are with us, we incorporate the [service bulletin]. Rapidly. We 
don't need to wait for reaching the deadline, I mean. Yes. We don't need to wait for this 
deadline. No sooner we have order materials with us, we accomplish the service bulletin. 
(P04) 
Although Participant #04 did not specify the point of contact with the OEM organization, 
the general feedback from the interviews was that this type of engagement would be with the 
assigned field service representative.  
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Providing feedback to the OEM. When a service bulleting or airworthiness is completed 
on a specific engine, the airline will make sure to inform the respective OEM as mentioned by 
Participant #04. “We inform the manufacturer that we have accomplished the serviceability. [The 
assigned field service representative} is first to know about that accomplishment” (P04). 
Participant #04 went on to describe that this information is shared primarily with the 
assigned field service representative who then shares the information within the OEM 
organization. This response was consistent with the general feedback from the other participants 
that the completion of service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive compliance is done 
primarily thought the field service representative.  
OEM follow-up. For particularly urgent or otherwise high priority service bulletins or 
airworthiness directives, the respective aircraft engine OEM will proactively follow up with the 
airline to understand the progress on completing the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. 
This point was highlighted by Participant #08.  
The OEM is always keen to understand on a routine basis our accomplishment status. So 
be it's weekly, biweekly or monthly, they are interested in knowing how far we are with 
accomplishment of the airworthiness directive compared to the service bulletin. (P08) 
This OEM-initiated engagement is, based on general interview feedback, initiated by the 
assigned field service representative and directed to the airline technical teams.   
Requesting clarification on findings. When the airline performs the service bulletin or 
airworthiness directive they may need to engage with the OEM for clarification if there is 
conflicting guidance in the service bulletin and airworthiness directive. Recall that a service 
bulletin is a recommendation issued by the respective OEM. An airworthiness directive may be 
based on an existing service bulletin but may have small conflicts. As described by Participant 
#05, if this happens the airlines will immediately engage with the OEM and ask the OEM to 
clarify with the appropriate regulatory body.   
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One of the common problems with airworthiness directives related to a certain operative 
inspection is the disposition of inspection results. Some airworthiness directives will have 
the same requirements as service bulletins. If the service bulletins or the particular 
aircraft maintenance manual or the engine shop manual limitation tells you to accept a 
certain kind of finding with a certain limit, some airworthiness directive will directly just 
go for that. But some errors airworthiness directives put on their own disposition on 
certain type of findings. When that happens, sometimes there is a conflict of interest, a 
problem is defining what actually should be the decision based on the findings we have. 
(P05) 
Although not specified in this response, previous responses from Participant #05 suggest 
they would raise the request directly with the assigned field support representative. Participant 
#05 went on to advise that sometimes when completing a service bulletin or airworthiness 
directive there can be additional findings not addressed in the service bulletin or airworthiness 
directive. If this happens, the technician performing the task will need clear guidance on how to 
proceed. The technician will report the issue, which will be escalated to the responsible person 
on the technical team. The assigned field service representative will then be notified directly and 
asked to provide clarification.  
Sometimes the particular airworthiness directives will give you some disposition for 
some findings but when you do that inspection you will other findings which are directly 
mentioned in the airworthiness directive or in the service bulletin. Then that will lead you 
to wait for disposition to be advised usually the OEM because regulatory bodies do not 
have as many contact points as OEMs. (P05) 
Managing vendor repairs. Some service bulletins and airworthiness directives require a 
specific part to be removed from the engine and shipped to a repair facility to have the specific 
maintenance task completed. To support airline operations, the respective OEM will offer a 
single unit to be used to allow the engine to operate when the removed part is at the repair 
facility. Once the repaired unit is returned the airline, it will be used to replace and affected unit 
on another engine. With this type of rotable program, the airline must manage the repair time to 
ensure the repair part will be returned based on the maintenance schedule of the next engine to 
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have the part replaced. Participant #14 identified that the airline will engage directly with the 
OEM and ensure the OEM manages the operations at their facility.  
We make a plan with the OEM. And based on the turn-around-time of the component and 
the how many components we have at—how components affected I have—we do a plan. 
Through this plan, we do a plan and agree and mutually agreed with the OEM. And all, 
we start to implement this plan on our fleet [sic]. (P14) 
 Although the point of engagement within the OEM organization is not specified, previous 
responses from Participant #14 suggest the primary point of contact would be the assigned field 
service representative.  
Alternate method of compliance. When a regulatory body issues an airworthiness 
directive, the maintenance burden may significantly affect their commercial schedule or create 
an unmanageable maintenance burden. In this case the OEM may provide instructions to the 
regulatory body for approval for an alternate method of compliance with the airworthiness 
directive. The alternate method of compliance often relies on the use of operational data or 
inspection data to monitor the underlying condition. The alternate method of compliance is often 
used to manage the cost and maintenance burden associated with the primary method of 
airworthiness directive compliance.  
If we have an [alternate method of compliance] related to the service bulletin after we 
inspect, we perform a postponed inspection. We provide this data to the OEM. If they 
have any recommendation, we follow their recommendation. So, after performing the 
borescope [an instrument for conducting a visual inspection through a small aperture], 
we're done with [alternate method of compliance] recommendation, we provide this data 
to the OEM. (P14) 
During the assessment of the service bulletin and airworthiness process, the airline 
reviews the technical aspects of the service bulletin or airworthiness directive. During this 
technical review the airline professionals advised, they initiate engagement with the respective 
engine OEM to determine the engines in their fleet that are affected, the condition being 
addressed, the deadline for accomplishing the recommendations, and the maintenance burden 
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associated with the recommended maintenance task. This information is typically included in the 
text of the service bulletin, but when it is not clear the interviews show that the airline 
professional’s first point of contact is the assigned field service representative. Often the 
clarification that is requested, is communicated as explicit data. For example, a service bulletin 
might state the time required to perform the recommended task. This time will not include the 
time to perform the additional tasks required to gain access to the subject part. The airline may 
ask the field service engineer what the OEM’s experience with performing all tasks is, and how 
much time should they schedule to perform the service bulleting or airworthiness directive. 
This section reviewed the process for adoption of service bulletins and compliance with 
airworthiness directives. The OEM touchpoints identified by the interview participants were 
presented based on the phase of the process they occurred, the organization that initiated the 
touchpoint, the type of communication, and the type of knowledge shared within the touchpoint.  
Touchpoints Leading to Successful Performance of Maintenance and Inspection Tasks 
Aircraft engine OEMs, like all OEMs, provide documented instruction and guidance on 
how to perform required inspection and maintenance tasks. These instructions are published in 
regulatory approved manuals, which are provided to the airline. The manual provides detail on 
all maintenance and inspection tasks that should be carried out on the engine. When performing 
any type of maintenance task, the technicians executing the tasks are required to complete the 
task as detailed in the manual. Tasks in the manual can often be challenging to perform.  
Tasks not properly performed can affect the operation and performance of the engine, 
which can lead to increased maintenance cost, operational disruptions, or can impact the safety 
performance of the engine. To reduce the chance of tasks being performing improperly, aircraft 
engine OEMs share best practices for completing critical and complex tasks. Best practices are 
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industry accepted methods or techniques that demonstrates superior results (Bretschneider, 
Marc-Aurele, & Wu, 2004).  
Interview participants were asked to describe their experience working with aircraft 
engine OEMs to identify and adopt best practices. All 14 participants provided detailed 
responses. Based on their feedback, and the coding analysis, the process for the adoption of best 
practices was identified as containing four critical elements. These critical elements, presented in 
Figure 4.5, include the awareness for the need of a best practices, strategies for engaging the 
aircraft engine OEM, effective medium for sharing best practices, and strategies for 
disseminating the information within the airline.  
 
Figure 4.5. Process for adoption of best practices. 
 
Awareness of need for a best practice. The use of best practice is not required by a 
regulatory body, nor is there a standard method for aircraft engine OEMs to make airlines aware 
of their existence. To be open to including a best practice in their operations, the airlines needs to 
first be aware of the need for a best practice. Feedback from the interview participants identified 
four primary conditions that highlight the need for a best practice.  
Lack of comfort or experience with the task. One of the primary conditions that leads to 
the awareness for the need of a best practice, as reported by the interview participants, was 
inexperience with performing the task. Lack of familiarity with performing a task can result in 
uncertainty that the inspection was performed properly. Participant #05 described that the airline 
does not perform tasks perfectly if the tasks are new to the airline. With developed expertise, the 
airline becomes more comfortable performing the tasks. “And so, airlines do not a perform 
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inspections as perfectly as required the first time they do it, they will need some kind of expertise 
developed through time” (P05). 
When there is uncertainty that the maintenance or inspection task was not correctly 
performed, the responsible person at the airline would reach out to the airline to ensure it was 
performed correctly. The response from Participant #06 confirmed this. “So normally when we 
do an inspection we're not used to, and we would contact OEM to make sure we did it correctly” 
(P06). 
Most of the participants indicated their first point of contact within aircraft OEM 
organization in the assigned field support representative. An airline-initiated touchpoint with the 
assigned field support engineer is described earlier in this chapter.     
Trend of negative inspection or task outcomes. Responses from interview participants 
revealed that a trend of negative outcomes related to the performance of inspection or 
maintenance tasks can highlight a need for best practice. Participant #05 described their 
experience on three separate engine types, with three different OEMs. The airline has been 
performing a specific scheduled maintenance task to remove accumulated moisture from a 
component call the EEC. Despite having performed the correct maintenance task, the airline 
reported still receiving maintenance notifications for moisture accumulation in the EEC. The 
airline recognized that the way they had been performing the moisture removal procedure was 
not effective, and, so, engaged with the OEM for recommendations, specifically best practices.  
Let me tell you three particular cases where this has been extremely efficient. For [three 
specific aircraft engine OEMs], there has been a new technology where we didn't use to 
do, there is a moisture removal from EEC. For about the first three, four, five, six months 
of our operations my airline was not doing this moisture removal correctly. We collected 
best practice videos from [the three aircraft engine OEMs]. and those best practice videos 
contained details of how to use the tools, how to [correctly perform the task], the tools 
correctly removed, the tools correctly store and things like that. After getting that best 
practice videos of these practices, a number of [maintenance notifications] and alerts 
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received on all three engine models significantly decreased because the onsite 
representatives participated in giving the training. (P05) 
Based on feedback from the interview participants, the primary point of contact with the 
airline, as highlighted in Participant #05’s response, is the assigned field service representative. 
Airline initiated touchpoint with the assigned field support engineer is described earlier in this 
chapter.     
Participant #05 described this experience as having a positive outcome, citing the 
reduction in maintenance notifications and alerts as proof the best practices were effective. They 
also specified that their initial and only engagement with the aircraft engine OEM was with the 
assigned, onsite field service representative. They also described the assigned, onsite field 
service representative engagement as leading training. This topic is related to engagement 
strategies and will be discussed further in the section on engagement strategies.  
Feedback from aircraft engine OEM. Airlines often share details of the maintenance 
procedure performed or visual media from inspection tasks that have been performed. The 
aircraft engine OEM review this information, and in many cases can provide feedback on if the 
task had been properly accomplished. Interview responses confirmed OEM feedback, based on 
data shared by the airline, often identifies needs for best practices.  
Participant #05 described a process of sharing pictures and videos captured during an 
inspection with the OEM. The assigned field service representative reviews these data, and 
confers with their technical team if needed, and provides feedback to the airline if they observe 
the inspection was performed incorrectly or if the assessment of the inspection data is consistent 
with how the aircraft engine OEM assesses data.   
And in addition to that, for some particular inspections, which are not very easy to 
understand, the OEMs representatives will receive the videos, the pictures and review the 
findings our inspectors have done. And they will look at it, evaluate it, and they will get it 
evaluated by their expert engineering team and they will comment on it. (P05) 
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Feedback from the aircraft engine OEM, in this situation, is dependent on the airline first 
sharing data with the OEM. Some interview participants stated their airline proactive provides 
inspection data to the OEM, while other participants stated inspection data is shared only if there 
is a need for feedback from the OEM. Other participants stated their airlines do not share data 
with the OEM. While feedback on shared data was reported as helping to identify need for best 
practices, it applies only to those airlines that share inspection and maintenance task data with 
the OEM.   
Based on feedback from the interview participants, the primary point of contact with the 
airline for this type of feedback is the assigned field service representative. Airline initiated 
touchpoint with the assigned field support engineer is described earlier in this chapter.     
Written instruction is not clear. The final condition that leads airlines to be aware there 
is a need for a best practice, as reported by the interview participants, is when the written 
instructions in the manual are not clear. Participant #12 described that if the written procedure is 
not clear than they will reach out to the OEM for clarity. “But in this case if the finding is clear 
compared to the manual, there's no problem we'll follow the manual. If it is not clear for us, we'll 
send the case to the OEM” (P12). 
Other participants also indicated they would reach out to the aircraft engine OEM if the 
instructions in the manual were clear but difficult to follow. Airline initiated touchpoint with the 
assigned field support engineer is described earlier in this chapter.     
Engagement strategies. Once the need for a best practice is confirmed, multiple 
strategies were identified by interview participants, for engaging both within the airline 
organization and with the OEM to learn best practices for correctly and effectively performing 
inspection and maintenance tasks. Feedback from the interviews suggest that airline 
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professionals first reach out within their airline organization to understand if the needed 
information can be acquired without the need of reaching out of their organization. The interview 
participants suggested that a review of the current manuals and previous training material is 
completed before reaching out to the OEM.  
Airline review of the engine manual. Airline professionals reported referring to the 
appropriate manual clarifies the details of a maintenance task. Participant #02 discussed how 
they find the aircraft maintenance manual helpful. “Sometimes we go to the aircraft maintenance 
manual and it helps us” (P02). 
Airline reviews internally. The interview participants indicated that before contacting the 
aircraft engine OEM the relevant members of the airline organization will review the issue. 
Participant #07 stated that by reviewing internally, they can often address the issue without the 
need to contact the OEM. “Okay, in that case we will contact, I will contact because the 
mechanic will come and see our office, so they will explain what happened, so maybe sometimes 
I can give an answer without contacting [the OEM], for example” (P07). 
Airline reviews material from previous training. Aircraft engine OEMs provide training 
to those airlines that operate and maintain their products. Through these trainings the airline 
participants are provided training materials. Interview participants, particularly those that had 
attended OEM training, advised that before contacting the respective OEM they would review 
the relevant training material.  
I personally went to the U.S. [for OEM provided] training. I know [from this training] 
that [this OEM] has a channel on YouTube, where you access information on LPT 
change and other tasks. If there's something that you need help on, you can go to the 
channel. There are some additional things you can do on the [OEM] website. (P03) 
Airline searches the OEM website. Aircraft engine OEMs, like many OEMs, have 
portals that individuals at the airline can use to access information and raise queries. Responses 
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from the interviews confirm that someone airline personnel will review the OEM website for 
clarification on how to perform specific tasks. Participant #08 described their proactive efforts 
searching an OEM website. “And then the other item I will talk about is on best practices, 
usually we get to share, you get to know about best practices in two forms, number one is, my 
old pro activeness trying to reach out to the website to gather whether there is any new industry 
information” (P08). 
Review of the OEM website is initiated by the airline. The explicit knowledge is shared 
using non-reciprocal communication if the airline only uses data posted to the website. However, 
the individual raises an inquiry the communication would be classified as partially-reciprocal.  
Escalation within the airline. Many of the interview participants’ responses confirmed 
that they directly contact the OEM for support, sometimes after exploring other resources. 
However, Participant #03 stated that contacting the aircraft engine OEM was not within the 
scope of their position and that issues requiring engagement with the OEM were escalated to 
their direct manager. “As a maintenance supervisor, every problem that I've got, I will escalate it 
to my manager. So, my manager is the one who deals with the OEM” (P03). 
This response was interesting given that all other interview participants indicated they 
were empowered to discuss these matters directly with OEMs, and in this case contact with the 
OEM has to be escalated beyond the maintenance supervisor.  
Continuous proactive engagement with OEM. Feedback from the interviews confirmed 
that continuous practice sharing of best practice knowledge was a critical engagement between 
the airline and the aircraft engine OEM. Responses from the participants indicated there are two 
primary forms for continues proactive sharing: OEM-hosted conferences with the airlines and the 
day-to-day engagement with the assigned field service representative.  
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Aircraft engine OEMs typically host conferences that operators of their products can 
attend with the goal of building relationships and learning more about the product. The 
frequency, format, and content of these meetings can vary between the aircraft engine OEMs. 
Feedback from the interviews was consistent that airlines see these meetings as opportunities to 
learn more about the product they are operating, including associated best practices. “If there are 
best practices, we normally find out about this during the monthly calls with the fleet team” 
(P08). These meetings, commonly called “all operators meetings,” are initiated by the respective 
OEM. Given that typically a large number of airlines join the call, there is very little opportunity 
for reciprocal communication. As such, explicit knowledge is communicated using a              
non-reciprocal approach. These calls are use a teleconference service that allows screen sharing   
Another form of proactive sharing discussed during the interviews was based on 
continuous and on-going engagement with the assigned field support representative from the 
respective OEM. During this engagement field service representatives begin to develop an 
understanding of the challenges and needs at the airline. They can then review internally, within 
the OEM organization, for information to support the airline. Participant #08 described their 
experiences with the day-to-day engagement with the assigned field support representative.  
And number two, we get them shared to us by the field rep. However, on the second point 
this is already done on reactive phase, on the sense that whenever we have an event that 
has happened then we are trying to trouble shoot, that's when, say the rep would stumble 
upon some best practice. Of course, both of us will be the looking here, there and 
everywhere to see if there is any information that is relevant. Then for the time that we 
realize, oh there is some best practice that we've been shared and that's when we get to 
share that with our team and make them aware of this. And so, I think there is a 
significant gap there because had we been doing this for a routine then we'd be able to 
identify the opportunity earlier and to continuously share the best practices. (P08) 
 The day-to-day engagement between the assigned field service representative and airline 
is defined earlier in Chapter IV.  
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Request training or support from OEM. If a sufficient number of airline personnel lack 
basic familiarity with or understanding of a specific task, or if the specific task is especially 
critical, that the airline and the aircraft engine OEM may work together to provide formal 
training. The formal training would also include a review of any relevant best practices. 
Participant #08 recalled their experience engaging the aircraft OEM for formal training, in this 
specific case the request was for borescope inspection training.  
We request for a training to be performed to our team. Especially specific training would 
be on borescope inspection. An inspection task like inspection, so if there's a significant 
gap that we've noted from our field then we engage with the OEM to see if they can come 
down and train our staff, make them aware of what to look out for and the important steps 
in the project. (P08) 
 After the OEM has been contacted and the need for training has been communicated, the 
OEM and the airline will work together to determine the most convenient timing and location of 
the training. The training is often offered at the respective aircraft engine OEM facility but can 
also be arranged onsite with the subject airline or even a third-party facility if both the OEM and 
airline agree. Participant #14 highlighted this point during their interview. “We have two 
options; send our team outside to have this training or ask the OEM to train our own support 
team to do this task in [the airline’s home country] and do a training for our maintenance team to 
perform this task after that by themselves” (P14). 
 Participant #14 also pointed out that airlines may also request the OEM to train their 
training team. This will allow the airline to provide future training without the need to engage the 
OEM.   
 Although not specifically mentioned in the responses, the participants would likely 
approach the assigned field service representative based on their responses throughout the 
interview. The airline-initiated engagement with the OEM was described and categorized earlier 
in Chapter IV.  
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Sharing inspection and operational data with the OEM. One strategy the interview 
participants advised that they use to engaged aircraft engine OEMs is sharing inspection data 
with the OEM. Some indicated that they provided inspection data to the OEM proactively, and 
others said they only provided inspection data when they felt the inspection or maintenance task 
was not correctly performed or there was an unexpected result. The expectation of the airlines, as 
described by Participant #05, is that the OEM will review the data and provide feedback 
confirming the procedure was performed properly.  
They will get it evaluated by their expert engineering team and they will comment on it, 
they will tell us that we have taken these pictures from these angles and taking these 
pictures from this angles will not give you the correct view of the inspection so you will 
not be able to define or to give disposition correctly. (P05) 
Participant #05 touched on two aspects of the inspection task the airline expects feedback 
on. First, they mention if the images are taken from the proper angles. This relates to whether the 
procedure was followed properly. Participant #05 then mentions if the airline correctly 
dispositions the findings. Incorrect disposition of a remark can affects the operation of the 
engine. For this reason, the airline needs input from the OEM to ensure they are correctly 
identifying, assessing, and acting upon remarks. 
The primary means for engaging with the OEM for clarity on performing maintenance 
tasks and inspection tasks, as well as proper disposition of inspection remarks is through the 
assigned field service representative.  
Airline avoids engaging the OEM. The responses were overwhelming positive regarding 
engagement with the aircraft engine OEM in order to access best practices and get general 
feedback. Airline professionals reported they actively sought our aircraft engine OEM when they 
felt maintenance and inspection tasks were not performed properly. However, Participant #13 
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advised that if a “silly mistake” were made or if the task was rushed, potentially resulting in the 
task not being completed properly, they would not engage with the OEM.  
If the, the staff is making maybe silly mistakes or mistake because of a time or something 
like that. Uh, of course in this case, I will not communicate with the OEM. But I can 
highlight this to the hanger manager or the observing engineer. I will try to make this 
unofficial. (P13) 
 When asked to further explain why they wouldn’t engage the OEM if they felt the tasks 
were not being performed properly, Participant #13 responded that if the OEM knows the 
procedures are performed improperly there may be commercial repercussions. This feedback 
highlights the significance of trust between the individuals in the airline and the OEM.  
Mediums for sharing best practices. Responses from the interview participants revealed 
three mediums for sharing best practices. These are verbal instruction—given by the assigned 
field support representative that is typical onsite—written instruction, and video instruction.  
Verbal instruction Verbal instruction is provided via the assigned field service 
representative, who is typically onsite with the airline. Best practices provided verbally are 
provided reactively when the respective field service representative identifies a procedure step or 
inspection assessment performed incorrectly. Participant #05 described verbal feedback received 
from the field service representative and confirmed that this feedback is very helpful in avoid 
future challenges.  
[The OEM] defines it and they tell us this is what you did and this is where you got it 
wrong, from now on you have to do it this way, the limits should be defined like this, you 
say this is cracked but this is not cracked, you say this is a scratch but you have missed 
the crack at this point, you have to look at the root or the tip or at the front, so you have to 
start doing this. I can tell you that our powerplant inspection department has used best 
practice recommendations for the past three, four years and it does help us a lot. We have 
avoided so many problems because of that. (P05) 
The feedback provided by the interview participants, including Participant #05 assumes 
proactive engagement, either initiated by the OEM or the airline. In the example provided by 
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Participant #05, the feedback was based on shared data, in this case images taken during the 
inspection of an engine.  
Written instruction. Many of the participants responded that best practices and other 
similar guidance are effectively provided in written form. Written instructions for performing 
best practices often include images to supplement text. Using text and images OEMs can provide 
explanation on how to perform challenging or critical tasks. Participant #10 explained how they 
had previously received best practice recommendations in written form from an OEM to perform 
a particularly challenging inspection.  
So, they sent us a procedure for that, and they sent us as to exactly how to open it of 
which we identified tools that we had actually had. And they sent us step-by-step 
processes and we opened it, then we just used the borescope machine, we took some 
pictures. (P10) 
 The ability of the any type of written instruction to be effective is based on the clarity of 
the written instruction. Clarity can be increased by using a visual aid in the written document. 
Written documents are often not created based on an individual airline request, but rather the 
OEM creates the document based on a wide spread need. Written documents, even those 
containing visual aids, are non-reciprocal forms of communication that transfer explicit 
knowledge. The written instruction is primarily an OEM initiated engagement, but in some 
circumstances could also be initiated by the airline through requesting for a best practice.  
Video instruction. The final medium for communicating best practices as reported during 
the interviews, was instructional video. The uses of an instructional video were identified as the 
most effective way to communicate best practices and other types of guidance. Participant #05 
highlighted that use of instructional videos are very efficient.  
 
 
 
140 
Often best practices would be categorized as tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is 
difficult to communicate using verbal or written mediums as the nature of tacit knowledge means 
it is difficult, as best, to codify the information.  
Another interesting point raised during the interviews, highlighted in the response from 
Participant #09, is that information communicated through video is retained longer by the 
individuals watching the video than information communicated otherwise. This is consistent with 
the common saying attributed to the Chinese philosopher Confucius, “I hear, and I forget. I see, 
and I remember. I do, and I understand.” This is an important point to consider when developing 
a strategy to disseminate the best practice information within the airline organization. “But the 
thing you watch on video whether you ever come up having to do it in real life or not it sticks 
with you because you're going to sit there and see the equipment” (P09). 
Strategies for sharing within airline. The engagement between the airline and aircraft 
engine OEM is typically limited to a few key positions within the airline. This is to ensure 
information and recommendations communicated from the OEM flow through the correct 
channels within the airline organization. Once the OEM shares best practice and similar types of 
recommendations are with the airline, it is the responsibility of the airline to make sure this 
information is disseminated correctly. The OEM also has an interest in the ensuring the 
information is disseminated and actioned accordingly. For this reason, the interview participants 
were asked how this information is communicated within their organization. They were also 
asked if they could provide recommendations for improving how this information is 
communicated internally at the airlines. Their responses are categorized as formal strategies and 
information strategies.  
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Formal engagement. Most of the responses from the interview participants described 
formal steps the airline can take to facilitate the communication and adoption of best practices. 
The reason for this is because best practices are not strictly a regulatory requirement. As 
Participant #07 pointed out, there little to no organizational support to communicate best 
practices or follow up to ensure they are actioned 
But I don't know how to explain, sorry, you know this is the mechanical engineer 
responsibility, not responsibility, but . . . because the engineer, if he doesn’t want to 
check on the IT system or there is no new video . . . nobody [from the airline 
organization] will take care of us. (P07) 
Based on interview feedback, formal communication of availability or release of a best 
practice is the first step in formalizing the process of best practice communication and adoption. 
Once the existence of the best practice has been formally communicated it will gain leadership 
visibility. “Because if we think it's very important, it's a major issue, we will use a technical 
notice” (P07). 
Interview participants indicated that requiring the airline senior leadership and middle 
management to formally acknowledge their awareness of best practices and order a directive for 
them to be adopted is critical for those recommendations to actually be adopted. “It means that 
each mechanic or engineer will receive a technical notice, and must acknowledge the receipt of 
these documents, it is very important” (P07). 
To support formal training requirements, the assigned field service representative can 
participate in these training sessions. Feedback from the participants indicated engagement of the 
field support representative was critical to the thorough understanding of best practices and other 
similar recommendations. Participant #04 detailed the effectiveness of the field service 
representative’s role in participating and leading training with the airline.  
[The assigned field OEM service representative] did this job here with us. Has given us 
the training, took us to the shop engine, he gave us the training, and we do have four 
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more technicians doing [correct] borescope inspections on the contrary to last year. We 
just had two inspectors doing this. Now we already have six people doing it. Two 
inspectors and four mechanic. And this whole job thanks to the [assigned field OEM 
service representative]. (P04) 
Formal training can be reinforced by requiring individuals that will be performing the 
task to review the video again shortly before performing the task. Interview participants believe 
that completing a refresher review shortly before performing the task will ensure the best 
practice is properly adopted. “If he will perform this task, first time to perform this task, he 
should take . . . see the video before performing this task” (P14). 
Many of the participants indicated that currently their training departments are not 
sufficiently staffed to support additional training on best practices. Also, the frequency at which 
training is presently provided is not able to accommodate best practices that are released. These 
points were clearly described by Participant #07: 
Unfortunately, we are a smaller company. So, we have just one guy who in charge to the 
training for technical people, and this guy will either edit technical notice according to 
what you send to use, or maybe during the next training, he will take time to explain the 
best practice. So, this is the way we try to use, but, you know, it's not easy to do . . . 
because there is only few training, and all training happens only every two years for 
engineers, so the best will be to organize, maybe, every six months, to organize dedicated 
training for these guys for information, but engineer or mechanics are not available as we 
like. (P07) 
 Participant #07 described how their airline training team consists of a single person. This 
person is responsible for training on multiple engine types. Keeping up with updated training 
information on multiple products is challenging for a limited staff. Participant #07 also discussed 
how the current training frequency only offers courses every six months. This presents a 
challenge as best practices release is not coordinated with the airlines training schedule.  
Informal engagement. Interview participants discussed the current methods used. Since 
there is no formal organizational or leadership support to facilitate the adoption of best practices 
the methods used by the interview participants is categorized as informal. These approaches 
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include influencing team leaders and managers to include the best practice in their team’s work, 
playing instructional videos where technicians take breaks, and ensuring open access to best 
practice instructional videos.  
Participant #13 described their approach of influencing the team leader, or manager, 
based on the merit of the best practice. This can be an effective approach if the team leader is 
open to performing the task and the team has time to include the work. However, without the 
support of the senior leadership to make adoption of best practices a formal requirement, simply 
influencing team leaders and managers will have limited success. “I send it to the concerned 
manager and the responsible engineers, which most of them are my colleagues, and I will 
communicate with them the importance of watching this video and how it will help to perform as 
task and address the problem” (P13). 
Another informal method for communicating and facilitating the adoption of best 
practices was to play instructional videos provided by the OEM in the technician breakrooms. 
This approach attempts to use an effective medium in a location where technicians often visit 
throughout the day. “And we have been showing to our technician through TV this is something 
that is always there. When mechanics are having a rest, they start watching this video while they 
are having lunch or rest” (P04). 
This approach may find limited success because when technicians enter the breakroom 
their primary focus is either on eating their meal or chatting with their friends. In the aviation 
industry, break times are regulated. Playing instruction videos, with the expectation that the 
technicians will watch them, may not be allowed by some airline human resource policies. So, 
while this may seem like a promising approach, the effectiveness is limited and may not be 
allowed by airline policy.  
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Feedback from the interviews identified that ensuring open access to best practice 
instructional videos was a critical factor in facilitating informal use of the best practice 
recommendations. Interview participants advised that best practice videos stored on internal 
servers at the airline, or on the OEM’s website, often require password and approvals to access. 
This is an added barrier to accessing this important information and can dissuade people from 
trying to access these data. Participant #09 suggested that available the instruction videos on a 
social media site like YouTube is a preferred method. “[Accessing video from some OEMs is 
difficult] based on that password issue, I think if they made it more simple like the way [one 
OEM] uses YouTube” (P09). 
Making such information available on YouTube or other social media platforms allows 
for public access, is great for technicians who want to view the video. However, the aircraft 
engine OEM must determine it is comfortable and permitted to share this type of information 
publicly.  
Critical Elements of OEM-Airline Engagement 
In the interviews, participants were asked about OEM engagement during the processes 
of service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive compliance. Feedback from this portion 
of the interview was used to identify and analyze OEM touchpoints that occurred during this 
four-phase process. Then participants provided feedback on the important OEM touchpoints used 
to identify the need for best practice sharing and OEM touchpoints used to facilitate this transfer 
of knowledge, both from OEM to airline and within the airline.  
The final topic discussed with the interview participants focused on better understanding 
what facilitates engagement between the airline and OEM. Participants were asked to discuss the 
characteristics of engagement they felt were effective, efficient, and through. Through the data 
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analysis process the participant responses fell into three categories. These categories were the 
engagement strategies used by the OEM, the engagement topics, and engagement facilitators.    
Engagement strategies. The first category that emerged from the interview data was the 
engagement strategy used by the aircraft engine OEM to engage the airline. The interview 
feedback identified two fundamental approaches to airline engagement. The first strategy 
includes at least one assigned individual, specifically a field service representative, to support the 
airline. The assigned support individuals could be co-located with the airline or could support the 
airline from a remote location. With this strategy, the airline has at least one person they can 
contact for any issue and the OEM has at least one dedicated person to engage the airline. In the 
second strategy, the OEM takes a more passive stance to airline engagement. Using this 
approach, the OEM provides airline personnel access to a web portal where important 
information can be accessed and questions, both technical and commercial, can be submitted.  
Feedback on both strategies is presented.   
Assigned field service representative. Interview participants provided feedback on an 
OEM engagement model that utilizes an assigned field service representative. Many of the 
critical elements of this model were identified regardless if the field service representative is 
located onsite with the airline or based at a different location. Those elements are presented as 
critical elements common to both onsite and offsite field service representative. Some elements 
applied only to field service representative based onsite or offsite and are presented as such.  
There were many elements of the assigned field service representative model, common to 
both onsite and offsite field service representatives, identified from the interviews. The first 
element of this support model is that field service representatives provide a confirmed 
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connection, as stated by Participant #12: “By going to the [field service representative] you feel 
that, that connection is automatically made” (P12). 
Most people have had the experience submitting a question online. Many of those people 
were left with the uncertainty on whether the question was actually received and how they can 
follow up if they do not receive feedback. Airline professionals are the same, and since they are 
often working under pressure, they need for them to have someone, a person, they can follow up 
with is extremely important to developing confidence in the support model.  
Beyond acting as the dedicated contact point, interview participants identified that field 
service representatives act as all-inclusive support, Participant #05 stated that they do everything. 
“But when you talk to the [field service representative], they do everything” (P05). 
The question then becomes, what is “everything”? Based on additional feedback from the 
interview participants, field service representatives are perceived as knowing their organization.  
Those working for the airline trust that the field service representative knows the subject matter 
experts to contact to answer their question. Likewise, the field service engineer is perceived as 
having the ability to escalate critical issues to the appropriate leadership to drive a faster or more 
favorable response.  
But when it comes to onsite support of a certain operator, the onsite representative has a 
better view of who they can go to because they know the hierarchy, and they will contact 
some of their own ranks, the responsible people in all areas of OEM capability support 
network and they will try to make the parts. Obviously, airlines do not expect to receive 
final responses, or they don't expect their own onsite support engineer to know 
everything, but they want online support engineer. They want that person to know where 
to go for a particular type of question. (P05)  
An interesting point brought up by Participant #12 is that field service representatives 
assist in arranging alternative support. In the example provided, the participant described how in 
the field, “Sometimes I get the parts from other operator if it is not available on the OEM. I get 
this help from the local rep sometimes” (P12). Service representative helped to identify 
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alternative sources of needed parts. Participant #12 described how their team had placed an order 
for needed parts with the aircraft engine OEM and were informed the parts were not available. 
The field service representative then reached out to counterparts at other airlines and determined 
those airlines had the needed parts. In this case, the field service representative utilized their 
network of contacts at other airlines to facilitate a solution that the OEM was not able to support.   
A critical element of engagement identified by the interview participants is that field 
service engineers have direct, relevant experience and knowledge that can benefit the airline.  
No, if I've got some question with [an] AD, and I used to have a lot of question regarding 
AD, I contact [a nearby field service representative], so I often send an email with some 
images to be sure I am well understood at the meaning of the AD. I have got also 
[support from our maintenance service provider], but for the specific case [this AD], due 
to the fact that [the maintenance service provider]  don't have any aircraft fitted with 
[these types of engines], I prefer also to contact [the OEM field service representative], 
because they [have experience with this AD]. (P07) 
Participant #07 discussed that their airline had contracted with maintenance service 
provider to support maintenance on their engines. Instead of engaging with this contracted entity, 
Participant #07 preferred to reach out to a field service representative they knew because the 
representative had direct experience. This is despite the fact the specific field service 
representative was not even assigned to their airline.  
Interview participants also identified the field service representative’s knowledge of 
airline operations and airline culture as a critical element of successful support. Participant #05 
stated:  
You tell them you have a problem on a certain [aircraft], they know that aircraft had 
certain maintenance a week ago, the engine was removed months ago or things like that. 
When you tell them that this engine which was removed at this time has this problem and 
remember that we have done this and this, we need a certain support, then the onsite 
engineers will better understand the situation you are in, what you need, if you have a 
response time or if it is urgent, they will act on it. (P05) 
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Participant #05 provided further detail on how the field service representative understand 
the technical and operational history of the engines. This acquired, and often tacit, knowledge 
enables the representative to more clearly understand technical issues on the engines. This allows 
the OEM to provide better recommendations to the airline.  
Engagements with the field service representatives were described as more efficient than 
writing emails or submitting requests online. In the fast paced, high pressure environment of 
airline operations efficient communication becomes critical. Participant #01 highlighted that 
communication via email and submitting cases can takes hours or even days. But, conversely,  
When you are with someone, five seconds, you post a doubt that you have before on 
some publication, but you question some part of publication and you get a reply on that 
two seconds and the communication is more efficient when you are face-to-face. (P01) 
This efficiency in direct engagement, and a perception of always being available, leads 
the interview participants to believe that contacting the field service representative is the fastest 
way to get an answer and resolve a technical issue. “If we are in vacation especially in Saturday 
or Sunday, I'm afraid that maybe the response for maybe delayed [by sending an email or online 
request] especially. I think [the field service representative] will help us in this time” (P12). 
Interview participants discussed the availability of field service representatives during 
critical moments and outside of business hours as a critical element of this engagement. Having a 
strong routine engagement was also identified as a critical element of successful engagement 
with an aircraft engine OEM field service representative. Both the airline employees use the 
regular engagement to discuss operational and technical items. 
So, we have our routine engagements, for our case it's weekly. So, every week we are 
discussing items that affect us and during this meeting the agenda is mostly operational 
items that require industry support and we haven't gotten the support already or any 
matters that come about during such a sitting. (P08) 
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They primarily focus on open item and emerging issues. The benefit of these face-to-face 
engagement initiated by the OEM is that is creates a break in the routine for the airline 
employees. It forces them to dedicate time to review the technical program for the associated 
OEM’s product. In doing so, the airline employees can identify discrepancies in their data, open 
technical items, open requests for support, and identify exposures on their fleet. These items are 
used to drive the discussion with the field service representative during scheduled engagements.  
Beyond the ad-hoc engagements and the scheduled engagements, interview participants 
identified that informal engagements with the field service representative are a critical to 
establishing successful engagement with the aircraft engine OEM. Informal engagements occur 
without being scheduled or without a pressing need. Participant #08 described informal 
engagements as occurring outside of work hours and in social settings.  
Oh, like discussions out of work, phone calls outside work. What I would call formal of 
course is within the work environment whereas what I would call informal [include] 
conversations over lunch hour, phone calls, or even meet-ups in social events. I would 
say is that during this sitting there is a lot of information that can be shared during these 
sittings. (P08) 
Interview participants reported they had different experiences with assigned field service 
representatives. Some reported the representative was based onsite and others reported the 
representative was not based onsite. Those respondents that reported engagement with a 
representative not onsite, identified the single most critical element of their engagement were 
onsite visits. The value in an onsite visit was identified as disrupting the normal day to day 
routine of the airline employees. This made the airline employees focus on engine related items 
and refresh themselves on the technical items. “But I think nothing replaces the fact that a rep 
comes and visits us” (P07). 
Frequent face-to-face engagement, while unanimously preferred, may not be feasible for 
representatives not based onsite with the airline. Some of the participants highlighted strategies 
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that field services representatives not based onsite with the airline can take to improve the 
effectiveness of engagement. “If they must work remotely then they can do better by scheduling 
frequent calls. Just teleconferences that we can have more frequently as compared to waiting for 
the monthly face-to-face visit” (P08). 
Many of the respondents highlighted that using a facilitating technology, such as Skype, 
to hold more frequent calls is very helpful. Participant #08 made this point, and even suggested 
that sharing a presentation is very helpful. Other participants stated that, in additional to 
maintaining frequent virtual engagements, timely follow-ups to emails and phone calls is critical 
to facilitating effective engagement. Interview responses from participants who reported 
engagements with field service representatives based onsite with the airlines, identified that 
access to airline information, possessing an understanding of that airline operations, and 
understanding the airline organization are critical to having effective engagement with the 
airline. 
Although frequency of engagement was identified as a critical element of the engagement 
by representatives not based onsite with the airline, frequency of engagement was not mentioned 
as a critical element of effective engagement for onsite representatives. In fact, frequent 
engagement with an onsite representative runs the risk of becoming part of the routine and can 
actually hinder effective engagement.  
Participants who had engaged with representatives not based onsite recognized that these 
representatives were based onsite at other airlines. They voiced their concern that due to this 
arrangement the representative may prioritize host airline needs over their needs. Participant #07 
summarized: “You can't compare the value of having an onsite support compared to making calls 
and writing emails” (P11). 
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OEM website. The preferred form of aircraft engine OEM engagement, as described by 
the interview participants, was through dedicated support personnel. Aside from having 
dedicated personnel to engage the airlines, some interview participants noted that aircraft engine 
OEMs have websites that can be used to access information and raise inquiries with the OEM. 
Interview responses relating to the use of OEM websites as a strategy for airline engagement 
were analyzed. Elements of this method of engagement were identified either as facilitating 
engagement or hindering engagement. 
Use of the OEM website is very much a passive approach to airline engagement as it 
depends solely on the airline to initiate engagement. The airline employee must get some type of 
value out of using the website in order for them to continue using it as a primary means of 
engaging with the OEM. Responses from the interview participants revealed that one of the 
biggest facilitators of engagement with the portal is that communication on portals is formal and 
a record is kept. Participant #07 explained that when submitting a request on the website, a 
tracking number is generated that can be used to check the status of the request. Other elements 
of using the OEM website to submit inquiries is that the airline can identify the urgency of the 
request and the individual raising the request can attach relevant documents to the case as well.  
Another aspect of the OEM website that participants reported as facilitating engagement, 
is the ease of navigating the website. This seems logical given that individuals working for 
airlines in positions that are directly supporting commercial or maintenance operations need to 
be able find the needed information quickly. They do not have time in their day to meander 
around the website hoping to find the information. Likewise, participants explained that to use 
the website they need to be reasonably certain the data they need will be found on the website.  
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Ease of navigation and certainty that the website has the needed information, are 
developed over time and over a multitude of occurrences using the OEM website. If individuals 
have positive experiences with the website, they will be more likely to use the website the next 
time there is a need to ask a question or access information. If an individual has a poor 
experience and cannot find what they are looking for or it takes them a great deal of time than 
they will be less likely to visit the website for needed information. 
The final element that facilitates engagement via the OEM website is the airline culture. 
Participants who indicated they used the OEM website frequently stated that use of the portal 
was enforced by the airline leadership. This was described by Participant #07. “Yeah, it is 
obligatory. Every day we open the portal. If the rep is onsite, we use the portal. But if the rep is 
on vacation, we continue to use the portal. The portal we need to use every day” (P02). 
Leadership motivation for using the website is due to the fact that the requests and documents are 
recorded. The leadership also sees requests on the portal as being more formal and thus require 
their teams to use this method.  
However, it should be noted that the same participants who indicated that they use the 
website for submitted requests also stated they always contact the assigned field service 
representative when submitting a case. They also indicate that the field service representative 
will direct them to provide feedback using the website. The field service representative will also 
identify critical information the airline needs to review and instruct the relevant person at the 
airline to access the data on the OEM website. This shows that prior engagement with the 
assigned field service representative is also a facilitator of OEM engagement via their website.  
Interview participants were also asked to identified elements of the OEM website that 
hindered engagement. Responses from interview participants identified a number of elements of 
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the OEM websites that hinder or dissuade the use of it. The first element identified was that use 
of the OEM website is very cold and emotionless engagement. Participant #01 described using 
the OEM website as engaging with a robot. “Sometimes you feel like it's kind of robot is giving 
you the answer. But what I'm saying is, the way that I feel like, a computer answering me, giving 
me the solution” (P01). They described the interaction as being uncomfortable because there is 
no relationship. When asked further what the importance of a relationship is in this transaction, 
Participant #01 replied that with a relationship you know that the other person cares about the 
airline and providing the best solution. The cold, emotionless ambiance of engagement using the 
OEM website, can be a hindrance in other ways. Participant #01 described how they would be 
uncomfortable raising up “every little question” that popped into their head. They would only 
submit an inquiry for big issues. A definition of a big issue was not provided but can be 
understood that if the airline personnel does not fully understand an issue, they also may not 
fully understand the importance or severity of this issue.   
The lack of a relationship was also identified by other interview participants as hindering 
the process of submitting an inquiry. The OEM website doesn’t have the operational and 
technical background, knowledge of airline specific issues, or doesn’t understand the current 
pressure for rapid responses. This puts the added burden on the airline employee to add these 
complex details to a request. As mentioned previously in this section, airline employees working 
in positions that support operations have many high priority items competing for their time. 
When tasks become more complicated, they have less, and less priority placed on them.     
An additional and related element that hinders engagement with the OEM using the 
website, is poor internet connection. While developed countries have high internet speeds, many 
developing countries have very slow connections in comparison. For example, the United States 
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offers broadband service to Americans that averages 3.9 Mbps (Foresman, 2010) while many 
countries in Africa struggle with broadband speeds less than 0.7 Mbps (Kazeem, 2017). Such 
slow internet speeds impair an airline employee’s ability to use a website. This hindrance is 
magnified when the website is not easy to navigate or requires large amounts of data to be 
downloaded. Interview participants reported that disrupted connections, operation time-out 
errors, and other challenges associated with slow and unreliable internet connections affected 
their propensity to even attempt to use the website.  
A report by the International Telecommunications Union (2013) identified that the 
number of internet users as a percent of population for all countries. The study showed that the 
number of users in African countries is by far the lowest when compared to other regions. Most 
of the countries in Africa were reported as having less than 20% of the population as internet 
users, and many countries had less than 10% of their population identified as internet users. 
Although not specifically discussed in the interviews, the poor internet connection combined 
with the low number of internet users can create a culture where use of the internet is not a 
primary means for communication and could result in less propensity to use the OEM’s website. 
Engagement topics. Interview participants were also asked to describe the topics they 
discussed with aircraft engine OEMs. Responses from the interviews were categorized as 
technical topics, commercial topics, or operational topics during the coding of interview data. It 
should be recalled from Chapter III that participant inclusion in this study was restricted to 
airline professionals working in positions related to maintenance. These positions are primarily 
technical positions, although some of the participants did have experience with commercial and 
operational aspects of the airline. As such, the topic of discussion naturally gravitates towards 
technical discussions. Some responses did highlight non-technical topics. 
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Technical topics.  Interview participants reported that engagement with aircraft engine 
OEMs included many items related to the technical aspect of the products. These topics were 
highlighted by Participant #13: “I use the OEM portal, of course for engine condition monitoring 
for, for submitting inquires, and for the technical presentations, the technical manuals” (P13). 
Interview responses also revealed that airline professionals also engage with the OEM to receive 
feedback on maintenance actions that had been accomplished: “Then afterwards we provide 
feedback of the troubleshooting to the OEM” (P06). This engagement referred to airline 
professionals asking for additional guidance on troubleshooting or seeking clarification on 
inspection findings. Airline professionals also stated they engage with the aircraft engine OEM 
to report that certain maintenance tasks had been completed or to share inspection results the 
OEM would then use to provide additional operational allowance. 
A topic of engagement that was also mentioned by many of the interview participants as 
being very important is reviewing known and emerging fleet issues. “So, we can improve by 
being proactively on the lookout for any relevant information and making sure that during the 
routine meetings that we have, we talk about these emerging issues” (P12). 
As aircraft engines are in operation, technical issues arise for which the OEM will 
develop a repair plan and, in some cases, a containment plan. Fleet issues rarely affect every 
operator, but the feedback from the interview participants is that airline professionals what to be 
aware of known fleet issues as well as emerging fleet issues even if their airline is not directly 
affected.  
Commercial topics. Although all of the interview participants worked in airline positions 
that were technical in the nature of the work, a few of the participants did indicate that they 
engage with aircraft engine OEMs on topics commercial topics. The primary commercial support 
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topic that interview participants discussed with the aircraft engine OEM related to support 
provided to airline to accomplish service bulletins or airworthiness directives. 
If the support is clarified and the warranty, as per support in the [service bulletin] please 
provide these [substantiating documents]. But in the second case, if the support is not 
clarified [in the service bulletin], I had to get some approach with the OEM and make 
some negotiations [sic]. (P13) 
Service bulletins and airworthiness directives often require the airline to replace one or 
more parts on the aircraft engine with new, re-designed parts. Purchasing the specific parts, as 
well as additional consumable parts, result in a cost to the airline. The responses from the 
interview confirmed that airline professionals engage with OEM to request additional support in 
order to minimize the cost of adopting service bulletins and complying with airworthiness 
directives.  
Operational topics.  Interview participants also responded that they engage with aircraft 
engine OEMs to address topics related airline operations, specifically maintenance operations. 
Airline professionals often engage with the OEM, through the assigned field service 
representative, to align the shipping schedule parts with the planned aircraft maintenance 
schedule. This engagement was predominantly used during critical service bulletins or 
airworthiness for which there were limited parts available.  
Interview participants also provided insight that they engaged with the aircraft engine 
OEM to expedite shipment of needed parts, regardless of if the spare parts were needed for to 
support the adoption of a service bulletin or airworthiness directive. Participant #12 described 
how they reach out to the OEM if a part that has been ordered has an excessively long lead time 
which can drive an aircraft on-ground (AOG) situation. “You asked at the beginning if there is 
actually any chance to improve this lead time. Otherwise, you will be pushed to ask for the part 
on AOG situation” (P12). 
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An aircraft is AOG when specific maintenance tasks are required to be completed before 
the engine can be allowed to return to service. If there is a long lead time for acquiring a needed 
part, the airline may need to remove the affected engine and aircraft from service until the part is 
available. Removing an aircraft from service will have a significant negative impact on the 
airline’s financial performance. For this reason, the responsible person at the airline will engage 
with OEM to find a way to avail in order not to disrupt airline commercial operations. 
Another item discussed that falls within the category of operational topics is when parts 
are sent for repair. Replacement parts or aircraft engines can be very expensive, both for the 
OEM and the airline. To save cost, the suppliers of these parts have developed approved repair 
procedures for specific parts. The airline will send the parts to either the aircraft engine OEM or 
the specific part supplier for repair. It is in the best interest of the airline that the repaired part be 
returned to the airline as soon as possible. Participant #14 described how they engage with the 
OEM, through the field service representative, to ensure the airline’s part receives high priority 
and is returned as soon as possible 
We make a plan with the OEM. And based on the turnaround time of the component and 
the how many components we have at . . . how component affected I have, we do a plan. 
Through this plan, we do a plan and agree and mutually agreed with the OEM. And all, 
we start to implement this plan on our fleet. So, we manage this program with [field 
service representative]. (P14) 
Interview participants also stated that they engage with the OEM if the repair process 
required time cannot be reduced. In such cases, the interview participants indicated they would 
request for a part exchange in order their stock of serviceable parts to be replenished as soon as 
possible.  
Engagement facilitators. The final question asked of all interview participants was to 
describe the characteristics of OEM engagement that they felt facilitated better understanding of 
the topic being discussed and faster resolution of open issues. Participants identified key 
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characteristics of the OEM that result in improved engagement. Some participants also identified 
characteristics of the airline that, in their view, directly influence the effectiveness of OEM 
engagement.  
Airline characteristics. Interview participants identified critical characteristics of the 
airline organization that both facilitate improved engagement as well as characteristics that 
hinder effective engagement with aircraft engine OEMs. The identified characteristics are 
directly under the control and influence of the airline leadership.  
As new airlines enter service, their leadership and technical teams may be inexperienced 
and not fully understand the support available to them. In the excitement of starting operations, 
they may not even be aware that they would need support in the future. Participant #09 
highlighted this concerning situation and advised that the aircraft engine OEM needs to take this 
as a call to action and intensely engage new airlines to ensure they are aware of how to contact 
the OEM for support.   
Yeah, the [OEM] has always been there, but I think they need to radically . . . especially 
now in Africa [where] aviation is growing . . . they need to radically approach these 
airlines because at the end of the day it's going to be a win-win situation. The operator 
wins, you win at the end of the day. Secondly, I'll put it as well, lack of awareness again 
on the operator side [of available OEM support] because many of them, especially here in 
Africa, start up these aviation companies not fully aware. Yeah, they might be excited, 
airline business, but they need, that's why I said radically on the part of the OEM to 
approach these airlines. (P09) 
Interview participants also reported high employee turnover in critical positions made  
maintaining effective engagement with the aircraft engine OEM challenging. This point was 
raised by Participant #03, who went on to explain that high employee turnover can result in 
inexperienced, untrained employees filling in the slots. “Okay because recently, remember, 
we've got a lot of guys who left us, so we've got a lot of new guys who are not trained” (P03). 
When this happens the topics of engagement with the OEM will revert to more fundament 
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discussions, as opposed to advanced, detailed discussions. In other words, any engagement from 
the OEM will need to start over with very basic topics. This becomes a challenge for both the 
airline and the individuals newly assigned to the position. 
The participants also highlighted the importance of the airline’s organizational structure 
as it relates to engagement with the aircraft engine OEM. Participant #03 described how their 
airline created a department that focused only on aircraft engine related topics. The participant 
stated that, prior to the establishment of this department, the process to adopt service bulletins 
was problematic; but having a department focused only on the engines significantly improved 
the process and engagement with OEM. “We created this department for engine performance and 
analytics, I think it was one year and six months, that's when things got easier. But before that, it 
was a little bit of a problem because there was no one dedicated to [service bulletins] from the 
engine section” (P03). 
Interview participants also identified that alignment and preparedness of all relevant 
individuals within the airline organization are critical to engaging with the OEM and to 
effectively adopting service bulletins and complying with airworthiness directives. Participant 
#10 described their experience when they described the engagement from the OEM was received 
very well, but the effectiveness of the engagement was significantly reduced due to internal 
misalignment and miscommunication at the airline.  
I know from our side it went quite well from the engagement we had. It's just internally, I 
think we let ourselves down as the company, because there were certain processes and 
procedures not followed internally which could have ran smoother if everyone in his or 
her departments were involved at all times. (P10) 
Making structural changes in the airline organization, and ensuring the priorities of 
leadership are aligned, require clearly communicated support from airline senior leadership. 
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Interview participants also identified that support from both direct managers as well as senior 
leadership was critical in facilitating effective engagement with the aircraft engine OEM. 
OEM characteristics. Interview participants were asked to identify characteristics that 
facilitate effective engagement between their airline and aircraft engine OEMs; they also 
identified characteristics of the OEM. They indicated the need for OEM policies that make 
accessing technical information, such as manuals and technical presentations, easier. Many of the 
interview participants stated that making important documentation available on the OEM website 
is a good gesture but remembering login information for different website can be difficult. “What 
they have actually, before we can use their manuals, we need to pay them first. Recently we had 
an audit where it was a finding that we don't have access to [specific OEM] manuals” (P03). 
Participant #03 also described how one OEM required the airline to pay for access to this critical 
information. They went on to state how an audit found no one at the airline had access to these 
manuals. It was not clear if the lack of access was a direct result of the fee the OEM had 
required; certainly, the need to pay for access to critical documents does create an impediment 
for those who need access to the documents.  
Proactive engagement from the OEM was identified as a critical characteristic of 
effective OEM engagement. Proactive engagement refers to the propensity for the aircraft engine 
OEM to initiate engagement with the airlines operating their engines. This response is consistent 
with input presented in the preceding section, where Participant #09 highlighted the need to 
proactively engage new airlines to ensure they were aware of support available to them. 
Participant #09 also described a situation at their airline, which they attribute to the lack of 
proactive engagement on the part of the aircraft engine OEM. “We have almost six aircraft that 
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are AOG and I bet if we had gotten involved much earlier, this equipment being monitored, most 
of these issues where we are right now would have been avoided” (P09).   
Frequency of engagement was also identified by many of the participants as a critical 
characteristic of the successful engagement.  The most mentioned characteristic of the OEM that 
facilitated effective engagement were those characteristics that have been shown in previous 
research (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2007) to be critical in establishing trust between separate 
organizations. This point was highlighted by Participant #05, who stated that effectiveness of 
engagement first and foremost depends on having a trust-based relationship between the airline 
and the aircraft engine OEM. 
The first thing is the relationship. The effectiveness depends on the relationship, the 
onsite support team creates with the airline team. If the onsite support team has a good 
relationship, trust-based relationship with the airline engineering and technical 
department, things always go smooth. Some OEMs like for example, engine OEMs have 
very good relationship with engineering and every department. (P05) 
All interview participants responded that a relationship between the airline and OEM, 
rooted in trust, was critical for effective engagement. Interview participants were asked to 
describe the elements which lead to the establishment of trust in the context of engagement 
between their airline and an OEM.  
Many of the interview participants pointed to the human connection as a facilitator of 
trust between airlines and aircraft engine OEMs. Participant #01 described that connecting with a 
person leaves them assured that someone who cares about the airlines is working on getting a 
response. In contrast, submitting a request through the OEM website is like talking to a robot. 
Participant #14 elaborated that when two people work together a connection is made. That 
connection makes communication easier and grows with repetitive engagement. 
You know, sometimes if we know the person you communicate with him, if you know 
the person personally, it is easier to communicate and get data and information from him. 
For me, if I know that the person I communicate with personally, it is easier for me to get 
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data and information that I need. For me, if I know the person, I communicate with them, 
it will be easier and more effective. (P14) 
Trust, and its ability to facilitate effective engagement, is affected by the accessibility and 
availability of the OEM. The responses related to accessibility and availability were provided in 
reference to the interview participants engagement with the assigned field support representative. 
The ability of the airline to easily contact the field service representative directly influenced the 
feeling of trust for the specific OEM. Participant #09 described how they would walk to the 
representative’s office and have an informal discussion about whatever was on the mind of the 
interview participant. 
Using the [OEM] rep here [at my airline] as reference, let's say for instance we have an 
issue. You walk straight into his office, you can sit down, chat, get solution immediate, 
much faster than having to first send a mail and probably waiting for three, four, five 
hours or probably even a day for reply, but you have them on ground. Exactly. Which 
makes things much easier. (P09) 
This type of openness and accessibility created a sense of trust that the representative 
would be available whenever needed. Conversely, some interview response highlighted negative 
experiences with representatives. One interview participant stated that it seems like whenever 
they tried to reach the OEM, the representative was not in the office or was on vacation. This left 
the them feeling frustrated as they did not know how to have their inquiry address. If also 
undermined the interview participant’s feeling confidence that the representative really cared 
about helping the airline.  
In additional to accessibility and availability of the field service representative, interview 
participants also identified timeliness or rapidness of responses as critical to the development of 
trust. Many of the participants discussed how timely responses positively influence trust.  
An experienced [onsite field support representative] will take very short time to identify 
the problem and to define which team in his own loop of supporting teams, he or she will 
know, they will know where to go, what kind of case to create, whom to contact in order 
to get quick responses. Whenever airlines contact onsite support team and when they get 
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a quick response because of technical proficiency or because of the communication skill 
of the onsite support engineer. (P05) 
Quick responses positively influence the development of trust between the OEM and 
airline as quick responses are an indication of the competence, both technically and regarding 
organizational acumen, as well as showing that the representative and OEM prioritize requests 
from the airline. If an airline submits a request, and the request takes a few days before it is 
addressed, the airline is left with a feeling that their issues are not a priority for the OEM.   
Consistency of engagement was also identified as critical to developing trust between 
OEMs and airlines. Consistent engagement refers to frequency of engagement as well as the 
topics of engagement, as pointed out by Participant #08. Establishing a rhythm of regular 
engagement, whether virtually or face-to-face, ensure that the items of importance related to a 
specific OEM remain a priority for the airline and ensure visibility to airline senior leadership.   
Just letting us know that I'm aware that this is happened, I believe, I hope you guys are 
working on [a specific topic]. A summary of that would be constant engagement through 
phone calls and Skype teleconference and follow up on emerging issues through email. 
(P08) 
Ensuring a regular rhythm with the airline also provides an opportunity for the OEM to 
follow up on open items. All of this demonstrates that the OEM cares about the success of the 
airline. This demonstration of concern for the airline positively influences the development of 
trust between the airline and the OEM.   
Based on the interviews, the development of an airline’s trust in an aircraft OEM is also 
influenced by the representative’s situational knowledge of the airline. Having a situational 
awareness of the struggles the airline is going through allow the field support representative, and 
any additional support personnel from the airline, to better understand the airline challenges and 
even empathize with their situation. The ability of the OEM to understand the situation of the 
airline goes a long way in developing trust between the airline and the OEM. Participant #13 
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described that the support individual who acts like the airline’s agent within the OEM 
organization, demonstrates concern and empathy for the airline. “If I have a justification, if [my 
airline] is really affected by a specific event or fleet issue. So, I like the customer support that 
believes in my request and escalates it, like they were my lawyer, within the OEM” (P12). 
This is a critical factor in the development of trust.  
Chapter Conclusions   
The study was designed to identify and analyze the critical engagement with aircraft 
engines OEM during the adoption of service bulletins and compliance with airworthiness 
directives. OEM engagements, called touchpoints in this study, were analyzed and categorized 
based on the phase of the process during which they occurred, the organization that initiated the 
engagement, the type of information shared, and the type of communication. The type of 
information shared was categorized as either explicit knowledge or tacit knowledge. The type of 
communication was categorized as either non-reciprocal, partially reciprocal, or fully reciprocal.  
Findings from the interviews indicate that notification of service bulletin release—
initiated by the OEM and occurring in the Phase 1 of the process—and communication of 
completion of service bulletins and worthiness directives—initiated by the airline and occurring 
at the end of Phase 4—communicate explicit knowledge. This explicit knowledge is best 
communicated using a non-reciprocal form of communication such as one-way emails or 
communication using the OEM portal.    
Communications during Phase 2 (review of the service bulletin or airworthiness 
directive) and Phase 3 (preparing for the service bulletin or airworthiness directive), include both 
explicit and tacit knowledge. Airlines may raise a question for which response is classified as 
explicit knowledge. In such a situation, an airline can make a request with the field service 
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representative or using the OEM website. Use of the OEM website is classified as partially 
reciprocal because it allows for customized questions to be asked and facilitates the response but 
does not facilitate additional conversation.  
Many of the topics that airlines discuss with OEMs during Phase 2 and Phase 3 are 
detailed and tacit in nature. As such, the only type of communication effective for discussion this 
information is fully reciprocal communication. Fully reciprocal communication required the 
engagement of a field service representative, either based onsite with the airline or based offsite.  
The findings from this study highlight that during the adoption of a service bulletin and 
compliance with an airworthiness directive, the OEM and airline engage frequently to ensure 
awareness and understanding of service bulletins and airworthiness directives. Likewise, the 
airline and OEMs frequently engage during the preparation and execution stages of the process 
as well. Throughout the engagement there is a great deal of both explicit and tacit knowledge 
communicated between the two organization. While automated emails and an OEM website can 
be used for communicated explicit knowledge, they are not suitable engagement tools for 
communication of tacit knowledge. Any support or engagement model developed by an aircraft 
engine OEM must consider the role of the field support representative as absolutely critical to 
leading fully reciprocal communication with the airline.  
This study also investigated the critical elements in the process of airlines and aircraft 
engine OEMs engaging to share best practices relating to maintenance and inspection tasks. 
Interview participants identified that awareness of a need for the best practice is required to 
establish the required motivation to seek out and learn best practices. Feedback from the OEM, a 
trend of negative outcomes from a maintenance or inspection task, lack of clarify in the manual, 
inexperience with a specific task, and a feeling of not being comfortable performing the task, 
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were identified as the top reasons that motivate airline employees to actively seek out best 
practices from the OEM.  
Interview participants also identified strategies the airline employees are likely to use to 
engage with the OEM. Initially airline employees may re-read the tasks, as they are written in the 
manual, or search through old training material for guidance on how to better perform a specific 
task. If they are unable to find the needed guidance, airline employees are likely to either ask 
their manager for support or directly reach out to the OEM. Engagement with the OEM is 
facilitated by a trusting relationship with the assigned field service representative. The field 
service representative can then assist with provided known best practices or other type of aids to 
assist in the correct performance of a task. If the relationship between the airline employee and 
OEM representative is not based on trust, the airline employee may take steps to intentionally not 
share their need for a best practice out of fear the OEM may consider any errors made during 
commercial negotiations.  
Although best practices can be shared in written form and verbally, the interview 
participants overwhelmingly identified video recording as the most effective medium for sharing 
best practices. Review of these videos can be through formal training, included as required 
preparation for performing the specific task, or played where the technicians who perform the 
tasks take their breaks.  
Finally, interview participants were asked to describe effective engagements with aircraft 
engine OEMs based on their experiences. Their responses were categorized as relating to the 
method of engagement, the topic of engagement, or characteristics of the engagement.  
Two primary types of engagement emerged from the interview responses. The first 
method of engagement, which was preferred by all interview participants, was human 
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engagement. Some of the interview participants described engagement with a field service 
representative based onsite with their airlines, while others described their experience engaging 
with a field service representative who was not based onsite with the airline. The feedback on 
both onsite and offsite representatives was that frequency and proactive engagement was 
perceived as critical to facilitating beneficial engagement.  
The other method of engagement that interview participants reported aircraft engine 
OEMs using is engagement solely via the OEM website. Although some of the interview 
participants identified benefits of using the website, such as accessibility of information and the 
fact that all communications are recorded and stored, not one interview participant stated a 
preference for engagement using the website over dedicated support personnel.  
Responses from participants stated that airline trust in the OEM, developed through 
engagements with the field service representative, is absolutely critical to establishing effective 
and productive engagements between the airline and OEM. Elements critical to the development 
of trust between the airline and OEM are similar to elements identified by previous studies that 
focus the development of trust during interorganizational engagement.  
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Chapter V: Discussion 
The motivation for this study can be found at the intersection of my interest in business 
development in Africa, passion for aviation and driving improved safety in aviation, and 
experience as an aircraft engine OEM Field Service Representative (FSR) supporting airlines in 
Africa. It is here where I began to see the FSR not only as a position within the organization of 
the OEM, but also as an opportunity to drive positive change for the OEM, the airlines, as well 
as the populations served by the airline.  
To understand better the processes of OEM engagement with airlines in Africa, I 
interviewed 14 aviation professionals who had been working in a maintenance organization at an 
airline in Africa and had at least one year of experience engaging with aircraft engine OEMs. 
Three primary, open-ended questions were asked to understand the adoption of service bulletins, 
compliance of airworthiness directives, and proper performance of maintenance and inspection 
tasks. The interview participants came from both large and small airlines as well as airlines the 
flew international routes and those that operated regional route structures. Through the 
interviews and systems analysis, I was able to identify critical engagement touchpoints and 
critical characteristics of these touchpoints that led to successful outcomes.  
This chapter reviews the findings presented in Chapter IV and presents the takeaways and 
conclusions that were observed and created through the analysis of the data. When applicable, 
the findings from this study are related to existing literature. Limitations of the study are then 
discussed along with a review of the author’s background. Finally, practical application of the 
findings and recommendations for action are presented in the context of opportunities for 
leadership and change.  
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Addressing Research Question 1: Touchpoints for Adoption of Service Bulletins and 
Airworthiness Directives 
The first research question in this research study was, “What are the critical touchpoints 
between engine OEMs and airlines in Africa that lead to successful outcomes during the 
adoption of service bulletins and the compliance with airworthiness directives?” This question 
was asked to better understand the process of engagement between aircraft engine OEMs and 
airlines in Africa during the adoption of service bulletins and the compliance with airworthiness 
directives, which can directly affect the safety performance of the airline.  
The engagement between the airline and OEM during this critical process was analyzed 
by reviewing the characteristics of the touchpoints. The touchpoints were characterized by 
identifying the phase of the process during which they occurred, the organization that initiated 
the communication, the type of information exchanged, and the type of communication used. 
Analysis of the interview data identified four primary phases of the process of adopting service 
bulletins and complying with airworthiness directives. Those primary phases, in order, are titled 
awareness, assessment, preparation, and execution. The type of information was identified as 
either explicit knowledge, easily codified and communicated, or tacit knowledge, which cannot 
easily be communicated. The three types of communication were identified were nonreciprocal, 
partially reciprocal, and fully reciprocal. Engagement initiated was identified as either the airline 
or the OEM.  
Nonreciprocal communication is one-directional communication for which there is no 
opportunity to respond. Nonreciprocal communication includes automated emails and 
information found through using the OEM’s website. Partially reciprocal communication, as 
defined in this study, occurs when the airline submits a question via the OEM’s website and 
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receives a response. In this case, the OEM provides feedback based on the inquiry raised by the 
airline, but communication ends when the OEM provides feedback. Fully reciprocal 
communication, as defined in this study, as communication method that facilitates back and forth 
knowledge transfer and unstructured conversation. Fully reciprocal communication allows for 
individuals to discuss complex topics that involve transfer of tacit knowledge.   
Figure 5.1 presents the phases of the process of service bulletin adoption and 
airworthiness compliance along with the touchpoints, touchpoint initiator, characteristics of each 
touchpoint, and content communicated during each touchpoint. The key findings are presented 
according to the phase of the process.  
Awareness: Airworthiness directive and service bulletin. During the first phase of the 
process, the awareness phase, the communication between the airline and the aircraft engine 
OEM is very one-directional as the information being communicated is limited to notification of 
new service bulletins or changes to existing service bulletins. This transfer of explicit knowledge 
can easily be facilitated by techniques using nonreciprocal communication, such as automated 
emails or searches of the OEM’s website, as shown in the left column in Figure 5.1.   
The effectiveness of automated emails can be limited when those receiving automated 
emails start receiving an excessive number of automated emails, such that they are unable to 
fully review all emails. It is critical that aircraft engine OEMs ensure that distributions lists are as 
focused as possible to ensure that communication is always relevant for all members of the 
distribution list. If the distribution list is broad and communication not always relevant to 
everyone, then the importance of reading the emails can become lessened from the perspective of 
those receiving the emails.  
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Likewise, another limitation inherent in the use of automated emails is that the critical 
information is shared only with individuals on the distribution list. Care must be taken to ensure 
distribution lists are frequently updated and that the aircraft engine OEM is aware when new 
airlines begin operating their aircraft engines.  
When an airline starts operating new equipment, they might not be aware of the support 
that is available to them through the aircraft engine OEM. Furthermore, they may not know the 
importance of registering for these distribution lists. The aircraft engine OEM needs to take care 
and engage airlines that are new to operate their product to ensure the personnel at the airline are 
aware of the support and communication provided by the OEM.  
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Figure 5.1. OEM and airline touchpoints during the process of service bulletin adoption and airworthiness directive compliance. 
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Assessment: Airworthiness directive and service bulletin. During the assessment 
phase, the number of airline-initiated touchpoints increased. As discussed by the interview 
participants, these touchpoints were raised primarily to request clarification on applicability 
criteria provided in the service bulletin. Engaging with the OEM to receive clarification on the 
applicability of the service bulletin was most often reported to have occurred by engaging with 
the assigned FSR. Typically, discussions with the FSR would be classified as fully reciprocal, 
however the knowledge being transferred is explicit. For this reason, these engagements were 
classified as partially reciprocal communication, with the understanding this partially reciprocal 
communication occurs often by asking the assigned FSR. Interview participants also identified 
that questions regarding commercial support can arise at this phase in the process. Some service 
bulletins do include detailed information on commercial support while others, even from the 
same aircraft engine OEM, do not. The interview participants indicated they will engage the 
OEM for additional support regardless if the commercial support is explicitly defined in the 
service bulletin or not. This engagement, as reported by the interview participants, takes place by 
contacting the FSR. Raising the request for additional commercial support and building the case 
to justify the request, require the communication of tacit knowledge, which is facilitated by fully 
reciprocal communication. This is consistent with the feedback from the interview participants.  
Preparation: Airworthiness directive and service bulletin. During the preparation 
phase, the touchpoints, as reported by the interview participants, focus on identifying acceptable 
repair facilities, developing the needed capability, contracting with the OEM to do the work, 
ordering and allocating needed parts, and further discussing commercial support. Except for 
requesting extensions to the operating limits, which is a technically oriented question, the content 
of the topics discussed involved the transfer of tacit knowledge between the OEM and the airline. 
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The type of communication utilized during this phase, according to the interview participants, is 
categorized as fully reciprocal.  
Execution: Airworthiness directive and service bulletin. The final phase of the 
overarching process is the phase when the plans to adopt the service bulletin are put in to action. 
At this point the airline has made the decision to adopt the service bulletin and has taken the 
needed action to prepare. Communication during this phase of the process primarily focuses on 
the airline providing feedback to the OEM, requesting feedback on unexpected findings, and 
requesting changes in the parts allocation due to schedule changes. Advising the OEM that the 
service bulletin or airworthiness directive has been completed was reported to occur by advising 
the assigned FSR, however the information being communicated is explicit knowledge. 
Clarification on findings refers to questions raised by the airline regarding the procedure that was 
completed. In such cases, the responsible person at the airline would typically contact the 
assigned FSR, but, occasionally, would submit a request through the OEM website. The 
interview participants often reported they would continue to ask commercial support during the 
final phase of the service bulletin adoption process.  
Addressing Research Question 2: Touchpoints Leading to Successful Performance of 
Maintenance and Inspection 
After discussing the OEM-airline touchpoints through the process of service bulletin 
adoption and airworthiness directive compliance, the interview moved to the second research 
question, which was: What are the critical touchpoints between engine OEMs and airlines in 
Africa that lead to successful outcomes during the performance of maintenance and inspections 
tasks?  The second research question delved in to the process by which airline personnel develop 
the understanding that guidance or support is needed from the aircraft engine OEM to correctly 
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perform standard maintenance or inspection tasks. Unlike the process discussed for Research 
Question1, the process discussed in regard to the second question, presented in Figure 5.2, is not 
a formal process within the airline or the OEM. For this reason, there was a great deal of 
variation found from airline to airline and individual to individual.  
The process for an airline professional to recognize that they need support from the 
aircraft engine OEM can vary significantly from person to person. The motivation to seek 
support comes from either an internal source, such as a lack of comfort performing a process, or 
an external source. The external source includes both proactive and reactive motivations. 
Reactive motivations for seeking support from the OEM include a single negative outcome that 
resulted in an operational disruption for the airline or a trend of negative outcomes that may not 
cause operational disruptions; such an outcome does increase the operational cost incurred by the 
airline. In both cases, the airline leadership would likely initiate the request for support. Some 
airlines have a policy of engagement with the aircraft engine OEM that includes the proactive 
sharing of inspection data and feedback from maintenance tasks. As reported by interview 
participants, the airline takes the responsibility of sharing the data and the aircraft engine OEM, 
through the assigned FSR, will review the data and identify areas for improvement.  
Interview participants identified that the first action taken when a support need was 
identified was to review the applicable maintenance manual as well as to discuss the procedure 
with more senior and experience engineers and technicians. If the airline personnel were unable 
to acquire the needed support from the engine manual, or from internal discussions with the 
airline, then participants indicated that the next step would be for to review content on the OEM 
website as well as existing training material previously acquired from the aircraft engine OEM. 
If the required information had still not been identified, then the responsible personnel at the 
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airline would reach out to the OEM directly. The feedback from the interviews confirmed that 
requesting support, such as best practices, is primarily done by contacting the assigned FSR.  
All 14 participants were asked how they reach out to the aircraft OEM for guidance on 
performing maintenance and inspection tasks. Not one of them indicated that best practices were 
requested using the OEM website. This indicates that the willingness of airlines to reach out to 
the aircraft engine OEM for support is greatly influenced by the personal and professional 
relationship that has been developed by the assigned field service representative. This is 
consistent with additional interview data highlighting the importance of trust between the aircraft 
engine OEM and airline in facilitating transfer of knowledge and information.  
One of the interview participants shared that if they felt the task was being performed 
incorrectly, or if there was a need for a best practice, then they would not advise the aircraft 
engine OEM of this support need. The interview participant went on to clarify that admitting the 
task had been completed incorrectly in the past may have resulted in punitive actions by the 
airline on the specific individual. Likewise, the aircraft engine OEM may use this information to 
withhold commercial support from the airline.   
One of the interview participants shared that if they felt the task was being performed 
incorrectly, or if there was a need for a best practice, then they would not advise the aircraft 
engine OEM of this support need. The interview participant went on to clarify that admitting the 
task had been completed incorrectly in the past may have resulted in punitive actions by the 
airline on the specific individual. Likewise, the aircraft engine OEM may use this information to 
withhold commercial support from the airline.   
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Figure 5.2. Process of identifying needed OEM support, engaging OEM for needed support, and internal strategies for communicating 
the OEM support to ensure engine maintenance tasks are properly completed and assessed. 
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Ensuring that maintenance tasks are completed properly is of vital to importance both the 
airline and to the aircraft engine OEM. Reporting challenges experienced while completing 
maintenance actions and inspections is critical for the OEM to develop product and procedural 
improvements. To ensure this information is provided freely and openly the individual reporting 
the feedback must feel comfortable that no negative actions will be taken against them. Other 
interview participants echoed this sentiment, advising that trust is a critical element in 
developing the engagement between the airline and OEM.  
Addressing Research Question 3: Touchpoints Facilitating Efficient Information Transfer 
The final topic of discussion focused on Research Question 3, which was, “What are the 
characteristics of the touchpoints that facilitate efficient transfer of needed information?” This 
question asked the interview participant to provide insight, based on their individual experiences, 
regarding the characteristics of the touchpoints that result in effective communication.  
Despite an extensive literature review on both airline operations and interorganizational 
engagement (Chapter II) there were no studies identified that investigated the details of the 
engagement between the aircraft engine OEM and airlines in the context of maintenance 
operations. For this reason, the research performed regarding Research Questions 1 and 2 was 
exploratory in nature. The same cannot be said about the topic of Research Question 3. There 
was a great deal of literature available on the topic of interorganizational engagement as 
summarized in Chapter II of this dissertation.  
RQ1 and RQ2 investigated internal processes at the airlines and how OEM engagement, 
analysis as touchpoints, supported and facilitated these processes to ensure positive outcomes for 
both the airline and aircraft engine OEM. RQ3 probed the critical elements of successful 
engagement between aircraft engine OEMs and airlines in Africa. The feedback from the 
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interview participants related to the critical elements of successful engagement between aircraft 
engine OEMs and airlines in Africa, was compared to the process of interorganizational 
engagement presented by Luna-Reyes and Andersen (2007; see Figure 2.6 in Chapter II). The 
purpose of comparing the interview data to this existing model was to identify the specific details 
of how to apply this model to interorganizational engagement between aircraft engine OEMs and 
airlines in Africa within the context of maintenance operations.  
The process of interorganizational engagement, as discussed by Luna-Reyes and 
Andersen (2007), is widespread in engagement between all types of organizations. This section 
will focus on combining the feedback from the interview participants with the engagement 
process defined in this model to identify a model for effective engagement between aircraft 
engine OEMs and airlines in Africa.  
The iterative model presented Luna-Reyes and Andersen (2007) contains eight separate 
elements comprising two feedback loops. A ninth element, Establishing Institutional Trust, is not 
included in either of the two feedback loops but does directly influence Luna-Reyes and 
Andersen’s element of Calculative Trust (as discussed below). Three of the elements are found 
in both feedback loops.  
The responses to RQ3, which asked about characteristics of the touchpoints associated 
with effective transfer of knowledge, can be compared to the existing model by Luna-Reyes and 
Anderson (2007). The result is a model specific to interorganizational engagement between 
aircraft engine OEMs and airlines in Africa within the context of maintenance related. The 
elements of the process have been renamed in Figure 5.3 to underscore that they are specific to 
the engagement of the aircraft engine OEM and the airline. In order to help present the data in 
contact of the model, the elements have been numbered 1 to 9, and feedback specific to each 
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element is discussed below. It should be noted that as this is an iterative process there is no 
defined starting or engine point in the process.  
  
Figure 5.3. Process of airline-engine OEM engagement. Adapted from “Towards a Theory of 
Interorganizational Collaboration: Generic Structures Of Cross-Boundary Requirements 
Analysis” by L. Luna-Reyes & D. Andersen, 2007, from Proceedings of the International 
Conference of the System Dynamics Society. Copyright 2007 by Luis Luna-Reyes & David 
Andersen. Adapted with permission. 
 
Element #1: Establishing institutional trust. Feedback from the interview participants 
confirmed that airlines are keenly aware of the entitlements contained within the various 
contracts they have with a specific aircraft engine OEM. When faced with a pending service 
bulletin to adopt or support needed to ensure maintenance and inspection procedures are properly 
being performed, airline personnel often revert to the contractual entitlements as a starting point 
for discussions with the aircraft engine OEM. According to Luna-Reyes and Anderson (2007) 
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this element of engagement is based solely on the language in the contracts various contracts and 
there is no other influence on this element. However, this element of engagement does directly 
affect the element of engagement called calculative trust.  
Element #2: Calculative trust. Calculative trust is directly influenced by the outcome of 
reviewing the various contracts that the OEM has with the airline within the context of the 
applicable regulations the OEM and airline must adhere to. Calculative trust is solely based on an 
economic analysis of the challenge and solution options. In the case of service bulletin adoption, 
which is simply a recommendation from the aircraft engine OEM, interview feedback indicated 
that airlines often perform a cost-benefit analysis regarding the decision to adopt a service 
bulletin.  
Element #3: Airline trust in OEM. Airline trust in the OEM can be seen during the 
assessment phase of the service bulletin assessment. Many of the interview participants indicated 
that often adoption of high priority service bulletins was made solely on the OEM categorization 
of the service bulletin. In this example the OEM recommendation is actioned according to airline 
policy, based the category the OEM assigns.  
In addition to the organization trust that is developed between the airline and the OEM, 
interpersonal trust was also mentioned by interview participants as critical to the open and 
transparent engagement between the two individuals. Additional feedback from the interviews 
highlighted that trust between the aircraft engine OEM and the airlines is influenced by the 
availability and accessibility of the assigned FSR and other support staff. Furthermore, timely 
and accurate follow-up were identified as contributing to the development of trust with the 
airline. When asked what airlines define as trust in the relationship with the aircraft engine OEM, 
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interview participants responses all indicated that it meant feeling that the person supporting 
them cared about the success of the airline and ensuring a positive outcome.  
Part of caring about the airline’s success includes understanding the challenges the airline 
is facing. Interview participants stated that along with availability and accessibility, having the 
FSR have situation awareness of the issues at the airline is a critical element to developing trust. 
The final point highlighted by the interview participants points less to the FSR’s intent, but rather 
concerns their experience and training. In order to develop trust, the FSR needs to possess the 
technical knowledge and experience to provide support. Airlines often look to the assigned FSR 
to provide technical support without the need to consult with the OEM’s engineering team. 
Without the technical expertise the airline will not likely trust the support provided by someone 
they perceive as unqualified.  
Element #4: Airline willingness to engage with the OEM. As the airline develops trust 
in the aircraft engine OEM, they will be more confident to engage with the OEM, particularly 
with regards to sharing data. As discussed in Chapter IV, some interview participants stated that 
airlines and personnel at these airlines may be hesitant to share data out of fear that the OEM 
may use the data against them in future commercial negotiations. As the assigned FSR develops 
trust with the team members working for the airline there will be a greater sense of confidence 
that shared information will not be used against airline employees personally or against the 
OEM.  
Element #5: Airline and the OEM doing work together. As the airline and OEM work 
together, during the process of service bulletin adoption, the OEM and airline identify and assess 
different options regarding the development of capability at the airline, availably of induction 
slots at a repair facility, adjustments to the material allocation schedule based on changes in the 
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airline’s operation, and allowances to extend the deadline of the service bulletin. Feedback from 
the participants was very clear that willingness from the OEM to work with the unique and often 
changing needs of the airline is a significant contributor to the development of trust with the 
airline. The result of the aircraft engine OEM and the airline working together, influences both 
the airline’s knowledge of its need and the airline’s collaboration experience with the OEM. 
Element #6: Airline knowledge of airline’s needs. Interview participants identified that 
during the process of engaging with the OEM and during the process for the adoption of service 
bulletins, the airline identifies its needs in terms of technical support, operational support, and 
commercial support. The technical support needed by the airline can only be defined by the 
airline; the aircraft engine OEM does not define the needed support. Likewise, as the airline 
operations change, the need for deadline extension and adjustment to material allocation evolve, 
and, with this, the needed support changes. This can affect the commercial support needed for 
some service bulletins to make the adoption economical viable and is why commercial support is 
identified as a topic of discussion during three of the four process phases. 
The feedback from the interviews was clear. If maintenance or inspection tasks were 
being performed incorrectly the responsible airline personnel would engage the OEM for 
guidance and best practices on how to perform the task correctly. The purpose of these         
airline-initiated requests was not to analyze why the task was performing incorrectly, or to 
evaluate how the task was being performed incorrectly; rather, it was a request simply for the 
OEM to provide guidance on how to perform the task correctly. The airline personnel, through 
engagement with the OEM, are able to identify the what improvements need to be made to 
ensure maintenance and inspections tasks are properly completed   
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Once the airline understands the technical and operational aspects of what they need, they 
are able to identify the commercial support needs. Improved understanding of their needs then 
feeds into Element #2, which is development of calculative trust.  
Element #7: Airline collaboration experiences with OEM. The outcomes of working 
with the aircraft engine OEM can leave a long-lasting impression. Many of the interview 
participants, in one way or another, discussed the importance of previous experiences on the 
development of trust between the OEM and airline. Participant #08 identified that critical 
elements of a successful engagement include consistency in sharing information. Other 
participants pointed to successful outcomes as being critical to a positive collaboration 
experience. Many respondents reported that positive collaboration experiences with the OEM 
occurred even if the intended outcome was not met. Desire of the OEM to provide the support 
needed by the airline, and making the effort to consider alternative solutions, demonstrated that 
the OEM cares about the airline’s success. Demonstrating that the OEM cares about the success 
of the airline was also identified as a critical element of a positive collaboration experience.  
“Mostly the constant engagement and through that the consistent sharing of information and of 
course both formal and informal. That makes the relationship really awesome, and a good 
enabler to perhaps wanting to reach out to them” (P08). 
Although the interview participants identified critical elements that led to positive 
collaboration experiences with the aircraft engine OEM, the collaboration experience can also be 
negative. Whether positive or negative, the collaboration experience directly influences the 
airline’s perception of the trustworthiness of the aircraft engine OEM.  
Element #8: Airlines perception of OEM trustworthiness. As the OEM and airline 
engage multiple times over the course of weeks, months, and even years, the airline’s perception 
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of the aircraft engine OEM trustworthiness continues to evolve. Previous engagement 
experiences that had a positive outcome increase the perception of OEM trustworthiness while 
negative outcomes reduce the perception of OEM trustworthiness. As the OEM and airline 
continue to engage over time the perception of trustworthiness of the aircraft engine OEM 
becomes more refined. If the airline has a positive perception of OEM trustworthiness, then 
future positive engagements will serve to reinforce the positive perception of the OEM and if 
there were to be a negative experience it would most likely have a very minor impact to the 
airline’s perception of the OEM. 
Opportunity for Leadership and Change  
 In a 2012 report, the African Development Bank Group identified the top challenges 
facing the aviation industry in Africa and specifically point to safety as the most pressing 
challenge facing the aviation industry in Africa (“Africa’s Aviation Industry,” 2012). This report 
went on to note that the average number of aircraft related accidents in Africa was nine times 
higher in 2011 than the global average, while in the same year African airlines accounted for 
nearly a third of all aviation related fatalities; this has led the European Union to banning at least 
108 African airlines (“Departure Delayed,” 2016).   
The accident rate reported by African airlines is about 8 to 11 times higher than the 
global average. It should be noted that most of the accidents are on smaller propeller and 
regional aircraft while the safety performance of larger, international African carriers is the same 
as that of their global counterparts (“Departure Delayed,” 2016). Airlines that have poor safety 
records find it increasingly difficult to operate in countries or regions with strict safety 
regulations. This leads to a reduction, or potentially elimination, of safe air transportation 
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alternatives for populations living in regions with limited air service. Passengers are then 
exposed to increasing unsafe conditions if they fly with these airlines.     
The key to the economic success of Africa is the continent’s airline industry (Button et 
al., 2018). In support of the need for improvements in safety, ICAO released a report (ICAO, 
2015) that identified a number of actions required as part of the effort to improve aviation safety 
in Africa, one of which was “to increase the number of qualified personnel at the industry and 
oversight levels” (p. 12).    
The motive for improving airline safety performance, and hence this study, is to ensure 
safe conditions for the passengers, employees, and communities served by African airlines. This 
study looked specifically at how aircraft engine OEMs engage with African airlines, in the 
context of performing airworthiness directives and service bulletins as well obtaining support to 
ensure maintenance and inspection tasks are performed correctly. Based on the collected data 
and the analysis of these data, recommendations for improving and maintaining effective and 
efficient communication between the OEM and airline are presented. These recommendations 
are summarized in Figure 5.4 and detailed in this section.   
 
Figure 5.4. Recommendations to OEM and airlines leadership. 
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Recommendations for OEM Leadership. These recommendations focus primarily on 
engagement strategies for proactively engaging airlines.  
Awareness of new airlines. Interview participants identified that the primary means by 
which they became aware of issuance of new service bulletins, or changes to existing service 
bulletins, is through automated emails. It is therefore critical that OEMs ensure that distribution 
lists for such notifications are updated frequently. Knowing the proper contacts at an airline 
requires the OEM to proactively reach out to and engage with the airline. It is recommended that 
OEMs maintain acute awareness of airlines’ use—and changes in use—of their product. Only 
then can they ensure that critical information is being communicated to the correct contacts.  
Only then can they ensure that critical information is being communicated to the correct 
contacts.  
Proactive engagement. Interview participants identified a critical element: OEM 
engagement can actually disrupt the routine at the airline. OEM engagement forces airline 
personnel to review technical aspects of the engine that they might otherwise not.Proactive OEM 
engagement, through the use of dedicated support individuals, ensures that OEM-related topics 
maintain a priority for the airline technical teams and have the visibility of airline senior 
leadership.  
Frequent engagement and visits.  For airlines in Africa without dedicated support 
individuals onsite, participants identified frequent use of teleconferencing software (e.g., Skype) 
as a critical element of successful engagement with aircraft engine OEMs. However, internet 
connections in Africa are generally very unreliable, and the daily operational demands of the 
airline often result in the meeting having less priority. It is critical that dedicated staff be 
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allocated sufficient travel budget to support frequent onsite visits. Visits should be of sufficient 
length to allow for meaningful discussions.  
Access to technical information. The interview participants identified lack of access to 
technical data such as manuals, fleet highlights, and technical presentations as a significant 
hinderance to their understanding of technical issues on the OEMs fleet. Access to such technical 
documents may require passwords or even special fees imposed by the OEM to attain this critical 
information. It is recommended that the OEM leadership minimize or eliminate fees to technical 
information and, when possible, allow access to information without the use of a password.   
Qualification of support staff. Airlines see dedicated support individuals, particularly 
field service representatives (FSRs), as the first line of support. They expect the FSR to have a 
degree in a field related to aircraft engines, such as mechanical or aerospace engineering. The 
airline also expects the FSR to have significant experience and technical  understanding of the 
engines as well as understanding how to expediate responses within the OEM organization. The 
FSR needs to understand the unique challenges and priorities of the airline and be able to clearly 
communicate this within the OEM organization to drive solutions unique to the airline. Finally, 
one qualification of an FSR that was mentioned by nearly every participant was that FSR needs 
to demonstrate the desire to support the airline. Individuals in an FSR position directly support 
airline operations. Since airlines’ operations are non-stop it is not uncommon to be called for 
support during off hours, or even when sleeping. The FSR must be ready to provide support no 
matter what time of day they are called. In addition to the education, knowledge, and     
experience-based characteristics mentioned in this section, the OEM should ensure that FSRs 
and support individuals have the right type of personality for supporting an airline.   
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Airline relationship. In Africa, business is done through relationships. The same can be 
said for engaging airlines; it requires a trust-based relationship. This is much different from 
working with airlines in American or European cultures, in which engagement is more 
transactional than relational. This is an important point for aircraft engines OEMs, all of whom 
are either based in the U.S. or Europe, when working with airlines in Africa.  
Recommendations for airline leadership. These recommendations focus primarily on 
how leadership can manage the organization to facilitate effective engagement and 
communication with OEMs.  
Organizational structure. The interview participants identified that having dedicated 
individuals or groups, within the airline organization, dedicated to supporting aircraft engines 
and engaging aircraft engine OEMs had significant benefit to improving operational performance 
of the aircraft engines. Airline leadership should identify a product focal for each type of engine 
operated by the airline. This focal product would serve as the primary point of contact for the 
OEM.  
 Individual goals and objectives. In a similar manner, engagement with the OEM has 
shown to be a critically important to acquiring needed information on technical aspects of the 
aircraft engine. Airline leadership should formally recognize OEM engagement as part of an 
individual’s professional role with the airline.  
Formalize OEM recommendations. The interview participants identified that one of the 
biggest challenges of adopting technical recommendations from OEM, such as best practices, is 
that adoption of recommendations is not formally recognized as part of an individual’s role or 
part of the documented task. Participants identified the performing recommendation, such as best 
practices, may increase the time needed to perform a specific task. The maintenance planning 
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team will schedule maintenance and ground time based on the time required to perform the task. 
The technician, in turn, will be under pressure to perform the task in the allotted time. If the 
OEM recommendations increase the time needed to perform the task that it is likely the 
recommendations will not be actioned. To avoid such scenarios, it is recommended that airline 
leadership provide formal support, including updating the task time, to ensure OEM 
recommendations are actioned.  
Open communication and data sharing. Participant responses demonstrated that data 
sharing between the OEM and airline is critical to understand if the correct maintenance and 
inspection tasks are being performed as well as confirming they are being performed correctly. It 
is recommended the airline leadership empower their teams to share technical data with the 
respective OEM. The airline leadership should minimize internal barriers for sharing data.  
OEM support accountability. OEM support is critical support required to manage the 
technical program and safety performance related to the specific OEM engine. Airline leadership 
are recommended hold the OEM leadership accountable for providing the needed support. This 
can be completed by clearly communicating support expectations. Airline leadership, when 
possible, are recommended to ensure adequate support is included as contractual entitlement 
during negotiations. Another area the airline needs to hold to OEM accountable for support is 
with regards to providing timely feedback on any data provided.  
Employee retention. The final recommendation for airline leadership is to minimize 
employee turnover in critical roles that require engaging with the OEM. Providing stability in 
these positions ensures that the relationship between the OEM and airline can grow over time. If 
the individual in a position that engages with the OEM changes too frequently that the process 
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for developing trust will restart as a result. Likewise, reducing employee turnover in these critical 
positions helps ensure retention of accumulated knowledge in these key positions.  
Recommendations for Further Study 
As pointed out in Chapter II, despite the abundance of literature on interorganizational 
engagement there are limited studies within the context of the aviation industry. Among the very 
few studies conducted in the aviation industry, none of them were found to focus on the 
engagement of OEM with the airlines, let alone in the specific context of maintenance 
operations. As such, this study was exploratory in nature and allows for follow-up in multiple 
areas.  
 This study investigated the engagement between aircraft engine OEMs and airlines in 
Africa in two specific contexts. Those two contexts being during the completion of service 
bulletins and airworthiness directive and during the informal process of airline personnel 
identifying, obtaining, and disseminating best practice information from the OEM. One of the 
limitations of this study is that only professionals working in technical roles were considered. 
Furthermore, care was taken to ensure that those aviation professions were also working in 
similar roles even though their titles may not be similar.  
The organizational structure of airlines can vary significantly among airlines. As this 
study focused on the experiences of 14 aviation professionals, it is quite possible that despite 
their individual experiences there were some aspects of the engagement that were not reported if 
they are not directly involved. Recommended future work would be to perform exhaustive 
interviews with all airline employees and leadership that have experience engaging with aircraft 
engine OEMs. Similar interviews can be performed within the aircraft engine OEM. The results 
from all interviews could be analyzed together to build a communication and engagement map. 
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Since the organization structure and technical expertise can greatly vary between airlines, it 
would be recommended to select a few airlines based on key criteria, such as size and airline 
type. Comparing the communication maps, the knowledge shared, and communication type, 
technology used, and other facilitating factors.  
This study focused on two engagement contexts in which the airline and OEM have a 
shared goal of reducing exposure conditions that can result in accidents or incidents. This is 
achieved through adoption of service bulletin adoption, compliance with airworthiness 
directives, correct execution of maintenance tasks, and accurate assessment of inspection data. 
Both the airline and OEM are driving for the same outcome. The engagement of an aircraft 
engine OEM and airline during the adoption of service bulletins most reflects the characteristic 
of a collaborative engagement in Figure 2.2. The engagement starts to look more like a 
compliant engagement in the case a regulatory body creates an airworthiness directive based on 
the service bulletin. During sales and commercial negotiations, the engagements takes on the 
characteristics of contestation, as described in Chapter II and illustrated in Figure 2.2. Since the 
type of engagement fundamentally changes, future studies could also investigate and map out 
communication between the airline and OEM in the context of different types of engagements. 
An assumption made during this study was that the aviation professionals interviewed 
were experts in knowing the critical needs of the airline and what elements of engagement with 
the aircraft engine OEM were successful in meeting these needs. A final recommendation for 
further research is to validate this assumption. After mapping the communication between the 
airline and the aircraft engine OEM, it is recommended to compare the accident and incident rate 
of those airlines to the characteristics of OEM engagement. It is critical that only the accident 
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and incident rate related to products the specific aircraft engine OEM supplied and supports, are 
considered.  
Review of Researcher Position 
 I have four years of experience working for a major aircraft engine OEM supporting 
airlines in Africa as a field service representative. During this time, I have supported numerous 
airlines across the region. I have also had a strong interest in the business development in Africa 
since before I moved to the Africa region. In fact, it is my interest and desire to lead business 
development efforts in Africa that attracted me to the role.  
 While working as a field service representative, one of the airline employees I worked 
with stated that the support I provided was better than any other OEM. Based on this humbling 
feedback, I asked myself two questions. The first was, “What do I do that makes my support 
better?” The second question I asked was, “Does this better support make any difference.” The 
second question was asked in the context of making air transportation safer for passengers in 
Africa as well as in the context of business development in Africa.  
 My experience and passion for working with airlines in Africa, desire to lead business 
development in Africa, and the need to win a victory for humanity, have provided the motivation 
for me while working on this dissertation. All of the interview participants during this study were 
aviation professionals I had engaged with in my professional role working for an aircraft engine 
OEM. Many of the examples the participants referenced were from experiences working with 
me. The benefit of using examples that I was part of meant that I was clear on the details of the 
event and I was able to focus on the experience of the participant in the engagement. Given that I 
was interviewing people I had a history of working with, I projected that they would bring up 
examples that included me. To avoid a situation in which the participant felt uncomfortable to 
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say something critical about my support to me, I gently reminded the participants that this 
interview was separate from our professional relationship and that criticism of the support I 
provided is encouraged if that is how they truly felt.  
Concluding Statement 
 This study focused on the lived experiences of aviation professionals that work for 
airlines in Africa and engage with aircraft engine OEMs are part of their day-to-day job 
requirements. The feedback of the interview participants confirmed the importance of the 
engagement of the field service representative in terms of developing trust, facilitating 
communication, and developing creative solutions to drive positive outcomes. Through the 
engagement of the field service representative, the OEM can help reduce the airline’s exposure 
to conditions that can cause accidents and incidents. This is not only a benefit for the airline’s 
passengers, but improved safety has been identified by many consultancy groups as an area 
critical for the growth of the airline industry in Africa. The growth of the airline industry in 
Africa is also a critical element leading to the greater economic growth across the continent of 
Africa. 
 The leaders of aircraft engine OEMs are faced with an immense challenge on how to 
allocate field service representatives to support airlines across the world. As the OEM produces 
and sells more engines, they are faced with pressures on how to support more airlines and more 
engines without a proportional increase in headcount. Given this pressure, it may be tempting for 
leadership of OEM organizations to see roles such as the field service representative, and other 
customer support roles, simply as a cost. To minimize cost increase associated with hiring 
additional headcount, they may consider strategies that include transitioning some airlines from 
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personal support to support based at a central location or even pursue self-help strategies that see 
the OEM less engaged with the airlines.  
The findings from this study are clear. Effective support of airlines in Africa is contingent 
on the ability of an assigned field service representative, or other assigned support personnel, to 
develop and foster a relationship based on trust. In this context, trust is developed through 
proactive engagement, timely responses, and demonstrating that the OEM cares about the 
success of the airline.  Trust is a vital element of the engagement between aircraft engine OEMs 
and airlines in Africa and facilitates the sharing of information.  
Feedback from the interviews highlighted that fully reciprocal communication and 
sharing of tacit knowledge is required during the adoption of service bulletins, compliance with 
airworthiness directives, and proper execution of maintenance and inspection tasks. This type of 
communication and knowledge transfer is not suited for engagement through a website.  
Effective support of airlines in the context of maintenance operations can result in 
improved safety performance of the airlines. Improved safety performance has a direct benefit on 
the passengers that patronize the airline by ensuring safe options for air transportation services. 
Improved safety performance of the airline can also lead to reduced costs and opportunity to 
grow their business by expanding into additional markets. Expansion into additional markets 
result in new opportunities for local business owners to expand their business, for local 
merchants can access new customers, and individuals to travel to new destinations. This 
increased demand for air transport service will drive an increase in demand for aircraft and 
aircraft engines.  
The concept of social justice addresses the economic inequality and access to wealth 
(Banai, Ronzoni, & Schemmel, 2011). Better-connected African countries and cities are a key 
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factor to increasing economic prosperity in Africa (“Africa’s Aviation Industry,” 2012). Due to 
the size of the African continent the most feasible option for increasing connectivity of African 
countries and cities is through passenger and cargo airline service. The ability of the airline to 
sustain growth is by ensuring the safety of performance remains a priority. Engagement with 
OEMs, and the assigned field service representative, are a critical to ensuring that important 
modifications are completed on schedule and maintenance and inspection tasks are done 
properly.         
The position of the field service representative should be viewed not as a cost, but an 
opportunity to ensure safe air transport service and grow the airline industry in a very 
challenging region. Based on the findings of this research study, it is imperative that support 
teams, which include a field service representative, be assigned to airlines in Africa at a 
minimum to ensure service bulletins are adopted, airworthiness directives are complied, and 
maintenance and inspection tasks are performed correctly. The OEM support team, including the 
assigned field service representative, should be viewed as position used for supporting safe 
growth of the airline and potentially safe growth of the industry in the Africa region, which in 
turn, results in increased opportunity for future business with the airline.  
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important. The proposed study looks beyond having qualified personnel at industry and 
oversight levels and instead investigates the critical characteristics of their engagement. 
The purpose of this research is to develop an understanding of how OEM’s can improve 
engagement with airlines in Africa to reduce conditions that can lead to accidents or 
incidents. 
 
12. Describe the proposed participants- age, number, sex, race, or other special 
characteristics. Describe criteria for inclusion and exclusion of participants. Please 
provide brief justification for these criteria. (Up to 500 words) 
 
Age, gender, race, and special characteristics are not considerations in the selection of 
participant. Participants will be identified solely on their role within an airline in Africa. 
Participants will be selected from senior leadership, middle management, and execution 
roles within organizations that directly engage with OEMs. Examples of senior level 
roles would be Chief Operating Officer or Vice President. Examples of middle 
management roles would be Director or Manager. Examples of execution roles would be 
anyone without a direct report. Examples of an organization that engages with the OEM 
would be maintenance organizations or engineering organizations.  
 
Individuals that are not currently working for airlines based in Africa will be excluded 
from participating, even if they have worked for an African airline in the past. These 
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individuals will be excluded as their more recent experience could bias their responses.  
In addition, individuals currently working for an airline in Africa, but working in an 
organization that does not engage with an OEM will be excluded. An example of such an 
organization would be Marketing or Employee Affairs.   
 
13. Describe how the participants are to be selected and recruited. (Up to 500 words) 
 
Potential participants would come from three pools. The first pool would be my first-
degree network. My first-degree network is made up of aviation professionals working 
for airlines in Africa that I know directly. I would reach out to these individuals directly. 
The second pool of participants would come from my second-degree network. This 
network is made up of the direct contacts of those within my first-degree network. 
 
The physical location of my current professional role is based with Ethiopian Airlines in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ethiopian Airlines provide maintenance and repair services for 
many of the smaller airlines in Africa, and those airlines send representatives to Ethiopian 
Airlines while their aircraft or engine is being repaired. Those airlines representatives 
would also be included as potential participants would be used to identify other potential 
participants within their airlines. This would be the third pool of participants.    
 
Potential participants would be contacted via email (Ref. Appendix A). The email will 
contain a background and purpose of the study. The email will explain why the recipient 
has been identified as a potential participant to participate in an interview and the 
interview will focus on understanding the needs of the airline related to the OEM.  A 
copy of the informed consent letter will be included in the email as PDF attachment (Ref. 
Appendix C-D). All emails will be sent from my Antioch University email address. 
 
14. Do you have a prior or current relationship, either personal, professional, and/or  
financial, with any person, organization, business, or entity who will be involved in your 
research?  
 
Yes 
 
       14a. If yes, describe the situation that presents a potential personal, professional, and/or  
financial conflict of interest in the proposed research study, (e.g., if you are or have been 
employed at the research site, have received compensation from a participating 
organization have a personal or professional relationship with any participants). 
 
I have an existing professional relationship with many of the potential participants. The 
type of information that will be discussed during the interview would be very similar to 
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information discussed in a professional setting. The intent of the interview is to collect 
only the participants’ professional opinions regarding their interactions with engine 
OEMs. They are not being asked to reveal confidential information about the airlines they 
work for or personal opinions about management strategies. 
 
In my professional role I have been tasked with leading an effort to hire an engineer 
within the Africa region. To avoid potential conflict of interest I did not contact any 
candidates to participate as interview participants before or during the hiring process. I 
also took intentional measure to minimize my own influence on the hiring decision by 
including five additional individuals in the first round of interviews and two more 
individuals for the final round of interviews. Getting multiple inputs ensured that no one 
person was able to have overwhelming influence. I also designed the hiring process to 
include a set of checks to compare opinions of candidates without being influences by 
previous interviews.  
 
The individual that was offered and accepted the role was also someone I wanted to 
interview for this research study. Since I have a working relationship with him, I 
intentionally did not attend any of his interviews to preserve the working relationship and 
avoid the appearance of conflict of interest in the hiring process. After providing detail on 
the interview process, and specifically detailing how I took measure to minimize my own 
influence on the hiring decision, the Antioch University IRB Chair approved this person 
for inclusion as an interview participant in this research study 
 
14b. Describe how you will mitigate the bias caused by any conflicts of interest in your 
study and how you will protect the participants against real or potential bias (e.g., you 
will not recruit anyone who works directly for you or in your direct team, results will be 
reported in the aggregate so that participants will remain anonymous, any compensation 
received is independent of the study and its results). 
 
The study focuses on the relationship between OEMs and airlines and as I, the 
interviewer, work for a large OEM there is a concern the participants could develop an 
expectation that their responses will be provided as direct feedback to the leadership of 
the company I work for. To properly set expectations, I will clearly communicate that the 
research is being perform independent of my employer and they will not see any 
feedback. I will also limit all email communication regarding the interview, and other 
aspects of the study, to my Antioch University email address. 
 
15. Describe the process you will follow to attain informed consent. 
 
Informed consent form will be provided as a PDF file attached to the recruitment email. I 
have consent forms tailored for face-to-face, video conference, and tele-conference 
interviews. I will attach the consent for that is relevant to the type of interview that will 
most likely be used.  
I will review the informed consent form at the beginning of every interview to ensure the 
participant fully understand. After verbally reviewing the content of the document I will 
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ask them for verbal confirmation. Please note a sign consent for is required to schedule an 
interview.   
 
For interviews that take place using a teleconference of video conference I will ask the 
participant to review the informed consent form and return a signed copy before the 
interview. Before the interview I will verbally review the informed consent agreement. 
The participant would verbally indicate their willingness to continue with the interview.  
 
16. Describe the proposed procedures, (e.g., interview surveys, questionnaires, experiments, 
etc.) in the project. Any proposed experimental activities that are included in evaluation, 
research, development, demonstration, instruction, study, treatments, debriefing, 
questionnaires, and similar projects must be described. USE SIMPLE LANGUAGE, 
AVOID JARGON, AND IDENTIFY ACRONYMS. Please do not insert a copy of your 
methodology section from your proposal. State briefly and concisely the procedures for 
the project. (500 words) 
 
A semi-structured interview will be used as the format for the interview. The questions 
and protocol for the interview can be found in Appendix B. Due to unreliability of 
telecommunication services across the continent of Africa in-person interviews will be 
preferred. However, this may be challenging given the geographic location of the 
interviewer and the participants. Therefore, tele-conferencing or video-conferencing may 
be used if in-person interviews are not possible. 
 
17. Participants in research may be exposed to the possibility of harm physiological, 
psychological, and/or social please provide the following information: (Up to 500 words) 
a. Identify and describe potential risks of harm to participants (including physical, 
emotional, financial, or social harm). NOTE: for international research or vulnerable 
populations, please provide information about local culture that will assist the review 
committee in evaluating potential risks to participants, particularly when the project 
raises issues related to power differentials. For international research provide information 
about the regulatory environment (for reference see the International Compilation of 
Human Research Standards https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/international/compilation-human-
research-standards/index.html). 
 
The type of information that will be discussed during the interview would be very similar 
to information discussed in context of their professional engagements. The risk of any 
type of harm to the participants is minimal to none. 
 
b. The type of information that will be discussed during the interview would be very 
similar to information discussed in context of their professional engagements. The risk of 
any type of harm to the participants is minimal to none. 
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The benefits of the research include improved OEM support and improved safety 
performance. This would benefit both the airline and the OEM financially and with 
respect to their brand reputation. It also ensures improved safety conditions for air 
transport passengers in Africa 
 
c.  The content of the interview will focus on the professional opinions of airline 
professionals and would be similar to discussions they would have during the course of 
their normal work day. For this reason, there is very little to no risk for participants. The 
benefit of taking part in this study is improved understand on effective OEM engagement 
with airlines, which can lead to improved safety performance, reduced cost associated 
with accidents and incidents, and improved safety conditions for passenger. The benefit is 
improved safety for passengers and there is very little to no risk for the participants. I 
strongly believe the benefits outweigh any risks. 
 
d. Explain fully how the rights and welfare of participants at risk will be protected (e.g., 
screening out particularly vulnerable participants, follow-up contact with participants, list 
of referrals, etc.) and what provisions will be made for the case of an adverse incident 
occurring during the study. 
 
To ensure the rights and welfare of participants are protected I will not include the 
participants names nor the name of the airline the participant is employed by. I will 
include the position of the participant and key characteristics of the airline in the data 
collection. However, as stated previously, the content of the interview will focus on the 
professional opinions of airline professionals and will be similar to discussions they 
would have during the course of their normal work day. In addition, I will also contact 
the senior leadership at the airlines to obtain their consent for to approach individuals 
working within their airline. 
The interview will be conducted in an office setting or using tele-conferencing or video 
conferencing technology. Neither the environment nor the interview is expected to result 
in any adverse medical conditions. An adverse event is extremely unlikely to occur, but if 
an event were to occur, I will use the form for reporting Unanticipated Problems 
Involving Risk to Participants and Others 
 
18. Explain how participants' privacy is addressed by your proposed research. Specify any 
steps taken to safeguard the anonymity of participants and/or confidentiality of their 
responses. Indicate what personal identifying information will be kept, and procedures 
for storage and ultimate disposal of personal information. Describe how you will de-
identify the data or attach the signed confidentiality agreement on the attachments tab 
(scan, if necessary). (Up to 500 words) 
To ensure the rights and welfare of participants is protected I will not include the 
participants names nor the name of the airline the participant is employed by. I will 
include the position of the participant and key characteristics of the airline in the data 
collection. 
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19. Will audio-visual devices be used for recording participants? Will electrical, mechanical 
(e.g., biofeedback, electroencephalogram, etc.) devices be used? (Click one) 
Yes 
 
If YES, describe the devices and how they will be used: 
 
Yes, I will use a device, such as an iPhone or tablet, to record the interviews. The audio 
files will be stored in an online Box folder. A commercially available transcription 
service will be used to transfer the audio file to a text tile. 
 
20. Type of Review Requested 
 
Expeditated 
 
Please provide your reasons/justification for the level of review you are requesting. 
 
The content of the interview will focus on the professional opinions of airline 
professionals and would be similar to discussions they would have during their normal 
work day. Permission to approach employees from any airline will be approved by airline 
senior leadership. Interviews will take place in an office setting (if in person) or by 
teleconference or video-conference. These safeguards ensure the participants is not 
exposed to any risks, mental psychological distress, or physical requirements beyond 
what would be experienced during their normal work day.  
The interview does not include psychological intervention, physiological intervention, or 
deception. Employees of the airline would need to have post high school education, and 
this would ensure that no minors are included in interview population. Participants by 
subjects will not place them at risk for criminal or civil liability. Furthermore, 
participating in the interview will not damage subjects’ financial standing, employability, 
insurability, reputation, or cause them to be stigmatizing 
 
21. Please attach any recruitment flyers, letters, recruitment scripts, or other materials used to 
recruit participants. Attach informed consent, assent, and/or permission forms. If a 
consent form is not used, or if consent is to be presented orally, state your reason for this 
modification below. In cases when oral consent will be used, include the text to be used 
for the oral consent. *Oral consent is not allowed when participants are under age 18. 
 
See Recruitment Email in Appendix B 
See Dissertation Interview Consent Forms in Appendix C 
 
22. If questionnaires, tests, or related research instruments are to be used, then you must 
attach a copy of the instrument at the bottom of this form (unless the instrument is 
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copyrighted material) or submit a detailed description (with examples of items) of the 
research instruments, questionnaires, or tests that are to be used in the project. Copies 
will be retained in the permanent IRB files. If you intend to use a copyrighted instrument, 
please consult with your research advisor and your IRB chair. Please clearly name and 
identify all attached documents when you add them on the attachments tab 
 
See Dissertation Interview Protocol in Appendix D 
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Appendix B: Recruitment Email 
 
Hello: 
 
I hope this email finds you well. I am a candidate in the PhD in Leadership and Change 
program at Antioch University. As part of this program, I am performing research to better 
understand the critical elements of successful engine OEM engagement with airlines in Africa, 
specifically in the context of AD & SB compliance as well as sharing of best practices for both 
maintenance and inspection tasks. 
 
I am reaching out to invite you to take part in an interview. You were selected to take part 
in this study based on the fact you work for an airline in Africa, specifically within a 
maintenance organization. Also, due to the responsibilities of your position, you interact with 
engine OEMs on a regular basis. I am interested in understanding your experiences interacting 
with engine OEMs. 
 
The interview will take place over the phone and will take between 30-60 minutes. I 
would like to focus on your experiences working with engine OEMs with regards to SB adoption 
and AD compliance as well as knowledge transfer of best practices related to maintenance and 
inspections tasks. I am interested in understanding how engine OEMs can improve engagement 
with airlines in Africa. I look forward to learning from your experience of what works and what 
does not work. 
 
If you choose to take part in the interview, please do revert and we will set up a time to 
have the interview via phone call. I will also send a consent form for your review and signature.   
Thank you for your time. I truly hope you chose to take part. If you know anyone else who may 
be interested as well, please feel free to forward this invitation or provide me with their contact 
information. 
 
You will find attached an interview consent form. Please complete the form, sign it, and 
return a scanned copy to me. 
Please let me know a specific date and time so I can schedule the phone interview. 
 
Thank you 
 
Best regards, 
 
Nate Woods 
Leadership and Change Program, PhD Candidate 
Antioch University 
  
M +251 935 987 013 | M +1 513 240 8741 
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Appendix C: Dissertation Interview Consent Forms 
Consent Form (In-Person Interview) 
 
You are being asked to take part in a research study aimed as understanding how OEM 
engagement with airlines in Africa reduces exposure to condition that can lead to accidents and 
incidents. The interview will focus on effective elements of the OEM support during compliance 
with airworthiness directives, embodiment of service bulletins, sharing of best practices for 
inspection tasks, and sharing of best practices for maintenance tasks. You are specifically 
selected as you work for an airline in Africa and work in a role that requires engagement with an 
engine OEM. Please read the form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing 
to take part in this study.  
 
What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to better understand how engine OEMs 
effectively engage with airlines in Africa to facilitate compliance with airworthiness directives, 
embodiment of service bulletins, sharing of best practices for inspection tasks, and sharing of 
best practices for maintenance tasks. Proper and timely completion of these tasks can directly 
affect exposure to conditions that can lead to accidents or incident.  
 
What is asked from you: If you agree to take part in this survey, I will conduct an interview 
with you in-person. The interview will include questions about experience with OEM support in 
the context of compliance with airworthiness directives, embodiment of service bulletins, sharing 
of best practices for inspection tasks, and sharing of best practices for maintenance tasks. During 
the interview you are encouraged to drive the discussion and discuss areas that you think are 
important elements of OEM engagement. The interview will be scheduled for 60 minutes but can 
go shorter or longer as needed. The interview location will be in an office setting, in a reserved 
conference room or office.  
 
Risks and benefits: I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than 
those encountered in normal day-to-day life. There are not immediate benefits to you as a 
participant. Working for an airline is a very demanding job and I hope to learn how OEMs 
engagement can better support you.  
 
Compensation: There is no compensation for taking part in this study.  
 
Your answers will be confidential. All records of the interview, including interviewer notes, 
audio records, transcriptions of audio records, as well as this consent form will be kept private. 
Any report out made public, including the dissertation publication, will not include any 
information that identifies you. Physical research records, such as written notes, will be stored in 
a locked file. Digital research files, such as the audio recording, will be stored in a password 
control file on my computer. I am the only one that will have access to the records. After the 
audio file has been transcribe, it will be permanently deleted. I expect the audio file to be 
transcribed within three months of the interview. 
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Participation in voluntary. Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any 
question that you do not want to answer. You may elect not to participate. If you decide to take 
part, you are free to withdraw at any time.  
 
 
 
If you have questions: The researcher conducting this experiment is Nathan Woods. Please ask 
any question you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Nate at +251 935 987 
013 or nwoods@antioch.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, 
you may contact Lisa Kreeger at lkreeger@antioch.edu 
 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.   
 
Statement of consent. I have read the above information and have received answers to all 
questions I asked. I consent to participate in the study. 
 
Your signature _________________________________Date ____________________________ 
 
Your name (printed) _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recording the interview: With your permission, I would like to create an audio recording of the 
interview. As this is an in-person interview I will record the interview using my iPhone. The 
purpose of the audio recording is to make a written transcript of the interview using 
commercially available transcription software. Once the transcript has been created and checked 
for accuracy the audio file will be deleted. No identifying information will be included in the 
written transcript. This file will be used for reference and analysis. The digital file will be stored 
in an access-controlled folder. Please acknowledge your approval for the interview to be 
recorded by signing the second statement of consent at on the next page.   
 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.   
 
Statement of consent. I have read the above information and have received answers to all 
questions I asked. I agree to an audio recording of the interview.  
 
Your signature _____________________________________ Date ______________________ 
 
Your name (printed) ___________________________________________________________ 
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Consent Form (Phone Interview) 
 
You are being asked to take part in a research study aimed as understanding how OEM 
engagement with airlines in Africa reduces exposure to condition that can lead to accidents and 
incidents. The interview will focus on effective elements of the OEM support during compliance 
with airworthiness directives, embodiment of service bulletins, sharing of best practices for 
inspection tasks, and sharing of best practices for maintenance tasks. You are specifically 
selected as you work for an airline in Africa and work in a role that requires engagement with an 
engine OEM. Please read the form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing 
to take part in this study.  
 
What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to better understand how engine OEMs 
effectively engage with airlines in Africa to facilitate compliance with airworthiness directives, 
embodiment of service bulletins, sharing of best practices for inspection tasks, and sharing of 
best practices for maintenance tasks. Proper and timely completion of these tasks can directly 
affect exposure to conditions that can lead to accidents or incident.  
 
What is asked from you: If you agree to take part in this survey, I will conduct an interview 
with you over the phone. I will call you at a mutually agreed upon time at your preferred phone 
number. The interview will include questions about experience with OEM support in the context 
of compliance with airworthiness directives, embodiment of service bulletins, sharing of best 
practices for inspection tasks, and sharing of best practices for maintenance tasks. During the 
interview you are encouraged to drive the discussion and discuss areas that you think are 
essential elements of OEM engagement. The interview will be scheduled for 60 minutes but can 
go shorter or longer as needed. The interview location will be in an office setting, in a reserved 
conference room or office.  
 
Risks and benefits: I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than 
those encountered in normal day-to-day life. There are not immediate benefits to you as a 
participant. Working for an airline is a very demanding job and I hope to learn how OEMs 
engagement can better support you.  
 
Compensation: There is no compensation for taking part in this study.  
 
Your answers will be confidential. All records of the interview, including interviewer notes, 
audio records, transcriptions of audio records, as well as this consent form will be kept private. 
Any report out made public, including the dissertation publication, will not include any 
information that identifies you. Physical research records, such as written notes, will be stored in 
a locked file. Digital research files, such as the audio recording, will be stored in a password 
control file on my computer. I am the only one that will have access to the records. After the 
audio file has been transcribe, it will be permanently deleted. I expect the audio file to be 
transcribed within three months of the interview. 
 
Participation in voluntary. Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any 
question that you do not want to answer. You may elect not to participate. If you decide to take 
part, you are free to withdraw at any time.  
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If you have questions: The researcher conducting this experiment is Nathan Woods. Please ask 
any question you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Nate at +251 935 987 
013 or nwoods@antioch.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, 
you may contact Lisa Kreeger at lkeeger@antioch.edu 
 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of consent. I have read the above information and have received answers to all 
questions I asked. I consent to participate in the study. 
 
Your signature _________________________________Date ____________________________ 
 
Your name (printed) _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recording the interview: With your permission, I would like to create an audio recording of the 
interview. As this is a phone interview, I will record the interview using my iPhone. The purpose 
of the audio recording is to make a written transcript of the interview using commercially 
available transcription software. Once the transcript has been created and checked for accuracy 
the audio file will be deleted. No identifying information will be included in the written 
transcript. This file will be used for reference and analysis. The digital file will be stored in an 
access-controlled folder. Please acknowledge your approval for the interview to be recorded by 
signing the second statement of consent at on the next page.   
 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of consent. I have read the above information and have received answers to all 
questions I asked. I agree to an audio recording of the interview.  
 
Your signature _____________________________________ Date ______________________ 
 
Your name (printed) ___________________________________________________________ 
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Consent Form (Zoom Interview) 
 
You are being asked to take part in a research study aimed as understanding how OEM 
engagement with airlines in Africa reduces exposure to condition that can lead to accidents and 
incidents. The interview will focus on effective elements of the OEM support during compliance 
with airworthiness directives, embodiment of service bulletins, sharing of best practices for 
inspection tasks, and sharing of best practices for maintenance tasks. You are specifically 
selected as you work for an airline in Africa and work in a role that requires engagement with an 
engine OEM. Please read the form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing 
to take part in this study.  
 
What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to better understand how engine OEMs 
effectively engage with airlines in Africa to facilitate compliance with airworthiness directives, 
embodiment of service bulletins, sharing of best practices for inspection tasks, and sharing of 
best practices for maintenance tasks. Proper and timely completion of these tasks can directly 
affect exposure to conditions that can lead to accidents or incident.  
 
What is asked from you: If you agree to take part in this survey, I will conduct an interview 
with you using a video conferencing service called Zoom. There is no charge to use this software 
and requires you only to follow a secured link. We will schedule the interview for a mutually 
agreed upon time. The interview will include questions about experience with OEM support in 
the context of compliance with airworthiness directives, embodiment of service bulletins, sharing 
of best practices for inspection tasks, and sharing of best practices for maintenance tasks. During 
the interview you are encouraged to drive the discussion and discuss areas that you think are 
essential elements of OEM engagement. The interview will be scheduled for 60 minutes but can 
go shorter or longer as needed. The interview location will be in an office setting, in a reserved 
conference room or office.  
 
Risks and benefits: I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than 
those encountered in normal day-to-day life. There are not immediate benefits to you as a 
participant. Working for an airline is a very demanding job and I hope to learn how OEMs 
engagement can better support you.  
 
Compensation: There is no compensation for taking part in this study.  
 
Your answers will be confidential. All records of the interview, including interviewer notes, 
audio records, transcriptions of audio records, as well as this consent form will be kept private. 
Please note that while the audio of the interview of the interview will be recorded, there will be 
no video recording or recording of images from the interview. Any report out made public, 
including the dissertation publication, will not include any information that identifies you. 
Physical research records, such as written notes, will be stored in a locked file. Digital research 
files, such as the audio recording, will be stored in a password control file on my computer. I am 
the only one that will have access to the records. After the audio file has been transcribe, it will 
be permanently deleted. I expect the audio file to be transcribed within three months of the 
interview. 
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Participation in voluntary. Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any 
question that you do not want to answer. You may elect not to participate. If you decide to take 
part, you are free to withdraw at any time.  
 
 
 
If you have questions: The researcher conducting this experiment is Nathan Woods. Please ask 
any question you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact 251 935 987 013 or 
nwoods@antioch.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may 
contact Lisa Kreeger at lkeeger@antioch.edu 
 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of consent. I have read the above information and have received answers to all 
questions I asked. I consent to participate in the study. 
 
Your signature _________________________________Date ____________________________ 
 
Your name (printed) _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recording the interview: With your permission, I would like to create an audio recording of the 
interview. As this is a video conference interview, I will record the interview using the Zoom 
conference software. The purpose of the audio recording is to make a written transcript of the 
interview using commercially available transcription software. Once the transcript has been 
created and checked for accuracy the audio file will be deleted. Please note that video of the 
interview will not be recorded, nor will any still images be captured. No identifying information 
will be included in the written transcript. This file will be used for reference and analysis. The 
digital file will be stored in an access-controlled folder. Please acknowledge your approval for 
the interview to be recorded by signing the second statement of consent at on the next page.  
 
You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of consent. I have read the above information and have received answers to all 
questions I asked. I agree to an audio recording of the interview.  
 
Your signature _____________________________________ Date ______________________ 
 
Your name (printed) ___________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix D: Interview Protocol 
The following protocol will be used during interview. Please note that interviews will not 
be scheduled until a signed consent form is provided. The consent form will include permission 
to audio record the interview. 
 
At the beginning of the interview I will re-state that the purpose of this research is to 
better understand the critical elements of successful OEM-airline engagement in the context of 
AD & SB compliance as well as sharing of best practices for both maintenance and inspection 
tasks. I will reiterate why the interviewee was selected. Then I will explain that the interview is a 
semi-structured interview and that the interviewee is encouraged to discuss anything they feel is 
important. There is no right or wrong answer. I will start the interview by asking the pre-
determined interview questions below. 
 
Opening interview questions and probing / deepening questions 
 
Q1: Describe your experience with engine OEM engagement in compliance of airworthiness 
directives.  
 
Q2: Describe your experience with engine OEM engagement in embodiment of service bulletins. 
 
Q3: Describe your experience with engine OEM engagement with the adoption of best practices 
related to inspection tasks 
 
Q4: Describe your experience with engine OEM engagement with the adoption of best practices 
related to maintenance tasks.  
 
Follow-up questions will be used to probe for the following purposes: 
 
o Engage deeper discussion and exploration of a participant’s response 
o Return a previous response or topic (for further exploration of the topic) 
o Ask the participant to discuss the connection or relationship between two topics or 
responses previously discussed. 
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Appendix E: Sample Service Bulletin 
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Appendix F: Permissions to Use Copyrighted Material 
Figure 2.3 
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Figure 2.4 
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For Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 5.3.          
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Best  
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Regards, 
Nate Woods 
 
Leadership and Change Program, PhD Candidate 
Antioch University 
M +251 935 987 013 | M +1 513 240 8741 
 
Figure as adapted in Chapter 5: 
 
 
 
 
